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Abstract. We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent determin-
istic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called
the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a two-player turn-
based game which turns Nash equilibria into winning strategies (for some objective that
depends on the preference relations of the players in the original game). We use that
transformation to design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which
in most cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference relations.
This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player has a single ω-regular
objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the larger class of semi-quantitative objectives,
where each player has several ω-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance,
a player may want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives
that she achieves.)
1. Introduction
Games (and especially games played on graphs) have been intensively used in computer
science as a powerful way of modelling interactions between several computerised sys-
tems [39, 24]. Until recently, more focus had been put on the study of purely antagonistic
games (a.k.a. zero-sum games), which conveniently represent systems evolving in a (hostile)
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environment. In this zero-sum games setting, the objectives of both players are opposite:
the aim of one player is to prevent the other player from achieving her own objective.
Over the last ten years, games with non-zero-sum objectives have come into the picture:
they allow for conveniently modelling complex infrastructures where each individual system
tries to fulfil its own objectives, while still being subject to uncontrollable actions of the
surrounding systems. As an example, consider a wireless network in which several devices
try to send data: each device can modulate its transmit power, in order to maximise its
bandwidth and reduce energy consumption as much as possible. In that setting, focusing
only on optimal strategies for one single agent may be too narrow. Game-theoreticians
have defined and studied many other solution concepts for such settings, of which Nash
equilibrium [35] is the most prominent. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where no
player can improve the outcome of the game by unilaterally changing her strategy. In other
terms, in a Nash equilibrium, each individual player has a satisfactory strategy. Notice
that Nash equilibria need not exist or be unique, and are not necessarily optimal: Nash
equilibria where all players lose may coexist with more interesting Nash equilibria. Finding
constrained Nash equilibria (e.g., equilibria in which some players are required to win) is
thus an interesting problem for our setting.
In this paper, we report on our recent contributions on the computation of Nash equi-
libria in concurrent games (preliminary works appeared as [4, 5, 6]). Concurrent games
played on graphs are a general model for interactive systems, where the agents take their
decision simultaneously. Therefore concurrent games subsume turn-based games, where in
each state, only one player has the decision for the next move. One motivation for concur-
rent games is the study of timed games (which are games played on timed automata [3, 1]):
the semantics of a timed game is naturally given as a concurrent game (the players all choose
simultaneously a delay and an action to play, and the player with the shortest delay decides
for the next move—this mechanism cannot be made turn-based since we cannot fix a priori
the player who will choose the smallest delay); the region-based game abstraction which
preserves Nash equilibria also requires the formalism of concurrent games [5, 7]. Multi-agent
infrastructures can be viewed as distributed systems, which can naturally be modelled as
concurrent games.
Our contributions. The paper focuses on concurrent deterministic games and on pure
Nash equilibria, that is, strategy profiles which are deterministic (as opposed to randomised).
In this work we assume strategies only depend on the set of states which is visited, and not
on the actions that have been played. This is a partial-information hypothesis which we
believe is relevant in the context of distributed systems, where only the effect of the actions
can be seen by the players. We will discuss in more detail all these choices in the conclusion.
In the context exposed above, we develop a complete methodology for computing pure
Nash equilibria in (finite) games. First, in Section 4, we propose a novel transformation of
the multi-player concurrent game (with a preference relation for each player) into a two-
player zero-sum turn-based game, which we call the suspect game. Intuitively, in the suspect
game, one of the players suggests a global move (one action per player of the original game),
with the aim to progressively build a Nash equilibrium; while the second player aims at
proving that what the first player proposes is not a Nash equilibrium. This transformation
can be applied to arbitrary concurrent games (even those with infinitely many states) and
preference relations for the players, and it has the property that there is a correspondence
between Nash equilibria in the original game and winning strategies in the transformed
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Objective Value (Constrained) Existence of Nash Eq.
Reachability P-c. [32] NP-c. (Sect. 5.1)
Safety P-c. [32] NP-c. (Sect. 5.2)
Bu¨chi P-c. [32] P-c. (Sect. 5.3)
co-Bu¨chi P-c. [32] NP-c. (Sect. 5.4)
Parity UP∩ co-UP[28] PNP‖ -c.
1(Sect. 5.6)
Streett co-NP-c. [18] PNP‖ -h. and in PSPACE
Rabin NP-c. [18] PNP‖ -c. (Sect. 5.6)
Muller PSPACE-c. [27] PSPACE-c.
Circuit PSPACE-c. [27] PSPACE-c. (Sect. 5.5)
Det. Bu¨chi Automata P-c. PSPACE-h. (Sect. 5.7) and in EXPTIME
Det. Rabin Automata NP-c. PSPACE-h. and in EXPTIME (Sect. 5.7)
Table 1. Summary of the complexities for single objectives
Preorder Value Existence of NE Constr. Exist. of NE
Maximise, Disj. P-c. (Sect.6.2) P-c. (Sect.6.2) P-c. (Sect.6.2)
Subset P-c. (Sect. 6.3) P-c. (Sect.6.2) P-c. (Sect.6.2)
Conj., Lexicogr. P-c. (Sect. 6.3) P-h., in NP (Sect. 6.4) NP-c. (Sect. 6.4)
Counting coNP-c. (Sect. 6.4) NP-c. (Sect. 6.4) NP-c. (Sect. 6.4)
Mon. Bool. Circuit coNP-c. (Sect. 6.4) NP-c. (Sect. 6.4) NP-c. (Sect. 6.4)
Boolean Circuit PSPACE-c. (Sect. 6.1) PSPACE-c. (Sect. 6.1) PSPACE-c. (Sect. 6.1)
Table 2. Summary of the results for ordered Bu¨chi objectives
Preorder Value (Constrained) Exist. of NE
Disjunction, Maximise P-c. (Sect. 7.2) NP-c. (Sect. 7.2)
Subset PSPACE-c. (Sect. 7.1) NP-c. (Sect. 7.2)
Conjunction, Counting, Lexicogr. PSPACE-c. (Sect. 7.1) PSPACE-c. (Sect. 7.1)
(Monotonic) Boolean Circuit PSPACE-c. (Sect. 7.1) PSPACE-c. (Sect. 7.1)
Table 3. Summary of the results for ordered reachability objectives
two-player turn-based game. The winning condition in the suspect game of course depends
on the preference relations of the various players in the original game.
Then, using that construction we develop (worst-case) optimal-complexity algorithms
for deciding the existence of (constrained) Nash equilibria in finite games for various classes
of preference relations. In Section 5, we focus on qualitative ω-regular objectives, i.e.,
preference relations are given by single objectives (which can be reachability, Bu¨chi, parity,
etc), and it is better for a player to satisfy her objective than to not satisfy her objective.
We prove the whole set of results which are summarised in the second column of Table 1 (the
first column summarises the complexity in the zero-sum two-player setting – called the value
problem). Among the results obtained this way, the constrained Nash equilibrium existence
problem is NP-complete in finite games with single reachability or safety objectives, while
it is PTIME-complete for single Bu¨chi objectives.
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Figure 1. A simple game-model for the wireless network
In Sections 6 and 7, we extend the previous qualitative setting to the semi-quantitative
setting of ordered objectives. An ordered objective is a set of Bu¨chi (or reachability) objec-
tives and a preorder on this set. The preference relation given by such an ordered objective
is then given by the value of the plays (w.r.t. the objectives) in that preorder. Preorders
of interest are for instance conjunction, disjunction, lexicographic order, counting preorder,
maximise preorder, subset preorder, or more generally preorders given as Boolean circuits.
We provide algorithms for deciding the existence of Nash equilibria for ordered objectives,
with (in most cases) optimal worst-case complexity. These algorithms make use of the
suspect-game construction. The results are listed in Table 2 for Bu¨chi objectives and in
Table 3 for reachability objectives.
Examples. Back to the earlier wireless network example, we can model a simple discretised
version of it as follows. From a state, each device can increase (action 1) or keep unchanged
(action 0) its power: the arena of the game is represented for two devices and two levels of
power on Figure 1 (labels of states are power levels). This yields a new bandwidth allocation
(which depends on the degradation due to the other devices) and a new energy consumption.
The satisfaction of each device is measured as a compromise between energy consumption
and bandwidth allocated, and it is given by a quantitative payoff function.2 This can be
transformed into Bu¨chi conditions and a preorder on them. There are basically two families
of pure Nash equilibria in this system: the one where the two players choose to go and stay
forever in state (1, 1); and the one where the two players go to state (2, 2) and stay there
forever.
We describe another example, the medium access control, that involves qualitative
objectives. It was first given a game-theoretic model in [31]. Several users share the access
1The complexity class PNP‖ is defined in terms of Turing machine having access to an oracle; oracle are
artificial devices that can solve a problem in constant time, thus hiding part of the complexity of the overall
problem. The class PNP is the class of problems that can be solved in polynomial time by a deterministic
Turing machine which has access to an oracle for solving NP problems. The class PNP‖ is the subclass where,
instead of asking a sequence of (dependent) queries to the oracle, the Turing machine is only allowed to ask
one set of queries. We refer to [36, 44] for more details.
2The (quantitative) payoff for player i can be expressed by payoffi =
R
poweri
(
1− e−0.5γi
)L
where γi is the
signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio for player i, R is the rate at which the wireless system transmits the
information in bits per seconds and L is the size of the packets in bits ([37]).
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Figure 2. A simple game-model for the medium access control
to a wireless channel. During each slot, they can choose to either transmit or wait for the
next slot. If too many users are emitting in the same slot, then they fail to send data.
Each attempt to transmit costs energy to the players. They have to maximise the number
of successful attempts using the energy available to them. We give in Figure 2 a possible
model for that protocol for two players and at most one attempt per player and a congestion
of 2 (that is, the two players should not transmit at the same time): each state is labelled
with the energy level of the two players, and the number of successful attempts of each
of the player. There is several Nash equilibria, and they give payoff 1 to every player: it
consists in going to state (0, 1, 0, 1) by not simultaneously transmitting.
Related work. Game theory has been a very active area since the 1940’s, with the pio-
neering works of Von Neumann, Morgenstern [43], Nash [35] and Shapley [38]. It has had
numerous uses in various domains, ranging from economics to human sciences and logic.
Equilibria are a central concept in (non-zero-sum) games, as they are meant to represent
rational behaviours of the players. Many important results about existence of various kinds
of equilibria in different kinds of games have been established [43, 35, 20].
For applications in logic and computer science, games played on graphs have received
more focus; also, computer scientists have been mostly looking for algorithmic solutions for
deciding the existence and effectively computing equilibria and ǫ-equilibria [15, 10, 40].
For two-player concurrent games with Bu¨chi objectives, the existence of ǫ-equilibria
(in randomised strategies) was proved by Chatterjee [10]. However, exact Nash equilibria
need not exist; turn-based games with Bu¨chi objectives are an important subclass where
Nash equilibria (even in pure strategies) always exist [15]. When they exist, Nash equilibria
need not be unique; equilibria where all the players lose can coexist with equilibria where
some (or all) of them win. Ummels introduced constrained Nash equilibria, i.e., Nash equi-
libria where some players are required to win. In particular, he showed that the existence of
constrained Nash equilibria can be decided in polynomial time for turn-based games with
Bu¨chi objectives [40]. In this paper, we extend this result to concurrent games, and to
various classes of ω-regular winning objectives. For concurrent games with ω-regular ob-
jectives, the decidability of the constrained Nash equilibrium existence problem w.r.t. pure
strategies was established by Fisman et al. [21], but their algorithm runs in doubly expo-
nential time, whereas our algorithm runs in exponential time for objectives given as Bu¨chi
automata. Finally, Ummels and Wojtczak [42] proved that the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium in pure or randomised strategies is undecidable for stochastic games with reachability
or Bu¨chi objectives, which justifies our restriction to concurrent games without probabilistic
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transitions. They also proved a similar undecidability result for randomised Nash equilibria
in non-stochastic games [41], hence we consider only pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Several solution concepts have been defined and studied for games on graphs. In par-
ticular, secure equilibria [11, 17] are Nash equilibria where besides satisfying their primary
objectives, the players try to prevent the other players from achieving their own (primary)
objectives. Notice that our results in Sect. 6.4 and Sect. 7.1 do apply to such kinds of
lexicographic combination of several objectives.
Temporal logics can also be used to express properties of games. While ATL [2]
can mainly express only zero-sum properties, other logics such as ATL with strategy con-
texts (ATLsc) [16] and Strategy Logic (SL) [14, 33] can be used to express rich properties
in a non-zero-sum setting. In terms of complexity however, model checking for such logics
has high complexity: Nash equilibria can be expressed using one quantifier alternation (an
existential quantification over strategy profiles followed with a universal quantification over
deviations); model checking this fragment of ATLsc or SL is 2-EXPTIME-complete.
2. Definitions
2.1. General definitions. In this section, we fix some definitions and notations.
Preorders. We fix a non-empty set P . A preorder over P is a binary relation . ⊆ P × P
that is reflexive and transitive. With a preorder ., we associate an equivalence relation ∼
defined so that a ∼ b if, and only if, a . b and b . a. The equivalence class of a, written [a].,
is the set {b ∈ P | a ∼ b}. We also associate with . a strict partial order ≺ defined so that
a ≺ b if, and only if, a . b and b 6. a. A preorder . is said total if, for all elements a, b ∈ P ,
either a . b, or b . a. An element a in a subset P ′ ⊆ P is said maximal in P ′ if there is
no b ∈ P ′ such that a ≺ b; it is said minimal in P ′ if there is no b ∈ P ′ such that b ≺ a.
A preorder is said Noetherian (or upwards well-founded) if any subset P ′ ⊆ P has at least
one maximal element. It is said almost-well-founded if any lower-bounded subset P ′ ⊆ P
has a minimal element.
Transition systems. A transition system is a pair S = 〈States,Edg〉 where States is a set
of states and Edg ⊆ States × States is the set of transitions. A path π in S is a sequence
(si)0≤i<n (where n ∈ N
+∪{∞}) of states such that (si, si+1) ∈ Edg for all i ≤ n. The length
of π, denoted by |π|, is n− 1. The set of finite paths (also called histories) of S is denoted
by HistS , the set of infinite paths (also called plays) of S is denoted by PlayS , and PathS =
HistS ∪PlayS is the set of all paths of S. Given a path π = (si)0≤i<n and an integer j < n,
the j-th prefix (resp. j-th suffix , j-th state) of π, denoted by π≤j (resp. π≥j, π=j), is the finite
path (si)0≤i<j+1 (resp. the path (sj+i)0≤i<n−j , the state sj). If π = (si)0≤i<n is a history,
we write last(π) = s|π| for the last state of π. If π
′ is a path such that (last(π), π′=0) ∈ Edg,
then the concatenation π · π′ is the path ρ s.t. ρ=i = π=i for i ≤ |π| and ρ=i = π
′
=(i−1−|π|)
for i > |π|. In the sequel, we write HistS(s), PlayS(s) and PathS(s) for the respective
subsets of paths starting in state s. If π is a play, Occ(π) = {s | ∃j. π=j = s} is the sets of
states that appears at least once along π and Inf(π) = {s | ∀i. ∃j ≥ i. π=j = s} is the set
of states that appears infinitely often along π.
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Figure 3. Representation of
a two-player concurrent game
2.2. Concurrent games. Our definition of concurrent
games extends the definition in [2] by allowing for more than
two players, each of them having a preorder over plays.
Definition 2.1. A concurrent game is a tuple G =
〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉, where States is a
finite non-empty set of states, Agt is a finite set of players,
Act is a finite set of actions, and
• Mov: States×Agt→ 2Act \ {∅} is a mapping indicating
the actions available to a given player in a given state;
• Tab: States × ActAgt → States associates, with a given
state and a given move of the players (i.e., an element of
ActAgt), the state resulting from that move;
• for each A ∈ Agt, -A is a preorder over States
ω, called
the preference relation of player A.
Figure 3 displays an example of a finite concurrent game. Transitions are labelled with the
moves that trigger them. We say that a move mAgt = 〈mA〉A∈Agt ∈ Act
Agt is legal at s if
mA ∈ Mov(s,A) for all A ∈ Agt. A game is turn-based if for each state the set of allowed
moves is a singleton for all but at most one player.
In a concurrent game G, whenever we arrive at a state s, the players simultaneously
select an available action, which results in a legal move mAgt; the next state of the game is
then Tab(s,mAgt). The same process repeats ad infinitum to form an infinite sequence of
states.
In the sequel, as no ambiguity will arise, we may abusively write G for its underly-
ing transition system (States,Edg) where Edg = {(s, s′) ∈ States × States | ∃mAgt ∈∏
A∈AgtMov(s,A) s.t. Tab(s,mAgt) = s
′}. The notions of paths and related concepts in
concurrent games follow from this identification.
Remark 2.2 (Representation of finite games). In this paper, for finite games, we will
assume an explicit encoding of the transition function Tab. Hence, its size, denoted |Tab|,
is equal to
∑
s∈States
∏
A∈Agt |Mov(s,A)| · ⌈log(|States|)⌉. Note that it can be exponential
with respect to the number of players. A symbolic encoding of the transition table has been
proposed in [30], in the setting of ATL model checking. This makes the problem harder,
as the input is more succinct (see Remark 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 for a formal statement).
We would also have a blowup in our setting, and prefer to keep the explicit representation
in order to be able to compare with existing results. Notice that, as a matter of fact, there
is no way to systematically avoid an explosion: as there are |States||States|·|Act|
|Agt|
possible
transition functions, for any encoding there is one function whose encoding will have size
at least ⌈log(|States|)⌉ · |States| · |Act||Agt|. The total size of the game, is then
|G| = |States|+ |States| · |Agt| · |Act|+
∑
s∈States
∏
A∈Agt
|Mov(s,A)| ·⌈log(|States|)⌉+
∑
A∈Agt
| .A |.
The size of a preference relation .A will depend on how it is encoded, and we will make it
precise when it is relevant. This is given in Section 2.5.
Definition 2.3. Let G be a concurrent game, and A ∈ Agt. A strategy for A is a mapping
σA : HistG → Act such that σA(π) ∈ Mov(last(π), A) for all π ∈ HistG . A strategy σP for a
coalition P ⊆ Agt is a tuple of strategies, one for each player in P . We write σP = (σA)A∈P
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for such a strategy. A strategy profile is a strategy for Agt. We write StratPG for the set of
strategies of coalition P , and ProfG = Strat
Agt
G .
Note that, in this paper, we only consider pure (i.e., non-randomised) strategies. This is
actually crucial in all the constructions we give (lasso representation in Subsection 3.1 and
suspect-game construction in Section 4). Notice also that our strategies are based on the
sequences of visited states (they map sequences of states to actions), which is realistic when
considering multi-agent systems. In some settings, it is more usual to base strategies on
the sequences of actions played by all the players. When dealing with Nash equilibria, this
makes a big difference: strategies based on actions can immediately detect which player(s)
deviated from their strategy; strategies based on states will only detect deviations because an
unexpected state is visited, without knowing which player(s) is responsible for the deviation.
Our construction precisely amounts to keeping track of a list of suspects for some deviation.
Let G be a game, P a coalition, and σP a strategy for P . A path π is compatible with
the strategy σP if, for all k < |π|, there exists a move mAgt such that
(1) mAgt is legal at π=k,
(2) mA = σA(π≤k) for all A ∈ P , and
(3) Tab(π=k,mAgt) = π=k+1.
We write OutG(σP ) for the set of paths (called the outcomes) in G that are compatible with
strategy σP of P . We write Out
f
G (resp. Out
∞
G ) for the finite (resp. infinite) outcomes, and
OutG(s, σP ), Out
f
G(s, σP ) and Out
∞
G (s, σP ) for the respective sets of outcomes of σP with
initial state s. Notice that any strategy profile has a single infinite outcome from a given
state. In the sequel, when given a strategy profile σAgt, we identify Out(s, σAgt) with the
unique play it contains.
A concurrent game involving only two players (A and B, say) is zero-sum if, for any
two plays π and π′, it holds π -A π
′ if, and only if, π′ -B π. Such a setting is purely
antagonistic, as both players have opposite objectives. The most relevant concept in such a
setting is that of winning strategies, where the aim is for one player to achieve her objectives
whatever the other players do. In non-zero-sum games, winning strategies are usually too
restricted, and the most relevant concepts are equilibria, which correspond to strategies
that satisfy (which can be given several meanings) all the players. One of the most studied
notion of equilibria is Nash equilibria [35], which we now introduce.
2.3. Nash equilibria. We begin with introducing some vocabulary. When π -A π
′, we
say that π′ is at least as good as π for A. We say that a strategy σA for A ensures π if
every outcome of σA is at least as good as π for A, and that A can ensure π when such a
strategy exists.
Given a move mAgt and an action m
′ for some player A, we write mAgt[A 7→ m
′] for the
move nAgt with nB = mB when B 6= A and nA = m
′. This is extended to strategies in the
natural way.
Definition 2.4. Let G be a concurrent game and let s be a state of G. A Nash equilibrium
of G from s is a strategy profile σAgt ∈ ProfG such that Out(s, σAgt[A 7→ σ
′]) -A Out(s, σAgt)
for all players A ∈ Agt and all strategies σ′ ∈ StratA.
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Figure 4. Two different no-
tions of improvements for a non-
total order.
So, Nash equilibria are strategy profiles where no sin-
gle player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
her strategy.
Remark 2.5. Our definition of a Nash equilibrium re-
quires any deviation to be worse or equivalent to the equi-
librium. Another possible definition would have been to
ask any deviation to be no better than the equilibrium.
Those two definitions yield different notions of Nash equi-
libria (unless the preorders are total), as illustrated in
Figure 4: the black node n represents Out(s, σAgt), the
light-gray area contains the nodes n′ such that n′ - n,
while the dark-gray area contains the nodes n′ for which
n 6- n′.
This alternative definition would also be meaningful,
and the techniques we develop in this paper could be
adapted to handle such a variant.
In this paper we will give a general construction that relates Nash equilibria in a game
(which can be infinite) and winning strategies in a two-player turn-based game (called the
suspect game), it is presented in Section 4. We will then be mostly interested in solving the
decision problems that we define next, when games are finite.
2.4. Decision problems we will consider. Given a concurrent game G = 〈States,Agt,
Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 and a state s ∈ States, we consider the following problems:
• Value problem: Given a player A and a play π, is there a strategy σA for player A such
that for any outcome ρ in G from s of σA, it holds π -A ρ?
• NE Existence problem: Does there exist a Nash equilibrium in G from s?
• Constrained NE existence problem: Given two plays π−A and π
+
A for each player A, does
there exist a Nash equilibrium in G from s whose outcome π satisfies π−A -A π -A π
+
A for
all A ∈ Agt?
We will focus on decidability and complexity results of these three problems when games
are finite, for various classes of preference relations. Complexity results will heavily rely on
what preorders we allow for the preference relation and how they are represented. We have
already discussed the representation of the game structure in Remark 2.2. We define and
discuss now the various preference relations we will study, and explain how we encode the
various inputs to the problems.
2.5. Focus on the preference relations we will consider. We define the various classes
of preference relations we will focus on in the rest of the paper. We begin with single-
objective preference relations, and we then define a more general class of ordered objectives.
We fix a game G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉.
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2.5.1. Single-objective preference relations.
Definition 2.6. An objective (or winning condition) is an arbitrary set of plays. A prefer-
ence relation -A is single-objective whenever there exists an objective ΩA such that: ρ -A ρ
′
if, and only if, ρ′ ∈ ΩA (we then say that ρ
′ is winning for A) or ρ 6∈ ΩA (we then say that
ρ is losing for A).
The setting of single-objective preference relations is purely qualitative, since a player
can only win (in case the outcome is in her objective), or lose (otherwise).
An objective Ω can be specified in various ways. Next we will consider the following
families of ω-regular objectives:
• A reachability objective is given by a target set T ⊆ States and the corresponding set
of winning plays is defined by
ΩReachT = {ρ ∈ Play | Occ(ρ) ∩ T 6= ∅}.
• A safety objective is given by a target set T ⊆ States and the corresponding set of
winning plays is defined by
ΩSafetyT = {ρ ∈ Play | Occ(ρ) ∩ T = ∅}.
• A Bu¨chi objective is given by a target set T ⊆ States and the corresponding set of
winning plays is defined by
ΩBu¨chiT = {ρ ∈ Play | Inf(ρ) ∩ T 6= ∅}.
• A co-Bu¨chi objective is given by a target set T ⊆ States and the corresponding set of
winning plays is defined by
Ωco-Bu¨chiT = {ρ ∈ Play | Inf(ρ) ∩ T = ∅}.
• A parity objective is given by a priority function p : States 7→ [[0, d]] (where [[0, d]] =
[0, d] ∩ Z) with d ∈ N, and the corresponding set of winning plays is defined by
ΩParityp = {ρ ∈ Play | min(Inf(p(ρ))) is even}.
• A Streett objective is given by a tuple (Qi, Ri)i∈[[1,k]] and the corresponding set of
winning plays is defined by
ΩStreett(Qi,Ri)i∈[[1,k]] = {ρ ∈ Play | ∀i. Inf(ρ) ∩Qi 6= ∅⇒ Inf(ρ) ∩Ri 6= ∅}.
• ARabin objective is given by a tuple (Qi, Ri)i∈[[1,k]] and the corresponding set of winning
plays is defined by
ΩRabin(Qi,Ri)i∈[[1,k]] = {ρ ∈ Play | ∃i. Inf(ρ) ∩Qi 6= ∅ ∧ Inf(ρ) ∩Ri = ∅}.
• A Muller objective is given by a finite set C, a coloring function c : States 7→ C, and a
set F ⊆ 2C . The corresponding set of winning plays is then defined by
ΩMullerc,F = {ρ ∈ Play | Inf(c(ρ)) ∈ F}.
We will also consider the following other types of objectives:
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Figure 5. Boolean circuit defining the condition that either ℓ3 appears
infinitely often, or if ℓ1 appears infinitely often then so does ℓ2.
• A circuit objective is given by a boolean circuit C with the set States as input nodes
and one output node. A play ρ is winning if and only if C evaluates to true when the
input nodes corresponding to states in Inf(ρ) are set to true, and all other input nodes
are set to false. We write ΩCircuitC for the set of winning plays.
Figure 5 displays an example of a circuit for the game of Figure 3: this Boolean circuit
defines the condition that either ℓ3 appears infinitely often, or if ℓ1 appears infinitely
often then so does ℓ2.
• A deterministic Bu¨chi automaton objective is given by a deterministic Bu¨chi au-
tomaton A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, q0, R〉, with Σ = States. Then the corresponding set of winning
plays is defined by
Ωdet-Bu¨chi-autA = L(A).
• A deterministic Rabin automaton objective is given by a deterministic Rabin au-
tomaton A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, q0, (Ei, Fi)i∈[[1,k]]〉, with Σ = States. Then the corresponding set of
winning plays is defined by
Ωdet-Rabin-autA = L(A).
• A Presburger-definable objective is given by a Presburger formula φ with free vari-
ables (Xs)s∈States. The corresponding set of winning plays is defined by
ΩPresbφ = {ρ ∈ Play | φ(#s(ρ))s∈States) = 0}
where #s(ρ) is the number of occurrences3 of state s along ρ.
Encodings. For complexity issues we now make explicit how the various objectives are en-
coded:
• Reachability, safety, Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi objectives are given by a set T ⊆ States, they
can therefore be encoded using |States| bits.
• For parity objectives, we assume without loss of generality that d ≤ 2 · |States|. The
priority function has then size at most |States| · ⌈log(2 · |States|+ 1)⌉.
• Street and Rabin objectives are given by tuples (Qi, Ri)i∈[[1,k]]. Their sizes are given by:∑
i∈[[1,k]] |Qi|⌈log(|States|)⌉.
• Muller objectives are given by a coloring function and a set F . Its size is |States| ·
⌈log(|C|)⌉+ |F| · ⌈log(|C|)⌉. Note that thanks to the coloring function, this encoding can
be exponentially more succinct than an explicit representation such as the one considered
in [26].
3By convention, if s ∈ Inf(ρ), and variable Xs appears in φ, then ρ /∈ Ω
Presb
φ .
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(0, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1)
(1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 1)
a. Subset preorder
(0, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
b. Maximise preorder
(0, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1)
(1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 1)
c. Counting preorder
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1)
d. Lexicographic order
Figure 6. Examples of preorders (for n = 3): dotted boxes represent equiv-
alence classes for the relation ∼, defined as a ∼ b ⇔ a . b ∧ b . a; arrows
represent the preorder relation . quotiented by ∼.
• The size of objectives given by circuits, deterministic automata or Presburger formulas is
that of the corresponding circuits, deterministic automata or Presburger formulas.
Encodings of thresholds in inputs of the value and the constrained NE existence problems.
For all the objectives except for those given by automata, whether a play ρ satisfies the
objective or not only depends on the sets Occ(ρ) and Inf(ρ). The various thresholds will
therefore be encoded as such pairs (Occ, Inf).
For deterministic-automata objectives, the thresholds will be also encoded as pairs of
sets of states of the objectives, representing respectively the set of states which are visited
and the set of states which are visited infinitely often.
For the Boolean circuit objectives, whether a play ρ satisfies the objective or not only
depends on the set Inf(ρ). Therefore we will use as encoding for the threshold a single set
Inf.
For the Presburger formulas objectives, we will use as encoding for the thresholds the
Parikh image of the play (i.e., the number of visits to each of the states).
2.5.2. Ordered objectives. We now turn to a more general class of preference relations, al-
lowing for a semi-quantitative setting.
Definition 2.7. An ordered objective is a pair ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉, where, for every 1 ≤ i ≤
n, Ωi is an objective, and . is a preorder on {0, 1}
n. A play ρ is assigned a payoff vector
w.r.t. that ordered objective, which is defined as payoffω(ρ) = 1{i|ρ∈Ωi} ∈ {0, 1}
n (where 1S
is the vector v such that vi = 1⇔ i ∈ S). The corresponding preference relation -ω is then
defined by ρ -ω ρ
′ if, and only if, payoffω(ρ) . payoffω(ρ
′).
There are many ways of specifying a preorder. We define below the preorders on {0, 1}n
that we consider in the sequel. Figure 6 displays four such preorders for n = 3. For the
purpose of these definitions, we assume that max∅ = −∞.
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(1) Conjunction: v . w if, and only if, either vi = 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, or wi = 1 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This corresponds to the case where a player wants to achieve all her
objectives.
(2) Disjunction: v . w if, and only if, either vi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, or wi = 1 for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The aim here is to satisfy at least one objective.
(3) Counting : v . w if, and only if, |{i | vi = 1}| ≤ |{i | wi = 1}|. The aim is to maximise
the number of conditions that are satisfied;
(4) Subset : v . w if, and only if, {i | vi = 1} ⊆ {i | wi = 1}: in this setting, a player will
always struggle to satisfy a larger (for inclusion) set of objectives.
(5) Maximise: v . w if, and only if, max{i | vi = 1} ≤ max{i | wi = 1}. The aim is to
maximise the highest index of the objectives that are satisfied.
(6) Lexicographic: v . w if, and only if, either v = w, or there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
vi = 0, wi = 1 and vj = wj for all 1 ≤ j < i.
(7) Boolean Circuit : given a Boolean circuit, with input from {0, 1}2n, v . w if, and only
if, the circuit evaluates 1 on input v1 . . . vnw1 . . . wn.
(8) Monotonic Boolean Circuit : same as above, with the restriction that the input gates
corresponding to v are negated, and no other negation appear in the circuit.
In terms of expressiveness, any preorder over {0, 1}n can be given as a Boolean circuit:
for each pair (v,w) with v . w, it is possible to construct a circuit whose output is 1 if,
and only if, the input is v1 . . . vnw1 . . . wn; taking the disjunction of all these circuits we
obtain a Boolean circuit defining the preorder. Its size can be bounded by 22n+3n, which is
exponential in general. But all the above examples ((1)-(6)) can be specified with a circuit
of polynomial size. In Figure 7 we give a polynomial-size Boolean circuit for the subset
preorder. In the following, for complexity issues, we will assume that the encoding of all
preorders (1)-(6) takes constant size, and that the size of the preorder when it is given as
a Boolean circuit is precisely the size of the circuit for input size n, where n is the number
of objectives.
A preorder . is monotonic if it is compatible with the subset ordering, i.e. if {i | vi =
1} ⊆ {i | wi = 1} implies v . w. Hence, a preorder is monotonic if fulfilling more objectives
never results in a lower payoff. All our examples of preorders except for the Boolean circuit
preorder are monotonic. Moreover, any monotonic preorder can be expressed as a monotonic
Boolean circuit: for a pair (v,w) with v . w, we can build a circuit whose output is 1 if,
and only if, the input is v1 . . . vnw1 . . . wn. We can require this circuit to have negation at
the leaves. Indeed, if the input wj appears negated, and if wj = 0, then by monotonicity,
also the input (v, w˜) is accepted, with w˜i = wi when i 6= j and w˜j = 1. Hence the negated
input gate can be replaced with true. Similarly for positive occurrences of any vj. Hence
any monotonic preorder can be written as a monotonic Boolean circuit. Notice that with
Definition 2.4, any Nash equilibrium σAgt for the subset preorder is also a Nash equilibrium
for any monotonic preorder.
Next we will be be interested in two kinds of ordered objectives, ordered reachability
objectives, where all objectives are supposed to be reachability objectives, and ordered Bu¨chi
objectives, where all objectives are supposed to be Bu¨chi objectives. Note that other classical
objectives (parity, Streett, Rabin, Muller, etc.) can be equivalently described with a preorder
given by a polynomial-size Boolean circuit over Bu¨chi objectives. For instance, each set of
a Muller condition can be encoded as a conjunction of Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi conditions.
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v1 v2 ... vn w1 w2 ... wn
NOT NOT ... NOT
OR
OR
...
OR
AND
Figure 7. Boolean circuit defining the subset preorder
For ordered reachability (resp. Bu¨chi) objectives, thresholds used as inputs to the
various decision problems will be given by the set of states that are visited (resp. visited
infinitely often).
In Sections 6 and 7, we will be interested in games where, for every player A, the
preference relation -A is given by an ordered objective ωA = 〈(Ω
A
i )1≤i≤nA ,.A〉. We
will then write payoffA instead of payoffωA for the payoffs, and if ρ is a play, payoff(ρ) =
(payoffA(ρ))A∈Agt.
2.6. Undecidability of all three problems for single Presburger-definable objec-
tives. We end this section with an undecidability result in the quite general setting of
Presburger-definable preference relations.
Theorem 2.8. The value, NE existence and constrained NE existence problems are unde-
cidable for finite games with preference relations given by Presburger-definable qualitative
objectives.
Proof. We first prove the result for the constrained NE existence problem, by encoding a
two-counter machine. We fix a two-counter machine, and assume without loss of generality
that the halting state is preceded by a non-zero test for the two counters (hence if the
machine halts, the two counters have a positive value in the halting state).
We begin with defining a family of preorders. Fix two sets of states S and T ; a play
is said (S = T )-winning if the number of visits to S equals the number of visits to T , and
both are finite. Formally, π -S=T π
′ whenever π is not (S = T )-winning, or π′ is.
We use such preorders to encode the acceptance problem for two-counter machines: the
value of counter c1 is encoded as the difference between the number of visits to S1 and T1,
and similarly for counter c2. Incrementing counter ci thus consists in visiting a state in Si,
and decrementing consists in visiting Ti; in other terms, if instruction qk of the two-counter
machine consists in incrementing c1 and jumping to qk′, then the game will have a transition
from some state qk to a state in S1, and a transition from there to qk′ . The game involves
three players: A1, A2 and B. The aim of player A1 (resp. A2) is to visit S1 and T1 (resp. S2
and T2) the same number of times: player Ai’s preference is -Si=Ti . The aim of player B
is to reach the state corresponding to the halting state of the two-counter machine. Due to
the assumption on the two-counter machine, if B wins, then both A1 and A2 lose.
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B
u6=0iAi
u=0i
Ai
si Ai tiAi
Figure 8. Testing whether ci = 0.
It remains to encode the zero-test: this is
achieved by the module of Figure 8. In this module,
player B tries to avoid the three sink states (marked
in grey), since this would prevent her from reaching
her goal. When entering the module, player B has
to choose one of the available branches: if she de-
cides to go to u 6=0i , then Ai could take the play into
the self-loop, which is winning for her if Si and Ti
have been visited the same number of times in the
history of this path, which corresponds to having
ci = 0; hence player B should play to u
6=0
i only if
ci 6= 0, so that A1 has no interest in going to this
self-loop.
Similarly, if player B decides to go to u=0i ,
player Ai has the opportunity to “leave” the main
stream of the game, and go to si or ti (obviously
si ∈ Si and ti ∈ Ti). If the numbers of visits to Si
and Ti up to that point are different, then player Ai has the opportunity to make both
numbers equal, and to win. Conversely, if both numbers are equal (i.e., ci = 0), then going
to si or ti will be losing for Ai, whatever happens from there. Hence, if ci = 0 when entering
the module, then player B should go to u=0i .
One can then easily show that the two-counter machine stops if, and only if, there is a
Nash equilibrium in the resulting game G, in which player B wins and players A1 and A2
lose. Indeed, assume that the machine stops, and consider the strategies where player B
plays (in the first state of the test modules) according to the value of the corresponding
counter, and where players A1 and A2 always keep the play in the main stream of the game.
Since the machine stops, player B wins, while players A1 and A2 lose. Moreover, none of
them has a way to improve their payoff: since player B plays according to the values of the
counters, players A1 and A2 would not benefit from deviating from their above strategies.
Conversely, if there is such a Nash equilibrium, then in any visited test module, player B
always plays according to the values of the counters: otherwise, player A1 (or A2) would
have the opportunity to win the game. By construction, this means that the run of the
Nash equilibrium corresponds to the execution of the two-counter machine. As player B
wins, this execution reaches the halting state.
Finally, it is not difficult to adapt this reduction to involve only two players: players A1
and A2 would be replaced by one single player A, in charge of ensuring that both conditions
(for c1 and c2) are fulfilled. This requires minor changes to the module for testing ci = 0:
when leaving the main stream of the game in a module for testing counter ci, player A
should be given the opportunity (after the grey state) to visit states S3−i or T3−i in order
to adjust that part of her objective.
By changing the winning condition for Player B, the game G can also be made zero-sum:
for this, B must lose if the play remains in the main stream forever without visiting the
final state; otherwise, B loses if the number of visits to si and ti are finite and equal for
both i = 1 and i = 2; B wins in any other case. The objective of player A is opposite. It is
not difficult to modify the proof above for showing that the two-counter machine halts if,
and only if, player B has a winning strategy in this game.
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s0
s1
s Copy of G
〈1,1〉,〈2,2〉
〈1,2〉,〈2,1〉
Figure 9. Extending the game with
an initial concurrent module
Finally, by adding a small initial module de-
picted on Figure 9 to this zero-sum version of the
game G, one can encode the halting problem for
two-counter machines to the NE existence problem.
Indeed, in the zero-sum game, there is exactly one
Nash equilibrium, with only two possible payoffs (ei-
ther A wins, or B wins). Now, assuming that A loses
and B wins in state s1, then there is a (pure) Nash
equilibrium in the game extended with the initial
module if, and only if, player B wins in the zero-
sum game above. 
3. Preliminary results
This section contains general results that will be applied later in various settings. In each of
the statements, we give the restrictions on the games and on the preference relations that
should be satisfied.
3.1. Nash equilibria as lasso runs. We first characterise outcomes of Nash equilibria as
ultimately periodic runs, in the case where preference relations only depend on the set of
states that are visited, and on the set of states that are visited infinitely often. Note that
ω-regular conditions satisfy this hypothesis, but Presburger relations such as the ones used
for proving Theorem 2.8 do not.
Proposition 3.1. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a finite concurrent
game such that, for every player A, it holds4 ρ ∼A ρ
′ as soon as Inf(ρ) = Inf(ρ′) and
Occ(ρ) = Occ(ρ′). Let ρ ∈ Play. If there is a Nash equilibrium with outcome ρ, then there
is a Nash equilibrium with outcome ρ′ of the form π · τω such that ρ ∼A ρ
′, and where |π|
and |τ | are bounded by |States|2.
Proof. Let σAgt be a Nash equilibrium from some state s, and ρ be its outcome. We define
a new strategy profile σ′Agt, whose outcome from s is ultimately periodic, and then show
that σ′Agt is a Nash equilibrium from s.
To begin with, we inductively construct a history π = π0π1 . . . πn that is not too long
and visits precisely those states that are visited by ρ (that is, Occ(π) = Occ(ρ)).
The initial state is π0 = ρ0 = s. Then we assume we have constructed π≤k = π0 . . . πk
which visits exactly the same states as ρ≤k′ for some k
′. If all the states of ρ have been
visited in π≤k then the construction is over. Otherwise there is an index i such that ρi
does not appear in π≤k. We therefore define our next target as the smallest such i: we let
t(π≤k) = min{i | ∀j ≤ k. πj 6= ρi}. We then look at the occurrence of the current state πk
that is the closest to the target in ρ: we let c(π≤k) = max{j < t(π≤k) | πk = ρj}. Then
we emulate what happens at that position by choosing πj+1 = ρc(π≤j)+1. Then πk+1 is
either the target, or a state that has already been seen before in π≤k, in which case the
resulting π≤k+1 visits exactly the same states as ρ≤c(π≤k)+1.
At each step, either the number of remaining targets strictly decreases, or the num-
ber of remaining targets is constant but the distance to the next target strictly decreases.
4We recall that ρ ∼A ρ
′ if, and only if, ρ -A ρ
′ and ρ′ -A ρ.
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Therefore the construction terminates. Moreover, notice that between two targets we do
not visit the same state twice, and we visit only states that have already been visited, plus
the target. As the number of targets is bounded by |States|, we get that the length of the
path π constructed thus far is bounded by 1 + |States| · (|States| − 1)/2.
Using similar ideas, we now inductively construct τ = τ0τ1 . . . τm, which visits precisely
those states which are seen infinitely often along ρ, and which is not too long. Let l
be the least index after which the states visited by ρ are visited infinitely often, i.e. l =
min{i ∈ N | ∀j ≥ i. ρj ∈ Inf(ρ)}. The run ρ≥l is such that its set of visited states and its
set of states visited infinitely often coincide. We therefore define τ in the same way we have
defined π above, but for play ρ≥l. As a by-product, we also get c(τ≤k), for k < m.
We now need to glue π and τ together, and to ensure that τ can be glued to itself, so
that π · τω is a real run. We therefore need to link the last state of π with the first state
of τ (and similarly the last state of τ with its first state). This possibly requires appending
some more states to π and τ : we fix the target of π and τ to be τ0, and apply the same
construction as previously until the target is reached. The total length of the resulting
paths π′ and τ ′ is bounded by 1+ (|States|− 1) · (|States|+2)/2 which is less than |States|2.
We let ρ′ = π′ · τ ′ω, and abusively write c(ρ′≤k) for c(π
′
≤k) if k ≤ |π
′| and c(τ ′≤k′) with
k′ = (k − 1 − |π′|) mod |τ ′| otherwise. We now define our new strategy profile, having ρ′
as outcome from s. Given a history h:
• if h followed the expected path, i.e., h = ρ′≤k for some k, we mimic the strategy at c(h):
σ′Agt(h) = σAgt(ρ
′
c(h)). This way, ρ
′ is the outcome of σ′Agt from s.
• otherwise we take the longest prefix h≤k that is a prefix of ρ
′, and define σ′Agt(h) =
σAgt(ρ
′
c(h≤k)
· h≥k+1).
We now show that σ′Agt is a Nash equilibrium. Assume that one of the players changes
her strategy while playing according to σ′Agt: either the resulting outcome does not deviate
from π · τω, in which case the payoff of that player is not improved; or it deviates at some
point, and from that point on, σ′Agt follows the same strategies as in σAgt. Assume that the
resulting outcome is an improvement over ρ′ for the player who deviated. The suffix of the
play after the deviation is the suffix of a play of σAgt after a deviation by the same player.
By construction, both plays have the same sets of visited and infinitely-visited states. Hence
we have found an advantageous deviation from σAgt for one player, contradicting the fact
that σAgt is a Nash equilibrium. 
3.2. Encoding the value problem as a constrained NE existence problem. We now
give a reduction that will be used to infer hardness results for the constrained NE existence
problem from the hardness of the value problem (as defined in Section 2.4): this will be
the case when the hardness proof for the value problem involves the construction of a game
satisfying the hypotheses of the proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a two-player zero-
sum game played between players A and B, such that:
• the preference relation -A for player A is total, Noetherian and almost-well-founded
(see Section 2.1);
• G is determined, i.e., for all play π:
[∃σA. ∀σB. π -A Out(σA, σB)] ⇔ [∀σB. ∃σA. π -A Out(σA, σB)].
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Let G′ be the (non-zero-sum) game obtained from G by replacing the preference relation of
player B by the one where all plays are equivalent. Then, for every state s, for every play
π from s, the two following properties are equivalent:
(i) there is a Nash equilibrium in G′ from s with outcome ρ such that π 6-A ρ;
(ii) player A cannot ensure π from s in G.
Proof. In this proof, σA and σ
′
A (resp. σB and σ
′
B) refer to player-A (resp. player-B)
strategies. Furthermore we will write Out(σA, σB) instead of OutG(s, (σA, σB)).
We first assume there is a Nash equilibrium (σA, σB) in G
′ from s such that π 6-A
Out(σA, σB). Since -A is total, Out(σA, σB) ≺A π. Consider a strategy σ
′
A of player A in
G. As (σA, σB) is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that Out(σ
′
A, σB) -A Out(σA, σB), which
implies Out(σ′A, σB) ≺A π. We conclude that condition (ii) holds.
Assume now property (ii). As the preference relation is Noetherian, we can select
π+ which is the largest element for -A which can be ensured by player A. Let σA be
a corresponding strategy: for every strategy σB , π
+ -A Out(σA, σB). Towards a con-
tradiction, assume now that for every strategy σ′B , there exists a strategy σ
′
A such that
π+ ≺A Out(σ
′
A, σ
′
B). Consider the set S of such outcomes, and define π
′ as its minimal ele-
ment (this is possible since the order -A is almost-well-founded). Notice then that π
+ ≺A π
′,
and also that for every strategy σ′B, there exists a strategy σ
′
A such that π
′ -A Out(σ
′
A, σ
′
B).
Then, as the game is determined, we get that there exists some strategy σ′A such that
for all strategy σ′B, it holds that π
′ -A Out(σ
′
A, σ
′
B). In particular, strategy σ
′
A ensures
π′, which contradicts the maximality of π+. Therefore, there is some strategy σ′B for
which for every strategy σ′A, π
+ 6≺A Out(σ
′
A, σ
′
B), which means Out(σ
′
A, σ
′
B) -A π
+. We
show now that (σA, σ
′
B) is a witness for property (i). We have seen on the one hand that
π+ -A Out(σA, σ
′
B), and on the other hand that Out(σA, σ
′
B) -A π
+. By hypothesis,
π+ ≺A π, which yields Out(σA, σ
′
B) ≺A π. Pick another strategy σ
′
A for player A. We have
seen that Out(σ′A, σ
′
B) -A π
+, which implies Out(σ′A, σ
′
B) -A Out(σA, σ
′
B). This concludes
the proof of (i). 
Remark 3.3. Any finite total preorder is obviously Noetherian and almost-well-founded.
Also, any total preorder isomorphic to the set of non-positive integers is Noetherian and
almost-well-founded. On the other hand, a total preorder isomorphic to {1/n | n ∈ N+} is
Noetherian but not almost-well-founded.
3.3. Encoding the value problem as a NE existence problem. We prove a similar
result for the NE existence problem. In this reduction however, we have to modify the game
by introducing a truly concurrent move at the beginning of the game. This is necessary
since for turn-based games with ω-regular winning conditions, there always exists a Nash
equilibrium [15], hence the NE existence problem would be trivial.
Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a two-player zero-sum game, with
players A and B. Given a state s of Gand a play π from s, we define a game Gπ by
adding two states s0 and s1, in the very same way as in Figure 9, on page 16. From s0,
A and B play a matching-penny game to either go to the sink state s1, or to the state s
in the game G. We assume the same hypotheses than in Proposition 3.2 for the preference
relation -A. Let π
+ be in the highest equivalence class for -A smaller than π (it exists since
-A is Noetherian). In Gπ, player B prefers runs that end in s1: formally, the preference
relation -πB of player B in Gπ is given by π
′ -πB π
′′ ⇔ π′′ = s0 · s
ω
1 ∨ π
′ 6= s0 · s
ω
1 . On the
PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONCURRENT DETERMINISTIC GAMES 19
other hand, player A prefers a path of G over going to s1, if and only if, it is at least as
good as π: formally, the preference relation -πA for player A in Gπ is given by s0 · π
′ -πA
s0 · π
′′ ⇔ π′ -A π
′′, and s0 · s
ω
1 ∼
′′
A s0 · π
+.
Proposition 3.4. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a two-player zero-
sum game, with players A and B, such that:
• the preference relation -A for player A is total, Noetherian and almost-well-founded;
• G is determined.
Let s be a state and π be a play in G from s. Consider the game Gπ defined above. Then
the following two properties are equivalent:
(i) there is a Nash equilibrium in Gπ from s0;
(ii) player A cannot ensure π from s in G.
In particular, in a given class of games, if the hardness proof of the value problem involves
a game which satisfies the hypotheses of the proposition, and if Gπ belongs to that class,
then the NE existence problem is at least as hard as the complement of the value problem.
Proof. Assume that player A cannot ensure at least π from s in G, then according to
Proposition 3.2, there is a Nash equilibrium (σA, σB) in the game G
′ of Proposition 3.2 with
outcome ρ such that π 6-A ρ. Consider the strategy profile (σ
π
A, σ
π
B) in Gπ that consists
in playing the same action for both players in s0, and then if the path goes to s, to play
according to (σA, σB). Player B gets her best possible payoff under that strategy profile.
If A could change her strategy to get a payoff better than s0 · π
+, then it would induce
a strategy in G′ giving her a payoff better than ρ (when played with strategy σB), which
contradicts the fact that (σA, σB) is a Nash equilibrium in G
′. Therefore, (σπA, σ
π
B) is a Nash
equilibrium in Gπ.
Conversely, assume that A can ensure π from s in G, and assume towards a contradiction
that there is a Nash equilibrium (σπA, σ
π
B) in Gπ from s0. Then OutGpi(σ
π
A, σ
π
B) does not end
in s1, otherwise player A could improve by switching to s and then playing according to a
strategy which ensures π. Also, OutGpi(σ
π
A, σ
π
B) cannot end in G either, otherwise player B
would improve by switching to s1. We get that there is no Nash equilibrium in Gπ from s0,
which concludes the proof. 
3.4. Encoding the constrained NE existence problem as an NE existence prob-
lem. The next proposition makes a link between the existence of a Nash equilibrium where
a player gets a payoff larger than some bound and the (unconstrained) existence of a Nash
equilibrium in a new game. This will allow, in some specific cases, to infer hardness results
from the constrained NE existence problem to the NE existence problem.
The construction is inspired by the previous one, but it applies to a game with at least
two players, and it applies to any two selected players as follows. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,
Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a concurrent game, s be a state of G, ρ be a play from s, and Ai
and Aj be two distinct players. We define the new game E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ) again in the same
way as on Figure 9. Now, in s0, the two players Ai and Aj play a matching-penny game to
either go to the sink state s1, or to state s in game G.
For player Aj , the preference relation in E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ) is given by -
′
Aj
such that
s0 · s
ω
1 ≺
′
Aj
s0 · π and s0 · π -
′
Aj
s0 · π
′ ⇔ π -Aj π
′, for any path π and π′ from s in G.
For player Ai the preference relation is s0 · π -
′
Ai
s0 · π
′ ⇔ π -Ai π
′, for any path π and
π′ from s in G, and s0 · s
ω
1 ∼Ai s0 · ρ. For any other player Ak, the preference relation
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E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ) is given by s0 · π -
′
Ak
s0 · π
′ ⇔ π -Ak π
′ for any path π and π′ from s in G,
and s0 · s
ω
1 ∼Ak s0 · ρ.
Proposition 3.5. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a concurrent game,
let s be a state of G, and Ai and Aj be two distinct players participating to G. Pick two plays
π and ρ from s such that ρ -Ai π. If there is a Nash equilibrium in G whose outcome is π,
then there is a Nash equilibrium in E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ) whose outcome is s0 · π. Reciprocally, if
there is a Nash equilibrium in E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ) whose outcome is s0 · π, then there is a Nash
equilibrium in G whose outcome is π.
Proof. Assume that there is a Nash equilibrium σAgt in G with outcome π such that ρ -Ai π.
Then s0 · s
ω
1 -
′
Ai
s0 · π. Consider the strategy profile in E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ) that consists for Ai
and Aj in playing different actions in s0 and when the path goes to s, to play according
to σAgt. Players Ai and Aj have no interest in changing their strategies in s0, since for Aj
all plays of G are better than s0 · s
ω
1 , and for Ai the play s0 · π is better than s0 · s
ω
1 . Hence,
this is a Nash equilibrium in game E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ).
Reciprocally, if there is a Nash equilibrium in E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ), its outcome cannot end
in s1, since Aj would have an interest in changing her strategy in s0 (all plays of G are then
better for her). The strategies followed from s thus defines a Nash equilibrium in G. 
If we consider a class of games such that E(G, Ai, Aj , ρ) belongs to that class when G
does, then the NE existence problem is then at least as hard as the constrained NE existence
problem. Note however that the reduction assumes lower bounds on the payoffs, and we do
not have a similar result for upper bounds on the payoffs. For instance, as we will see in
Section 6, for a conjunction of Bu¨chi objectives, we do not know whether the NE existence
problem is in P (as the value problem) or NP-hard (as is the existence of an equilibrium
where all the players are losing).
4. The suspect game
In this section, we construct an abstraction of a multi-player game G as a two-player zero-
sum game H, such that there is a correspondence between Nash equilibria in G and winning
strategies in H (formalised in forthcoming Theorem 4.5). This transformation does not
require the game to be finite and is conceptually much deeper than the reductions given in
the previous section; it will allow us to use algorithmic techniques from zero-sum games to
compute Nash equilibria and hence solve the value and (constrained) NE existence problems
in various settings.
4.1. Construction of the suspect game. We fix a concurrent game G = 〈States,Agt,
Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 for the rest of the section, and begin with introducing a few extra
definitions.
Definition 4.1. A strategy profile σAgt is a trigger profile for a play π from some state s if,
for every player A ∈ Agt, for every strategy σ′A of player A, the path π is at least as good
as the outcome of σAgt[A 7→ σ
′
A] from s (that is, Out(s, σAgt[A 7→ σ
′
A]) -A π).
The following result is folklore and a direct consequence of the definition:
Lemma 4.2. A Nash equilibrium is a trigger profile for its outcome. Reciprocally, a strategy
profile which is trigger profile for its outcome is a Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 4.3 ([4]). Given two states s and s′, and a move mAgt, the set of suspect players
for (s, s′) and mAgt is the set
Susp((s, s′),mAgt) = {A ∈ Agt | ∃m
′ ∈ Mov(s,A). Tab(s,mAgt[A 7→ m
′]) = s′}.
Given a path ρ and a strategy profile σAgt, the set of suspect players for ρ and σAgt is the
set of players that are suspect along each transition of ρ, i.e., it is the set
Susp(ρ, σAgt) =
{
A ∈ Agt
∣∣∣ ∀i < |ρ| . A ∈ Susp((ρ=i, ρ=i+1), σAgt(ρ≤i))
}
.
Intuitively, player A ∈ Agt is a suspect for transition (s, s′) and move mAgt if she can
unilaterally change her action to activate the transition (s, s′): if s′ 6= Tab(s,mAgt), then
this may be due to a deviation from mAgt of any of the players in the set Susp((s, s
′),mAgt),
and no one else. If s′ = Tab(s,mAgt), it may simply be the case that no one has deviated, so
everyone is a potential suspect for the next moves. Similarly, we easily infer that player A is
in Susp(ρ, σAgt) if, and only if, there is a strategy σ
′
A such that Out(s, σAgt[A 7→ σ
′
A]) = ρ.
Note that the notion of suspect players requires moves and arenas to be deterministic,
and therefore everything which follows assumes the restriction to pure strategy profiles and
to deterministic game structures.
We fix a play π in G. From game G and play π, we build the suspect game H(G, π), which
is a two-player turn-based game defined as follows. The players in H(G, π) are named Eve
and Adam. Since H(G, π) is turn-based, its state space can be written as the disjoint union of
the set V∃ controlled by Eve, which is (a subset of) States× 2
Agt, and the set V∀ controlled
by Adam, which is (a subset of) States× 2Agt ×ActAgt. The game is played in the following
way: from a configuration (s, P ) in V∃, Eve chooses a legal move mAgt from s; the next
state is (s, P,mAgt); then Adam chooses some state s
′ in States, and the new configuration
is (s′, P ∩ Susp((s, s′),mAgt)). In particular, when the state s
′ chosen by Adam is such
that s′ = Tab(s,mAgt) (we say that Adam obeys Eve when this is the case), then the new
configuration is (s′, P ).
We define projections proj1 and proj2 from V∃ on States and 2
Agt, resp., by proj1(s, P ) =
s and proj2(s, P ) = P . We extend these projections to paths in a natural way (but only using
Eve’s states in order to avoid stuttering), letting proj1((s0, P0) · (s0, P0,m0) · (s1, P1) · · · ) =
s0 · s1 · · · . For any play ρ, proj2(ρ) (seen as a sequence of sets of players of G) is non-
increasing, therefore its limit λ(ρ) is well defined. We notice that if λ(ρ) 6= ∅, then proj1(ρ)
is a play in G. An outcome ρ is winning for Eve, if for all A ∈ λ(ρ), it holds proj1(ρ) -A π.
The winning region W (G, π) (later simply denoted by W when G and π are clear from
the context) is the set of configurations of H(G, π) from which Eve has a winning strategy.
Intuitively Eve tries to have the players play a Nash equilibrium, and Adam tries to disprove
that it is a Nash equilibrium, by finding a possible deviation that improves the payoff of
one of the players.
4.2. Correctness of the suspect-game construction. The next lemma establishes a
correspondence between winning strategies in H(G, π) and trigger profiles (and therefore
Nash equilibria) in G.
Lemma 4.4. Let s be a state of G and π be a play from s in G. The following two conditions
are equivalent:
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• Eve has a winning strategy in H(G, π) from (s,Agt), and its outcome ρ′ from (s,Agt)
when Adam obeys Eve is such that proj1(ρ
′) = ρ;
• there is a trigger profile for π in G from state s whose outcome from s is ρ.
Proof. Assume there is a winning strategy σ∃ for Eve in H(G, π) from (s,Agt), whose
outcome from (s,Agt) when Adam obeys Eve is ρ′ with proj1(ρ
′) = ρ. We define the strategy
profile σAgt according to the actions played by Eve. Pick a history g = s1s2 · · · sk+1, with
s1 = s. Let h be the outcome of σ∃ from s ending in a state of V∃ and such that proj1(h) =
s1 · · · sk. This history is uniquely defined as follows: the first state of h is (s1,Agt), and
if its (2i + 1)-st state is (si, Pi), then its (2i + 2)-nd state is (si, Pi, σ∃(h≤2i+1)) and its
(2i + 3)-rd state is (si+1, Pi ∩ Susp((si, si+1), σ∃(h≤2i+1))). Now, write (sk, Pk) for the last
state of h, and let h′ = h · (sk, Pk, σ∃(h)) · (sk+1, Pk ∩ Susp((sk, sk+1), σ∃(h))). Then we
define σAgt(g) = σ∃(h
′). Notice that when g · s is a prefix of proj1(ρ
′), then g · s · σAgt(g · s)
is also a prefix of proj1(ρ
′). In particular, Out(s, σAgt) = proj1(ρ
′) = ρ.
We now prove that σAgt is a trigger profile for π. Pick a player A ∈ Agt, a strategy σ
′
A
for player A, and let g = Out(s, σAgt[A 7→ σ
′
A]). With a play g, we associate a play h
in H(G, π) in the same way as above. Then player A is a suspect along all the transitions
of g, so that she belongs to λ(h). Now, as σ∃ is winning, proj1(h) -A π, which proves that
σAgt is a trigger profile.
Conversely, assume that σAgt is a trigger profile for π whose outcome is ρ, and define
the strategy σ∃ by σ∃(h) = σAgt(proj1(h)). Notice that the outcome ρ
′ of σ∃ when Adam
obeys Eve satisfies proj1(ρ
′) = ρ.
Let η be an outcome of σ∃ from s, and A ∈ λ(η). Then A is a suspect for each transition
along proj1(η), which means that for all i, there is a move m
A
i such that
proj1(η=i+1) = Tab(proj1(η=i), σAgt(proj1(η≤i))[A 7→ m
A
i ]).
Therefore there is a strategy σ′A such that proj1(η) = Out(s, σAgt[A 7→ σ
′
A]). Since σAgt is
a trigger profile for π, it holds that proj1(η) -A π. As this holds for any A ∈ λ(η), σ∃ is
winning. 
We now state the correctness theorem for the suspect game construction.
Theorem 4.5. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a concurrent game, s be
a state of G, and π be a play in G. The following two conditions are equivalent:
• there is a Nash equilibrium σAgt from s in G whose outcome is π.
• there is a play ρ from (s,Agt) in H(G, π),
(1) such that proj1(ρ) = π;
(2) along which Adam always obeys Eve; and
(3) such that for all indices i, there is a strategy σi∃ for Eve, for which any play in
ρ≤i ·Out(ρ=i, σ
i
∃) is winning for Eve.
Proof. The Nash equilibrium is a trigger profile, and from Lemma 4.4, we get a winning
strategy σ∃ in H(G, π). The outcome ρ of σ∃ from s when Adam obeys Eve is such that
π = proj1(ρ) is the outcome of the Nash equilibrium. Now for all prefix ρ≤i, the strategy
σi∃ : h 7→ σ∃(ρ≤i · h) is such that any play in ρ≤i ·Out(ρ=i, σ
i
∃) is winning for Eve.
Conversely, let ρ′ be a path in H(G, π) and assume it satisfies all three conditions.
We define a strategy λ∃ that follows ρ
′ when Adam obeys. Along ρ′, this strategy is defined
as follows: λ∃(ρ
′
≤2i) = mAgt such that Tab(proj1(ρ
′
=i),mAgt) = proj1(ρ
′
=i+1). Such a legal
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ℓ0,{A1,A2}
ℓ0,{A1,A2},〈1,1〉
ℓ0,{A1,A2},〈1,2〉
ℓ0,{A1,A2},〈2,1〉
ℓ0,{A1,A2},〈2,2〉
ℓ0,∅
ℓ1,{A1,A2}
ℓ2,{A2}
ℓ3,{A1}
ℓ1,{A1,A2},〈1,1〉
ℓ1,{A1,A2},〈1,2〉
ℓ2,{A2},〈1,1〉
ℓ3,{A1},〈1,1〉
ℓ1,∅
ℓ2,{A1}
ℓ3,{A2}
ℓ2,{A1},〈1,1〉
ℓ3,{A2},〈1,1〉
Figure 10. A small part of the suspect game for the game of Figure 3
move must exist since Adam obeys Eve along ρ′ by condition 2. Now, if Adam deviates from
the obeying strategy (at step i), we make λ∃ follow the strategy σ
i
∃ (given by condition 3),
which will ensure that the outcome is winning for Eve.
The outcomes of λ∃ are then either the path ρ
′, or a path ρ′′ obtained by following a
winning strategy after a prefix of ρ′. The path ρ′′ is losing for Adam, hence for all A ∈ λ(ρ′),
ρ′′ -A ρ
′. This proves that λ∃ is a winning strategy. Applying Lemma 4.4, we obtain a
strategy profile σAgt in G that is a trigger profile for π. Moreover, the outcome of σAgt
from s is proj1(ρ
′) (using condition 1), so that σAgt is a Nash equilibrium. 
Remark 4.6. Assume the preference relations of each player A in G are prefix-independent,
i.e., for all plays ρ and ρ′, ρ -A ρ
′ iff for all indices i and j, ρ≥i -A ρ
′
≥j . Then the winning
condition of Eve is also prefix-independent, and condition 3 just states that ρ′ has to stay
within the winning region of Eve. Note that, for prefix-dependent preference relations,
condition 3 does not reduce to stay within the winning region of Eve: for instance, for safety
objectives, if the losing states of all the players have been visited then any prolongation will
satisfy the condition, even though it might leave the winning region of Eve.
Example 4.7. We depict on Figure 10 part of the suspect game for the game of Figure 3.
Note that the structure of H(G, π) does not depend on π. Only the winning condition is
affected by the choice of π.
In the rest of the paper, we use the suspect-game construction to algorithmically solve
the NE existence problem and the constrained NE existence problem in finite games for
large classes of preference relations. Before that we carefully analyse the size of the suspect
game when the original game is finite.
4.3. Size of the suspect games when the original game is finite. We suppose that
G is finite. At first sight, the number of states in H(G, π) is exponential (in the number
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of players of G). However, there are two cases for which we easily see that the number of
states of H(G, π) is actually only polynomial:
• if there is a state in which all the players have several possible moves, then the transition
table (which is part of the input, as discussed in Remark 2.2) is also exponential in the
number of players;
• if the game is turn-based, then the transition table is “small”, but there is always at most
one suspect player (unless all of them are suspects), so that the number of reachable
states in H(G, π) is also small.
We now prove that, due to the explicit encoding of the set of transitions (recall Remark 2.2,
page 7), this can be generalised:
Proposition 4.8. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a finite concurrent
game and π be a play in G. The number of reachable configurations from States × {Agt}
in H(G, π) is polynomial in the size of G.
Proof. The game H(G, π) contains the state (s,Agt) and the states (s,Agt,mAgt), where
mAgt is a legal move from s; the number of these states is bounded by |States|+ |Tab|.
The successors of those states that are not of the same form, are the (t,Susp((s, t),mAgt))
with t 6= Tab(s,mAgt). If some player A ∈ Agt is a suspect for transition (s, t), then be-
sides mA, she must have at least a second action m
′, for which Tab(s,mAgt[A 7→ m
′]) = t.
Thus the transition table from state s has size at least 2|Susp((s,t),mAgt)|. The successors
of (t,Susp((s, t),mAgt)) are of the form (t
′, P ) or (t′, P,mAgt) where P is a subset of
Susp((s, t),mAgt); there can be no more than (|States| + |Tab|) · 2
|Susp((s,t),mAgt)| of them,
which is bounded by (|States|+ |Tab|) · |Tab|. The total number of reachable states is then
bounded by (|States|+ |Tab|) · (1 + (|States|+ |Tab|) · |Tab|). 
5. Single-objective preference relations
In this section we will be interested in finite games with single-objective preference relations.
The value problem for finite concurrent games with ω-regular objectives has standard
solutions in game theory; they are given in Table 1 (page 3). Let us briefly give some
explanations. Most of the basic literature on two-player games focus on turn-based games,
and in particular algorithms for solving two-player games with ω-regular objectives only
deal with turn-based games (see for instance [23, Chapter 2]). In particular, McNaughton
developed an algorithm to solve turn-based parity games in time O(|States| · |Edg|p−1),
where p − 1 is the number of priorities [32]. Bu¨chi games and co-Bu¨chi games correspond
to parity games with two priorities, hence they are solvable in polynomial time. Similarly
reachability games and safety games can be transformed into Bu¨chi games by making the
target states absorbing. Hence turn-based game with these types of objectives can be solved
in polynomial time.
Note however that we can reuse these algorithms in the concurrent case as follows.
Any finite concurrent zero-sum game with objective Ω for player A1 can be transformed
into a turn-based zero-sum game with objective Ω˜ for player A1: the idea is to replace
any edge labelled with pair of actions 〈a1, a2〉 into two consecutive transitions labelled with
a1 (belonging to player A1) and with a2 (belonging to player A2). Furthermore Ω is an
ω-regular condition, then so is Ω˜, and the type of the objective (reachability, Bu¨chi, etc)
is preserved (note however that this transformation only preserves Player A1 objective).
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Hence the standard algorithm on the resulting turn-based game can be applied. Lower
bounds for reachability/safety and Bu¨chi/co-Bu¨chi games are also folklore results, and can
be obtained by encoding the circuit-value problem (we recall the encoding in Section 5.3.3).
We now focus on the NE existence problem and on the constrained NE existence prob-
lem when each player has a single (ω-regular) objective using the suspect game construction.
The results are summarised in the second column of Table 1.
Streett and Muller objectives are not explicitly mentioned in the rest of the section. The
complexity of their respective (constrained) NE existence problems, which is given in Table 1,
can easily be inferred from other ones. The PNP‖ -hardness for the NE existence problem with
Streett objectives follows from the corresponding hardness for parity objectives (parity
objectives can be encoded efficiently as Streett objectives). Hardness for the NE existence
problem in Muller games, is deduced from hardness of the value problem (which holds for
turn-based games), applying Proposition 3.4. For both objectives, membership in PSPACE
follows from PSPACE membership for objectives given as Boolean circuits, since they can
efficiently be encoded as Boolean circuits.
We fix for the rest of the section a multi-player finite game G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,
Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉, and we assume that each -A is single-objective, given by set ΩA.
Remark 5.1. Let us come back to Remark 2.2 on our choice of an explicit encoding for
the set of transitions. Assuming more compact encodings, the complexity of computing
Nash equilibria for qualitative objectives does not allow to distinguish between the intrinsic
complexity of the objectives. Indeed, in the formalism of [30], the transition function is
given in each state by a finite sequence ((φ0, s0), ..., (φh, sh)), where si ∈ States, and φi is
a boolean combination of propositions (A = m) that evaluates to true iff agent A chooses
action m. The transition table is then defined as follows: Tab(s,mAgt) = sj iff j is the
smallest index such that φj evaluates to true when, for every player A ∈ Agt, A chooses
action mA. It is required that the last boolean formula φh be ⊤, so that no agent can
enforce a deadlock.
We can actually state the following result, whose proof is postponed to the Appendix
on page 69.
Proposition 5.2. For finite concurrent games with compact encoding of transition func-
tions and with reachability/Bu¨chi/safety objectives, the constrained NE existence problems
is PSPACE-hard.
Remark 5.3. It is first interesting to notice that given two plays π and π′ the suspect games
H(G, π) and H(G, π′) only differ in their winning conditions. In particular, the structure of
the game only depends on G, and has polynomial size (see Proposition 4.8). We denote it
with J (G). Moreover, as each relation -A is given by a single objective ΩA, the winning
condition for Eve in H(G, π) rewrites as: for every A ∈ λ(ρ)∩Los(π), proj1(ρ) is losing (in G)
for player A, where Los(π) is the set of players losing along π in G. This winning condition
only depends on Los(π) (not on the precise value of play π). Therefore in this section, the
suspect game is denoted with H(G, L), where L ⊆ Agt, and Eve wins play ρ if, for every
A ∈ λ(ρ) ∩ L, A loses along proj1(ρ) in G. In many cases we will be able to simplify this
winning condition, and to obtain simple algorithms to the corresponding problems.
We now distinguish between the winning objectives of the players. There are some
similarities in some of the cases (for instance safety and co-Bu¨chi objectives), but they
nevertheless all require specific techniques and proofs.
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5.1. Reachability objectives. The value problem for a reachability winning condition is
P-complete. Below, we design a non-deterministic algorithm that runs in polynomial time
for solving the constrained NE existence problem. We then end this subsection with a NP-
hardness proof of the constrained NE existence problem and NE existence problem. In the
end, we prove the following result:
Theorem 5.4. For finite concurrent games with single reachability objectives, the NE ex-
istence problem and the constrained NE existence problem are NP-complete.
5.1.1. Reduction to a safety game. We assume that for every player A, ΩA is a single
reachability objective given by target set TA. Given L ⊆ Agt, in the suspect game H(G, L),
we show that the objective of Eve reduces to a safety objective. We define the safety
objective ΩL in H(G, L) by the set TL = {(s, P ) | ∃A ∈ P ∩ L. s ∈ TA} of target states.
Lemma 5.5. Eve has a winning strategy in game H(G, L) iff Eve has a winning strategy
in game J (G) with safety objective ΩL.
Proof. We first show that any play in ΩL is winning in H(G, L). Let ρ ∈ ΩL, and let
A ∈ λ(ρ) ∩ L. Toward a contradiction assume that Occ(proj1(ρ)) ∩ TA 6= ∅: there is a
state (s, P ) along ρ with s ∈ TA. Obviously λ(ρ) ⊆ P , which implies that A ∈ P ∩ L. This
contradicts the fact that ρ /∈ ΩL. We have shown so far that any winning strategy for Eve
in J (G) with safety objective ΩL is a winning strategy for Eve in H(G, L).
Now assume that Eve has no winning strategy in game J (G) with safety objective ΩL.
Turn-based games with safety objectives being determined, Adam has a strategy σ∀ which
ensures that no outcome of σ∀ is in ΩL. If ρ ∈ Out(σ∀), there is a state (s, P ) along ρ such
that there is A ∈ P ∩ L with s ∈ TA. We now modify the strategy of Adam such that as
soon as such a state is reached we switch from σ∀ to the strategy that always obeys Eve.
This ensures that in every outcome ρ′ of the new strategy, we reach a state (s, P ) such that
there is A ∈ P ∩ L with s ∈ TA, and λ(ρ
′) = P . This Adam’s strategy thus makes Eve lose
the game H(G, L), and Eve has no winning strategy in game H(G, L). 
5.1.2. Algorithm. The algorithm for solving the constrained NE existence problem in a
game where each player has a single reachability objective relies on Theorem 4.5 and Propo-
sition 3.1, and on the above analysis:
(i) guess a lasso-shaped play ρ = τ1 · τ
ω
2 (with |τi| ≤ 2|States|
2) in J (G), such that Adam
obeys Eve along ρ, and π = proj1(ρ) satisfies the constraint on the payoff;
(ii) compute the set W (G,Los(π)) of states that are winning for Eve in the suspect game
H(G,Los(π)), where Los(π) is the set of losing players along π;
(iii) check that ρ stays in W (G,Los(π)).
First notice that this algorithm is non-deterministic and runs in polynomial time: the
witness ρ guessed in step (i) has size polynomial; the suspect game H(G,Los(π)) has also
polynomial size (Proposition 4.8); Step (ii) can be done in polynomial time using a standard
attractor computation [23, Sect. 2.5.1] as the game under analysis is equivalent to a safety
game (Lemma 5.5); finally step (iii) can obviously be performed in polynomial time.
Step (i) ensures that conditions 2 and 1 of Theorem 4.5 hold for ρ and step (iii) ensures
condition 3. Correctness of the algorithm then follows from Theorem 4.5 and Proposi-
tion 3.1.
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5.1.3. Hardness. We prove NP-hardness of the constrained NE existence problem by encod-
ing an instance of 3SAT as follows. We assume set of atomic propositions AP = {x1, . . . , xk},
and we let φ =
∧n
i=1 ci where ci = ℓi,1 ∨ ℓi,2 ∨ ℓi,3 where ℓi,j ∈ {xk,¬xk | 1 ≤ k ≤ p}.
We build the turn-based game Gφ with n+ 1 players Agt = {A,C1, . . . , Cn} as follows: for
every 1 ≤ k ≤ p, player A chooses to visit either location xk or location ¬xk. Location xk
is winning for player Ci if, and only if, xk is one of the literals in ci, and similarly location
¬xk is winning for Ci if, and only if, ¬xk is one of the literals of ci. The construction is
illustrated on Figure 11, with the reachability objectives defined as ΩCi = {ℓi,1, ℓi,2, ℓi,3} for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Now, it is easy to check that this game has a Nash equilibrium with payoff 1 for
all players (Ci)1≤i≤n if, and only if, φ is satisfiable.
We prove hardness for the NE existence problem by using the transformation described
in Section 3.4 once for each player. We define the game G0 similar to G but with an
extra player Cn+1 who does not control any state for now. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define
Gi = E(Gi−1, Ci, Cn+1, ρ), where ρ is a winning path for Ci. The preference relation can
be expressed in any Gi by a reachability condition, by giving to Cn+1 a target which is the
initial state of G. According to Proposition 3.5 there is a Nash equilibrium in Gi if, and
only if, there is one in Gi−1 where Ci wins. Therefore there is a Nash equilibrium in Gn if,
and only if, φ is satisfiable. This entails NP-hardness of the NE existence problem.
Gφ
A
x1
¬x1
A
x2
¬x2
A . . .
xp
¬xp
Figure 11. Reachability game for the reduction of 3SAT
5.2. Safety objectives. The value problem for safety objectives is P-complete. We next
show that the constrained NE existence problem can be solved in NP, and conclude with
NP-hardness of both the constrained NE existence problem and the NE existence problem.
We hence prove:
Theorem 5.6. For finite games with single safety objectives, the NE existence problem and
the constrained NE existence problem are NP-complete.
5.2.1. Reduction to a conjunction of reachability objectives. We assume ΩA is a single safety
objective given by set TA. In the corresponding suspect game, we show that the goal of
Eve is equivalent to a conjunction of reachability objectives. Let L ⊆ Agt. In suspect game
H(G, L), we define several reachability objectives as follows: for each A ∈ L, we define
T ′A = TA × {P | P ⊆ Agt} ∪ States × {P | A 6∈ P}, and we write Ω
′
A for the corresponding
reachability objectives.
Lemma 5.7. A play ρ is winning for Eve in H(G, L) iff ρ ∈
⋂
A∈LΩ
′
A.
Proof. Let ρ be a play in H(G, L), and assume it is winning for Eve. Then, for each
A ∈ λ(ρ) ∩ L, ρ /∈ ΩA, which means that the target set TA is visited along proj1(ρ), and
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therefore T ′A is visited along ρ. If A /∈ λ(ρ), then a state (s, P ) with A /∈ P is visited by ρ:
the target set T ′A is visited. This implies that ρ ∈
⋂
A∈LΩ
′
A.
Conversely let ρ ∈
⋂
A∈LΩ
′
A. For every A ∈ L, T
′
A is visited by ρ. Then, either TA is
visited by proj1(ρ) (which means that ρ /∈ ΩA) or A 6∈ λ(ρ). In particular, ρ is a winning
play for Eve in H(G, L). 
5.2.2. Algorithm for solving finite zero-sum turn-based games with a conjunction of reach-
ability objectives. We now give a simple algorithm for solving zero-sum games with a con-
junction of reachability objectives. This algorithm works in exponential time with respect
to the size of the conjunction (we will see in Subsection 7.1.6 that the problem is PSPACE-
complete). However for computing Nash equilibria in safety games we will only use it for
small (logarithmic size) conjunctions.
Let G be a two-player turn-based game with a winning objective for Eve given as a
conjunction of k reachability objectives Ω1, . . . ,Ωk. We assume vertices of Eve and Adam in
G are V∃ and V∀ respectively, and that the initial vertex is v0. The idea is to construct a
new game G
′
that remembers the objectives that have been visited so far. The vertices of
game G
′
controlled by Eve and Adam are V ′∃ = V∃ × 2
[[1,k]] and V ′∀ = V∀ × 2
[[1,k]] respectively.
There is a transition from (v, S) to (v′, S′) iff there is a transition from v to v′ in the
original game and S′ = S ∪ {i | v′ ∈ Ωi}. The reachability objective Ω for Eve is given by
target set States × [[1, k]]. It is clear that there is a winning strategy in G from v0 for the
conjunction of reachability objectives Ω1, . . . ,Ωk iff there is a winning strategy in game G
′
from (v0, {i | v0 ∈ Ωi}) for the reachability objective Ω. The number of vertices of this new
game is |V ′∃ ∪ V
′
∀| = |V∃ ∪ V∀| · 2
k, and the size of the new transition table Tab′ is bounded
by |Tab| ·2k, where Tab is the transition table of G. An attractor computation on G
′
is then
done in time O(|V ′∃ ∪ V
′
∀| · |Tab
′|), we obtain an algorithm for solving zero-sum games with
a conjunction of reachability objectives, running in time O(22k · (|V∃ ∪ V∀| · |Tab|)).
5.2.3. Algorithm. The algorithm for solving the constrained NE existence problem for single
reachability objectives could be copied and would then be correct. It would however not
yield an NP upper bound. We therefore propose a refined algorithm:
(i) guess a lasso-shaped play ρ = τ1 · τ
ω
2 (with |τi| ≤ |States|
2) in J (G) such that Adam
obeys Eve along ρ, and π = proj1(ρ) satisfies the constraint on the payoff. Note
that if Los(π) is the set of players losing in π, computing W (G,Los(π)) would require
exponential time. We will avoid this expensive computation.
(ii) check that any Adam-deviation along ρ, say at position i (for any i), leads to a state
from which Eve has a strategy σi∃ to ensure that any play in ρ≤i ·Out(σ
i
∃) is winning
for her.
Step (ii) can be done as follows: pick an Adam-state (s,Agt,mAgt) along ρ and a successor
(t, P ) such that t 6= Tab(s,mAgt); we only need to show that (t, P ) ∈ W (G, (Los(π) \
Los(ρ≤i))∩P ). We can compute this set efficiently (in polynomial time) using the algorithm
of the previous paragraph since 2|P | ≤ |Tab| (using the same argument as in Proposition 4.8).
This non-deterministic algorithm, which runs in polynomial time, precisely implements
Theorem 4.5, and therefore correctly decides the constrained NE existence problem.
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Copy of Gφs A/C1 A/C2 A/C3 t
u
〈1,1〉,〈2,2〉
〈1,2〉,〈2,1〉
〈1,1〉,〈2,2〉
〈1,2〉,〈2,1〉
〈1,1〉,〈2,2〉
〈1,2〉,〈2,1〉
Figure 12. Extending game Gφ with final concurrent modules
5.2.4. Hardness. The NP-hardness for the constrained NE existence problem can be proven
by encoding an instance of 3SAT using a game similar to that for reachability objectives,
see Section 5.1. We only change the constraint which is now that all players Ci should be
losing, and we get the same equivalence.
The reduction of Lemma 3.4 cannot be used to deduce the hardness of the NE existence
problem, since it assumes a lower bound on the payoff. Here the constraint is an upper bound
(“each player should be losing”). We therefore provide an ad-hoc reduction in this special
case, which is illustrated on Figure 12. We add some module at the end of the game to
enforce that in an equilibrium, all players are losing. We add concurrent states between A
and each Ci (named A/Ci). All players Ci are trying to avoid t, and A is trying to avoid u.
Since A has no target in Gφ she cannot lose before seeing u, and then she can always
change her strategy in the concurrent states in order to go to t. Therefore an equilibrium
always ends in t. A player Ci whose target was not seen during game Gφ, can change her
strategy in order to go to u instead of t. That means that if there is an equilibrium, there
was one in Gφ where all Ci are losing. Conversely, if there was such an equilibrium in Gφ,
we can extend this strategy profile by one whose outcome goes to t and it is an equilibrium
in the new game. This concludes the NP-hardness of the NE existence problem.
5.3. Bu¨chi objectives. The value problem for Bu¨chi objectives is P-complete. In this
subsection we design a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the constrained NE existence
problem for Bu¨chi objectives. The P-hardness of the NE existence problem can then be in-
ferred from the P-hardness of the value problem, applying Propositions 3.2 and 3.4. Globally
we prove the following result:
Theorem 5.8. For finite games with single Bu¨chi objectives, the NE existence problem and
the constrained NE existence problem are P-complete.
5.3.1. Reduction to a co-Bu¨chi game. We assume that for every player A, ΩA is a Bu¨chi
objective given by target set TA. Given L ⊆ Agt, in the suspect game H(G, L), we show that
the objective of Eve is equivalent to a single co-Bu¨chi objective. We define the co-Bu¨chi
objective ΩL in H(G, L) given by the target set TL = {(s, P ) | ∃A ∈ P ∩L. s ∈ TA}. Notice
that the target set is defined in the same way as for reachability objectives.
Lemma 5.9. A play ρ is winning for Eve in H(G, L) iff ρ ∈ ΩL.
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Proof. Assume that ρ is winning for Eve in H(G, L). Then for every A ∈ λ(ρ) ∩ L, it holds
Inf(proj1(ρ)) ∩ TA = ∅. Toward a contradiction, assume that Inf(ρ) ∩ TL 6= ∅. There exists
(s, P ) such that there is A ∈ P ∩ L with s ∈ TA, which appears infinitely often along ρ.
In particular, P = λ(ρ) (otherwise it would not appear infinitely often along ρ). Hence,
we have found A ∈ λ(ρ) ∩ L such that Inf(proj1(ρ)) ∩ TA 6= ∅, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, ρ ∈ ΩL.
Assume ρ ∈ ΩL: for every (s, P ) such that there exists A ∈ P ∩ L with s ∈ TA, (s, P )
appears finitely often along ρ. Let A ∈ λ(ρ) ∩ L, and assume towards a contradiction that
there is s ∈ TA such that s appears infinitely often along proj1(ρ). This means that (s, λ(ρ))
appears infinitely often along ρ, which contradicts the above condition. Therefore, ρ is
winning for Eve in H(G, L). 
5.3.2. Algorithm. As for reachability objectives, the winning region for Eve in H(G, L) can
be computed in polynomial time (since this is the winning region of a co-Bu¨chi game, see
Lemma 5.9 above). A non-deterministic algorithm running in polynomial time similar to
the one for reachability objectives can therefore be inferred. However we can do better than
guessing an appropriate lasso-shaped play ρ by looking at the strongly connected compo-
nents of the game: a strongly connected component of the game uniquely defines a payoff,
which is that of all plays that visit infinitely often all the states of that strongly connected
component. Using a clever partitioning of the set of strongly connected components of the
game, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm.
From now on and until the end of Subsection 5.3.2 we relax the hypotheses on the
preference relations (that they are all single-objective with a Bu¨chi condition). We present
an algorithm in a more general context, since the same techniques will be used in Subsec-
tion 6.2.2 (and we chose to only present once the construction). For the rest of this sub-
section we therefore make the following assumptions on the preference relations (-A)A∈Agt.
For every player A ∈ Agt:
(a) -A only depends on the set of states which is visited infinitely often: if ρ and ρ
′ are
two plays such that Inf(ρ) = Inf(ρ′) then ρ -A ρ
′ and ρ′ -A ρ;
(b) -A is given by an ordered objective ωA with preorder .A, and .A is supposed to be
monotonic;
(c) for every threshold wA, we can compute in polynomial time SA ⊆ States such that
Inf(ρ) ⊆ SA ⇔ ρ -A w
A.
Obviously preferences given by single Bu¨chi objectives do satisfy those hypotheses. At every
place where it is relevant, we will explain how the particular case of single Bu¨chi objectives
is handled. Next we write (⋆) for the above assumptions, and (⋆)a (resp. (⋆)b, (⋆)c) for only
the first (resp. second, third) assumption.
We first characterise the ‘good’ plays in J (G) in terms of the strongly connected com-
ponents they define: the strongly connected component defined by a play is the set of
states that are visited infinitely often by the play. We fix for each player A, equivalence
classes of plays uA and wA, that represent lower- and upper-bounds for the constrained
NE existence problem. Both can be represented as finite sets, representing the set of states
which are visited infinitely often. For each K ⊆ States, we write vA(K) for the equiva-
lence class of all paths π that visits infinitely often exactly K, i.e.: Inf(π) = K. We also
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write v(K) = (vA(K))A∈Agt. We look for a transition system 〈K,E〉, with K ⊆ States and
E ⊆ K ×K, for which the following properties hold:
(1) uA .A v
A(K) .A w
A for all A ∈ Agt;
(2) 〈K,E〉 is strongly connected;
(3) ∀k ∈ K. (k,Agt) ∈W (G, v(K));
(4) ∀(k, k′) ∈ E. ∃(k,Agt,mAgt) ∈W (G, v(K)). Tab(k,mAgt) = k
′;
(5) (K × {Agt}) is reachable from (s,Agt) in W (G, v(K));
where W (G, v(K)) is the winning region of Eve in suspect game H(G, v(K)).5
If one can find one such transition system 〈K,E〉, then we will be able to build a lasso-
play ρ from (s,Agt) in the suspect-game that will satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.5.
Formally, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5.10. Under hypothesis (⋆)a, there is a transition system 〈K,E〉 satisfying condi-
tions 1–5 if, and only if, there is a path ρ from (s,Agt) in H(G, v(K)) that never gets out
of W (G, v(K)), along which Adam always obeys Eve, uA .A v
A(K) .A w
A for all A ∈ Agt,
and proj1(Inf(ρ) ∩ V∃) = K (which implies that ρ ∈ v
A(K) for all A).
Proof. The first implication is shown by building a path in W (G, v(K)) that successively
visits all the states in K × {Agt} forever. Thanks to 5, 2 and 4 (and the fact that Adam
obeys Eve), such a path exists, and from 3 and 4, this path remains in the winning region.
From 1, we have the condition on the preferences. Conversely, consider such a path ρ, and let
K = proj1(Inf(ρ)∩V∃) and E = {(k, k
′) ∈ K2 | ∃(k,Agt,mAgt) ∈ Inf(ρ). Tab(k,mAgt) = k
′}.
Condition 5 clearly holds. Conditions 1, 3 and 4 are easy consequences of the hypotheses
and construction. We prove that 〈K,E〉 is strongly connected. First, since Adam obeys Eve
and ρ starts in (k,Agt), we have λ(ρ) = Agt. Now, take any two states k and k′ in K: then
ρ visits (k,Agt) and (k′,Agt) infinitely often, and there is a subpath of ρ between those
two states, all of which states appear infinitely often along ρ. Such a subpath gives rise to
a path between k and k′, as required. 
As a consequence, if 〈K,E〉 satisfies the five previous conditions, by Theorem 4.5, there
is a Nash equilibrium whose outcome lies between the bounds uA and wA. Our aim is to
compute efficiently all maximal pairs 〈K,E〉 that satisfy the five conditions.
To that aim we define a recursive function SSG (standing for “solve sub-game”), working
on transition systems, that will decompose efficiently any transition system that does not
satisfy the five conditions above into polynomially many disjoint sub-transition systems via
a decomposition into strongly connected components.
• if K × {Agt} ⊆ W (G, v(K)), and if for all (k, k′) ∈ E there is a (k,Agt,mAgt) in
W (G, v(K)) s.t. Tab(k,mAgt) = k
′, and finally if 〈K,E〉 is strongly connected, then we
set SSG(〈K,E〉) = {〈K,E〉}. This means that conditions (2)-(4) are satisfied by 〈K,E〉.
• otherwise, we let
SSG(〈K,E〉) =
⋃
〈K ′,E′〉∈SCC(〈K,E〉)
SSG(T (〈K ′, E′〉))
where SCC(〈K,E〉) is the set of strongly connected components of 〈K,E〉 (which can be
computed in linear time), and where T (〈K ′, E′〉) is the transition system whose set of
5Formally the suspect game has been defined with a play as reference, and not a equivalence class.
However, in this subsection, if pi and pi′ are equivalent, the games H(G, pi) and H(G, pi′) are identical.
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states is {k ∈ K ′ | (k,Agt) ∈W (G, v(K ′))} and whose set of edges is
{(k, k′) ∈ E′ | ∃(k,Agt,mAgt) ∈W (G, v(K
′)). Tab(k,mAgt) = k
′}.
Notice that this set of edges is never empty, but T (〈K ′, E′〉) might not be strongly con-
nected anymore, so that this is really a recursive definition.
The recursive function SSG decomposes any (sub-)transition system of the game into a list
of disjoint transition systems which all satisfy conditions (2)-(4) above.
So far the computation does not take into account the bounds for the payoffs of the
players (lower bound uA and upper bound wA for player A). For each upper bound wA,
we assume condition (⋆)c holds . In the particular case of a single Bu¨chi objective for each
player define by target TA, this is simply done by setting S
A = States \ TA, if this player
has to be losing (that is, if wA does not satisfy the Bu¨chi objective). Now assuming we
have found the appropriate set SA, we define
Sol = SSG
(
〈
⋂
A∈Agt
SA,Edg′〉
)
∩
{
〈K,E〉 | ∀A ∈ Agt. uA . vA(K)
}
where Edg′ restricts Edg to
⋂
A∈Agt S
A.
We now show that the set Sol computes (in a sense that we make clear) the transition
systems that are mentioned in Lemma 5.10).
Lemma 5.11. We suppose condition (⋆) holds. If 〈K,E〉 ∈ Sol then it satisfies conditions 1
to 4. Conversely, if 〈K,E〉 satisfies conditions 1 to 4, then there exists 〈K ′, E′〉 ∈ Sol such
that 〈K,E〉 ⊆ 〈K ′, E′〉.
Proof. Let 〈K,E〉 ∈ Sol. By definition of SSG, all (k,Agt) for k ∈ K are in W (G, v(K)), and
for all (k, k′) ∈ E, there is a state (k,Agt,mAgt) inW (G, v(K)) such that Tab(k,mAgt) = k
′,
and 〈K,E〉 is strongly connected. Also, for all A, uA . vA(K) because Sol ⊆ {〈K,E〉 |
uA . vA(K)}. Finally, for any A ∈ Agt, vA(K) . wA because the set K is included in SA.
Conversely, assume that 〈K,E〉 satisfies the conditions. We show that if 〈K,E〉 ⊆
〈K ′, E′〉 then there is 〈K ′′, E′′〉 in SSG(〈K ′, E′〉) such that 〈K,E〉 ⊆ 〈K ′′, E′′〉. The proof is
by induction on the size of 〈K ′, E′〉.
The basic case is when 〈K ′, E′〉 satisfies the conditions 2, 3, and 4: in that case,
SSG(〈K ′, E′〉) = {〈K ′, E′〉}, and by letting 〈K ′′, E′′〉 = 〈K ′, E′〉 we get the expected re-
sult.
We now analyze the other case. There is a strongly connected component of 〈K ′, E′〉, say
〈K ′′, E′′〉, which contains 〈K,E〉, because 〈K,E〉 satisfies condition 2. We have vA(K) .A
vA(K ′′) (because K ⊆ K ′′ and .A is monotonic) for every A, and thus W (G, v(K)) ⊆
W (G, v(K ′′)). This ensures that T (〈K ′′, E′′〉) contains 〈K,E〉 as a subgraph. Since 〈K ′′, E′′〉
is a subgraph of 〈K ′, E′〉, the graph T (〈K ′′, E′′〉) also is. We show that they are not equal,
so that we can apply the induction hypothesis to T (〈K ′′, E′′〉). For this, we exploit the fact
that 〈K ′, E′〉 does not satisfy one of conditions 2 to 4:
• first, if 〈K ′, E′〉 is not strongly connected while 〈K ′′, E′′〉 is, they cannot be equal;
• if there is some k ∈ K ′ such that (k,Agt) is not in W (G, v(K ′)), then k is not a vertex of
T (〈K ′′, E′′〉);
• if there some edge (k, k′) in E′ such that there is no state (k,Agt,mAgt) in W (G, v(K
′))
such that Tab(k,mAgt) = k
′, then the edge (k, k′) is not in T (〈K ′′, E′′〉).
We then apply the induction hypothesis to T (〈K ′′, E′′〉), and get the expected result. Now,
because of condition 1, uA . vA(K) . wA. Hence, due to the previous analysis, there exists
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〈K ′, E′〉 ∈ SSG
(
〈
⋂
A∈Agt S
A,Edg′〉
)
such that 〈K,E〉 ⊆ 〈K ′, E′〉. This concludes the proof
of the lemma. 
Lemma 5.12. Under assumptions (⋆), if for every K, the set W (G, v(K)) can be computed
in polynomial time, then the set Sol can also be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Each recursive call to SSG applies to a decomposition in strongly connected compo-
nents of the current transition system under consideration. Hence the number of recursive
calls is bounded by |States|2. Computing the decomposition in SCCs can be done in linear
time. By assumption, each set W (G, v(K)) can be computed in polynomial time. SA is
obtained by removing the target of the losers (for wA) from States. Hence globally we can
compute Sol in polynomial time. 
To conclude the algorithm, we need to check that condition 5 holds for one of the
solutions 〈K,E〉 in Sol. It can be done in polynomial time by looking for a path in the
winning region of Eve in H(G, v(K)) that reaches K×{Agt} from (s,Agt). The correctness
of the algorithm is ensured by the fact that if some 〈K,E〉 satisfies the five conditions, there
is a 〈K ′, E′〉 in Sol with K ⊆ K ′ and E ⊆ E′. Since K ⊆ K ′ implies vA(K) .A v
A(K ′), the
winning region of Eve in H(G, v(K ′)) is larger than that H(G, v(K ′)), which implies that
the path from (s,Agt) to K × {Agt} is also a path from (s,Agt) to K ′ × {Agt}. Hence,
〈K ′, E′〉 also satisfies condition 5, and therefore the five expected conditions.
We have already mentioned that single Bu¨chi objectives do satisfy the hypotheses (⋆).
Furthermore, Lemma 5.9 shows that, given v(K), one can compute the set W (G, v(K)) as
the winning region of a co-Bu¨chi turn-based game, which can be done in polynomial time
(this is argued at the beginning of the section). Therefore Lemma 5.12 and the subsequent
analysis apply: this concludes the proof that the constrained NE existence problem for finite
games with single Bu¨chi objectives is in P.
5.3.3. Hardness. We recall a possible proof of P-hardness for the value problem, from which
we will infer the other lower bounds. The circuit-value problem can be easily encoded into
a deterministic turn-based game with Bu¨chi objectives: a circuit (which we assume w.l.o.g.
has only AND- and OR-gates) is transformed into a two-player turn-based game, where one
player controls the AND-gates and the other player controls the OR-gates. We add self-loops
on the leaves. Positive leaves of the circuit are the (Bu¨chi) objective of the OR-player, and
negative leaves are the (Bu¨chi) objective of the AND-player. Then obviously, the circuit
evaluates to true iff the OR-player has a winning strategy for satisfying his Bu¨chi condition,
which in turn is equivalent to the fact that there is an equilibrium with payoff 0 for the
AND-player, by Proposition 3.2. We obtain P-hardness for the NE existence problem, using
Proposition 3.4: the preference relations in the game constructed in Proposition 3.4 are
Bu¨chi objectives.
5.4. Co-Bu¨chi objectives. The value problem for co-Bu¨chi objectives is P-complete. We
now prove that the constrained NE existence problem is in NP, and that the constrained
NE existence problem and the NE existence problem are NP-hard. We therefore deduce:
Theorem 5.13. For finite games with single co-Bu¨chi objectives, the NE existence problem
and the constrained NE existence problem are NP-complete.
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The proof of this Theorem is very similar to that for safety objectives: instead of
conjunction of reachability objectives, we need to deal with conjunction of Bu¨chi objectives.
Of course constructions and algorithms need to be adapted. That is what we present now.
5.4.1. Reduction to a conjunction of Bu¨chi conditions. We assume that for every player A,
ΩA is a single co-Bu¨chi objective ΩA given by TA. In the corresponding suspect game, we
show that the goal of player Eve is equivalent to a conjunction of Bu¨chi objectives. Let
L ⊆ Agt. In suspect game H(G, L), we define several Bu¨chi objectives as follows: for each
A ∈ L, we define T ′A = TA × {P | P ⊆ Agt} ∪ States × {P | A 6∈ P}, and we write Ω
′
A for
the corresponding Bu¨chi objective.
Lemma 5.14. A play ρ is winning for Eve in H(G, L) iff ρ ∈
⋂
A∈LΩ
′
A.
Proof. Let ρ be a play in H(G, L), and assume it is winning for Eve. Then, for each
A ∈ λ(ρ) ∩ L, ρ /∈ ΩA, which means that the target set TA is visited along proj1(ρ), and
therefore T ′A is visited infinitely often along ρ. If A /∈ λ(ρ), then a state (s, P ) with A /∈ P
is visited infinitely often by ρ: the target set T ′A is visited infinitely often. This implies that
ρ ∈
⋂
A∈LΩ
′
A.
Conversely let ρ ∈
⋂
A∈LΩ
′
A. For every A ∈ L, T
′
A is visited infinitely often by ρ. Then,
either TA is visited infinitely often by proj1(ρ) (which means that ρ /∈ ΩA) or A 6∈ λ(ρ). In
particular, ρ is a winning play for Eve in H(G, L). 
5.4.2. Algorithm for solving zero-sum games with a conjunction of Bu¨chi objectives. We
adapt the algorithm for conjunctions of reachability objectives (page 28) to conjunctions
of Bu¨chi objectives. Let G be a two-player turn-based game with a winning objective for
Eve given as a conjunction of Bu¨chi objectives Ω1, . . . ,Ωk. The idea is to construct a new
game G′ which checks that each objective Ωi is visited infinitely often. The vertices of G
′
controlled by Eve and Adam are V ′∃ = V∃× [[0, k]] and V
′
∀ = V∀× [[0, k]] respectively. There is a
transition from (v, k) to (v′, 0) iff there is a transition from v to v′ in the original game and
for 0 ≤ i < k, there is a transition from (v, i) to (v′, i+ 1) iff there is a transition from v to
v′ in the original game and v′ ∈ Ωi+1. In G
′, the objective for Eve is the Bu¨chi objective Ω
given by target set States × {k}, where States = V∃ ∪ V∀ is the set of vertices of G. It is
clear that there is a winning strategy in G from v0 for the conjunction of Bu¨chi objectives
Ω1, . . . ,Ωk iff there is a winning strategy in G
′ from (v0, 0) for the Bu¨chi objective Ω. The
number of states of game G′ is |States′| = |States| · k, and the size of the transition table
|Tab′| = |Tab| ·k. Using the standard algorithm for turn-based Bu¨chi objectives [13], which
works in time O(|States′| · |Tab′|), we obtain an algorithm for solving zero-sum games with a
conjunction of Bu¨chi objectives running in time O(k2 · |States| · |Tab|) (hence in polynomial
time).
5.4.3. Algorithm. The algorithm is the same as for reachability objectives. Only the com-
putation of the set of winning states in the suspect game is different. Since we just showed
that this part can be done in polynomial time, the global algorithm still runs in (non-
deterministic) polynomial time.
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c1 c2 cn+1
A1 A1
ℓ1,1
ℓ1,2
ℓ1,3
⊥
. . .
Figure 13. Module M(φ), where φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn and ci = ℓi,1 ∨ ℓi,2 ∨ ℓi,3
5.4.4. Hardness. The hardness result for the constrained NE existence problem with co-
Bu¨chi objectives was already proven in [40]. The idea is to encode an instance of 3SAT into
a game with co-Bu¨chi objectives. For completeness we describe the reduction below, and
explain how it can be modified for proving NP-hardness of the NE existence problem.
Let us consider an instance φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn of SAT, where ci = ℓi,1 ∨ ℓi,2 ∨ ℓi,3, and
ℓi,j ∈ {xk,¬xk | 1 ≤ k ≤ p}. The game G is obtained from module M(φ) depicted on
Figure 13, by joining the outgoing edge of cn+1 to c1. Each module M(φ) involves a set of
players Bk, one for each variable xk, and a player A1. Player A1 controls the clause states.
Player Bk control the literal states ℓi,j when ℓi,j = ¬xk, then having the opportunity to go
to state ⊥. There is no transition to ⊥ for literals of the form xk. In M(φ), assuming that
the players Bk will not play to ⊥, then A1 has a strategy that does not visit both xk and ¬xk
for every k if, and only if, formula φ is satisfiable. Finally, the co-Bu¨chi objective of Bk is
given by {xk}. In other terms, the aim of Bk is to visit xk only a finite number of times.
This way, in a Nash equilibrium, it cannot be the case that both xk and ¬xk are visited
infinitely often: it would imply that Bk loses but could improve her payoff by going to ⊥
(actually, ¬xk should not be visited at all if xk is visited infinitely often). Therefore setting
the objective of A1 to {⊥}, there is a Nash equilibrium where she wins iff φ is satisfiable.
This shows NP-hardness for the constrained NE existence problem.
For the NE existence problem, we use the transformation described in Section 3.4. We
add an extra player A2 to G and consider the game G
′ = E(G, A1, A2, ρ), where ρ is a winning
path for A1. The objective of the players in G
′ can be described by co-Bu¨chi objectives:
A2 has to avoid seeing T = {s1} infinitely often and keep the same target for A1. Applying
Proposition 3.5, there is a Nash equilibrium in G′ if, and only if, there is one in G where
A1 wins, this shows NP-hardness for the NE existence problem.
5.5. Objectives given as circuits. The value problem is known to be PSPACE-complete
for turn-based games and objectives given as circuits [27]. The transformation presented in
the beginning of the section can be used to decide the value problem for finite concurrent
games with a single circuit-objective, yielding PSPACE-completeness of the value problem
in the case of finite concurrent games as well.
We now show that the (constrained) NE existence problem is also PSPACE-complete in
this framework:
Theorem 5.15. For finite games with single objectives given as circuits, the NE existence
problem and the constrained NE existence problem are PSPACE-complete.
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5.5.1. Reduction to a circuit objective. We assume the preference relation of each player
A ∈ Agt is given by a circuit CA. Let L ⊆ Agt. We define a Boolean circuit defining the
winning condition of Eve in the suspect game H(G, L).
We define for each player A ∈ Agt and each set P of players (such that States × P is
reachable in H(G, L)), a circuit DA,P which outputs true for the plays ρ with λ(ρ) = P (i.e.
whose states that are visited infinitely often are in States×{P}), and whose value by CA is
true. We do so by making a copy of the circuit CA, adding |States| OR gates g1 · · · g|States|
and one AND gate h. There is an edge from (si, P ) to gi and from gi−1 to gi if i < |States|
then there is an edge from the output gate of CA to h and from h to the output gate of
the new circuit. Inputs of CA are now the (s, P )’s (instead of the s’s). The circuit DA,P is
given on Figure 14.
(s1, P ) (s2, P ) (sn, P ). . .
CA
∨
g1
∨
g2
. . . ∨
gn ∧
h
Figure 14. Circuit DA,P
We then define a circuit EA which outputs true for the plays ρ with A ∈ λ(ρ) and
whose output by CA is true. We do so by taking the disjunction of the circuits DA,P .
Formally, for each set of players P such that States × P is reachable in the suspect game
and A ∈ P , we include the circuit DA,P and writing oA,P for its output gate, we add OR
gates so that there is an edge from oA,P to gi and from gi to gi+1, and then from gn+1 to
the output gate.
Finally we define the circuit FL, which outputs true for the plays ρ such that there is
no A ∈ L such that A ∈ λ(ρ) and the output of proj1(ρ) by CA is true. This corresponds
exactly to the plays that are winning for Eve in suspect game H(G, L). We do so by negating
the disjunction of all the circuits EA for A ∈ L.
The next lemma follows from the construction:
Lemma 5.16. A play ρ is winning for Eve in H(G, L) iff ρ evaluates circuit FL to true.
We should notice that circuit FL has size polynomial in the size of G, thanks to Propo-
sition 4.8.
5.5.2. Algorithm and complexity analysis. To solve the constrained NE existence problem
we apply the same algorithm as for reachability objectives (see section 5.1). For complexity
matters, the only difference stands in the computation of the set of winning states in the
suspect game. Thanks to Lemma 5.16, we know it reduces to the computation of the set of
winning states in a turn-based game with an objective given as a circuit (of polynomial-size).
This can be done in PSPACE [27], which yields a PSPACE upper bound for the constrained NE
existence problem (and therefore for the NE existence problem and the value problem – see
Proposition 3.2). PSPACE-hardness of all problems follows from that of the value problem
in turn-based games [27], and from Propositions 3.2 and 3.4 (we notice that the preference
relations in the new games are easily definable by circuits).
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5.6. Rabin and parity objectives. The value problem is known to be NP-complete for
Rabin conditions [18] and in UP∩ co-UP for parity conditions [28].
We then notice that a parity condition is a Rabin condition with half as many pairs as
the number of priorities: assume the parity condition is given by p : States 7→ [[0, d]] with
d ∈ N; take for i in [[0, d2 ]], Qi = p
−1{2i} and Ri = p
−1{2j + 1 | j ≥ i}. Then the Rabin
objective (Qi, Ri)0≤i≤ d
2
is equivalent to the parity condition given by p.
We design an algorithm that solves the constrained NE existence problem in PNP‖ for
Rabin objectives (see footnote 1 on page 4 for an informal definition of PNP‖ ).
Our algorithm heavily uses non-determinism (via the oracle). We then propose a deter-
ministic algorithm which runs in exponential time, but will be useful in Section 5.7. This
subsection ends with proving PNP‖ -hardness of the constrained NE existence problem and
NE existence problem for parity objectives. In the end, we will have proven the following
theorem:
Theorem 5.17. For finite games with single objectives given as Rabin or parity conditions,
the NE existence problem and the constrained NE existence problem are PNP‖ -complete.
5.6.1. Reduction to a Streett game. We assume that the preference relation of each player
A ∈ Agt is given by the Rabin condition (Qi,A, Ri,A)i∈[[1,kA]]. Let L ⊆ Agt. In the suspect
game H(G, L), we define the Streett objective (Q′i,A, R
′
i,A)i∈[[1,kA]],A∈L, where Q
′
i,A = (Qi,A×
{P | A ∈ P}) ∪ (States × {P | A 6∈ P}) and R′i,A = Ri,A × {P | A ∈ P}, and we write ΩL
for the corresponding set of winning plays.
Lemma 5.18. A play ρ is winning for Eve in H(G, L) iff ρ ∈ ΩL.
Proof. Assume ρ is winning for Eve in H(G, L). For all A ∈ λ(ρ)∩L, proj1(ρ) does not satisfy
the Rabin condition given by (Qi,A, Ri,A)i∈[[1,kA]]. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ kA, Inf(proj1(ρ))∩Qi,A = ∅
or Inf(proj1(ρ)) ∩ Ri,A 6= ∅. We infer that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ kA, Inf(ρ) ∩ Q
′
i,A = ∅ or
Inf(ρ)∩R′i,A 6= ∅. Now, if A /∈ λ(ρ) then all Q
′
i,A are seen infinitely often along ρ. Therefore
for every A ∈ L, the Streett conditions (Q′i,A, R
′
i,A) is satisfied along ρ (that is, ρ ∈ ΩL).
Conversely, if the Streett condition (Q′i,A, R
′
i,A)i∈[[1,kA]],A∈L is satisfied along ρ, then
either the Rabin condition (Qi,A, Ri,A) is not satisfied along proj1(ρ) or A 6∈ λ(ρ). This
means that Eve is winning in H(G, L). 
5.6.2. Algorithm. We now describe a PNP‖ algorithm for solving the constrained NE existence
problem in games where each player has a single Rabin objective. As in the previous cases,
our algorithm relies on the suspect game construction.
Write P for the set of sets of players of Agt that appear as the second item of a state
of J (G):
P = {P ⊆ Agt | ∃s ∈ States. (s, P ) is a state of J (G)}.
Since J (G) has size polynomial, so has P. Also, for any path ρ, λ(ρ) is a set of P. Hence,
for a fixed L, the number of sets λ(ρ) ∩ L is polynomial. Now, as recalled on page 25,
the winning condition for Eve is that the players in λ(ρ) ∩ L must be losing along proj1(ρ)
in G for their Rabin objective. We have seen that this can be seen as a Streett objective
(Lemma 5.18).
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Now, deciding whether a state is winning in a turn-based game for a Streett condition
can be decided in coNP [18]. Hence, given a state s ∈ States and a set L, we can decide
in coNP whether s is winning for Eve in H(G, L). This will be used as an oracle in our
algorithm below.
Now, pick a set P ⊆ Agt of suspects, i.e., for which there exists (s, t) ∈ States2 andmAgt
s.t. P = Susp((s, t),mAgt). Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4.8,
it can be shown that 2|P | ≤ |Tab|, so that the number of subsets of P is polynomial. Now,
for each set P of suspects and each L ⊆ P , write w(L) for the size of the winning region
of Eve in H(G, L). Then the sum
∑
P∈P\{Agt}
∑
L⊆P w(L) is at most |States| × |Tab|
2.
Assume that the exact value M of this sum is known, and consider the following algo-
rithm:
(1) for each P ⊆ P \ {Agt} and each L ⊆ P , guess a set W (L) ⊆ States, which we intend
to be the exact winning region for Eve in H(G, L).
(2) check that the sizes of those sets sum up to M ;
(3) for each s /∈W (L), check that Eve does not have a winning strategy from s in H(G, L).
This can be checked in non-deterministic polynomial time, as explained above.
(4) guess a lasso-shaped path ρ = π · τω in H(G, L) starting from (s,Agt), with |π| and
|τ | less than |States|2 (following Proposition 3.1) visiting only states where the second
item is Agt. This path can be seen as the outcome of some strategy of Eve when Adam
obeys. For this path, we then check the following:
• along ρ, the sets of winning and losing players satisfy the original constraint (remem-
ber that we aim at solving the constrained NE existence problem);
• any deviation along ρ leads to a state that is winning for Eve. In other terms, pick a
state h = (s,Agt,mAgt) of Adam along ρ, and pick a successor h
′ = (t, P ) of h such
that t 6= Tab(s,mAgt). Then the algorithm checks that t ∈W (L ∩ P ).
The algorithm accepts the input M if it succeeds in finding the sets W and the path ρ
such that all the checks are successful. This algorithm is non-deterministic and runs in
polynomial time, and will be used as a second oracle.
We now show that if M is exactly the sum of the w(L), then the algorithm accepts M
if, and only if, there is a Nash equilibrium satisfying the constraint, i.e., if, and only if, Eve
has a winning strategy from (s,Agt) in H(G, L).
First assume that the algorithm accepts M . This means that it is able, for each L, to
find setsW (L) of states whose complement does not intersect the winning region of H(G, L).
Since M is assumed to be the exact sum of w(L) and the size of the sets W (L) sum up
to M , we deduce that W (L) is exactly the winning region of Eve in H(G, L). Now, since
the algorithm accepts, it is also able to find a (lasso-shaped) path ρ only visiting states
having Agt as the second component. This path has the additional property that any
“deviation” from a state of Adam along this path ends up in a state that is winning for Eve
for players in L ∩ P , where P is the set of suspects for the present deviation. This way, if
during ρ, Adam deviates to a state (t, P ), then Eve will have a strategy to ensure that along
any subsequent play, the objectives of players in L∩P (in G) are not fulfilled, so that along
any run ρ′, the players in L ∩ λ(ρ′) are losing for their objectives in G, so that Eve wins
in H(G, L).
Conversely, assume that there is a Nash equilibrium satisfying the constraint. Following
Proposition 3.1, we assume that the outcome of the corresponding strategy profile has
the form π · τω. From Lemma 4.4, there is a winning strategy for Eve in H(G, L) whose
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outcome when Adam obeys follows the outcome of the Nash equilibrium. As a consequence,
the outcome when Adam obeys is a path ρ that the algorithm can guess. Indeed, it must
satisfy the constraints, and any deviation from ρ with set of suspects P ends in a state
where Eve wins for the winning condition of H(G, L), hence also for the winning condition
of H(G, L ∩ P ), since any path ρ′ visiting (t, P ) has λ(ρ′) ⊆ P .
Finally, our global algorithm is as follows: we run the first oracle for all the states and
all the sets L that are subsets of a set of suspects (we know that there are polynomially
many such inputs). We also run the second algorithm on all the possible values for M ,
which are also polynomially many. Now, from the answers of the first oracle, we compute
the exact value M , and return the value given by the second on that input. This algorithm
runs in PNP‖ and decides the constrained NE existence problem.
5.6.3. Deterministic algorithm. In the next section we will need a deterministic algorithm to
solve games with objectives given as deterministic Rabin automata. We therefore present it
right now. The deterministic algorithm works by successively trying all the possible payoffs,
there are 2|Agt| of them. Then it computes the winning strategies of the suspect game for
that payoff. In [25] an algorithm for Streett games is given, which works in time O(nk · k!),
where n is the number of vertices in the game, and k the size of the Streett condition. The
algorithm has to find, in the winning region of Eve in J (G), a lasso that satisfies the Rabin
winning conditions of the winners and do not satisfy whose of the losers. To do so it tries
all the possible choices of elementary Rabin condition that are satisfied to make the players
win, there are at most
∏
A∈Agt kA possible choices. And for the losers, we try the possible
choices for whether Qi,A is visited of not, there are
∏
A∈Agt 2
kA such choices. It then looks
for a lasso cycle that, when A is a winner, does not visit QiA,A and visits RiA,A, and when A
is a loser, visits RiA,A when it has to, or does not visit QiA,A. This is equivalent to finding
a path satisfying a conjunction of Bu¨chi conditions and can be done in polynomial time
O(n×
∑
A∈Agt kA). The global algorithm works in time
O

2|Agt| ·

|Tab|3∑A kA · (∑
A
kA)! +

 ∏
A∈Agt
kA · 2
kA

 · |Tab|3 ·∑
A
kA




Notice that the exponential does not come from the size of the graph but from the number of
agents and the number of elementary Rabin conditions, this will be important when in the
next subsection we will reuse the algorithm on a game structure whose size is exponential.
5.6.4. PNP‖ -hardness. We now prove P
NP
‖ -hardness of the (constrained) NE existence prob-
lem in the case of parity objectives. The main reduction is an encoding of the ⊕SAT
problem, where the aim is to decide whether the number of satisfiable instances among a
set of formulas is even. This problem is known to be complete for PNP‖ [22].
Before tackling the whole reduction, we first develop some preliminaries on single in-
stances of SAT, inspired from [12]. Let us consider an instance φ = c1∧· · ·∧cn of SAT, where
ci = ℓi,1 ∨ ℓi,2 ∨ ℓi,3, and ℓi,j ∈ {xk,¬xk | 1 ≤ k ≤ p}. With φ, we associate a three-player
game N(φ), depicted on Figure 15 (where the first state of N(φ) is controlled by A1, and
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N(φ)
A1
N ′(c1)
N ′(c2)
...
N ′(cn)
N ′(ci)
A2/A3
ℓi,1
ℓi,2
ℓi,3
N(φ)
〈2,2〉
〈0,1〉
〈1,0〉
〈1,1〉
〈2,0〉
〈0,2〉
〈0,0〉
〈2,1〉
〈1,2〉
Figure 15. The game N(φ) (left), where N ′(ci) is the module on the right.
the first state of each N ′(cj) is concurrently controlled by A2 and A3). For each variable xj,
players A2 and A3 have the following target sets:
TA22j = {xj} T
A2
2j+1 = {¬xj} T
A3
2j+1 = {xj} T
A3
2j = {¬xj}
This construction enjoys interesting properties, given by the following lemma:
Lemma 5.19. If the formula φ is not satisfiable, then there is a strategy for player A1
in N(φ) such that players A2 and A3 lose. If the formula φ is satisfiable, then for any
strategy profile σAgt, one of A2 and A3 can change her strategy and win.
Proof. We begin with the first statement, assuming that φ is not satisfiable and defining the
strategy for A1. With a history h in N(φ), we associate a valuation v
h : {xk | k ∈ [1, p]} →
{⊤,⊥} (where p is the number of distinct variables in φ), defined as follows:
vh(xk) = ⊤ ⇔ ∃m. hm = xk ∧ ∀m
′ > m. hm′ 6= ¬xk for all k ∈ [1, p]
We also define vh(¬xk) = ¬v
h(xk). Under this definition, v
h(xk) = ⊤ if the last occurrence
of xk or ¬xk along h was xk. We then define a strategy σ1 for player A1: after a history h
ending in an A1-state, we require σ1(h) to go to N
′(ci) for some ci (with least index, say)
that evaluates to false under vh (such a ci exists since φ is not satisfiable). This strategy
enforces that if h · σ1(h) · ℓi,j is a finite outcome of σ1, then v
h(ℓi,j) = ⊥, because A1 has
selected a clause ci whose literals all evaluate to ⊥. Moreover, v
h·σ1(h)·ℓi,j (ℓi,j) = ⊤, so that
for each j, any outcome of σ1 will either alternate between xk and ¬xk (hence visit both
of them infinitely often), or no longer visit any of them after some point. Hence both A2
and A3 lose.
We now prove the second statement. Let v be a valuation under which φ evaluates
to true, and σAgt be a strategy profile. From σA2 and σA3 , we define two strategies σ
′
A2
and σ′A3 . Consider a finite history h ending in the first state of N
′(ci), for some i. Pick
a literal ℓi,j of ci that is true under v (the one with least index, say). We set
σ′A2(h) = [j − σA3(h) (mod 3)] σ
′
A3
(h) = [j − σA2(h) (mod 3)].
It is easily checked that, when σA2 and σ
′
A3
(or σ′A2 and σA3) are played simultaneously
in the first state of some N ′(ci), then the game goes to ℓi,j. Thus under those strategies,
any visited literal evaluates to true under v, which means that at most one of xk and ¬xk
is visited (infinitely often). Hence one of A2 and A3 is winning, which proves our claim.

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We now proceed by encoding an instance
∃x11, . . . x
1
k. φ
1(x11, . . . , x
1
k)
. . .
∃xm1 , . . . x
m
k . φ
m(xm1 , . . . , x
m
k )
of ⊕SAT into a parity game. The game involves the three players A1, A2 and A3 of the
game N(φ) defined above, and it will contain a copy of N(φr) for each 1 ≤ r ≤ m. The ob-
jectives of A2 and A3 are the unions of their objectives in each N(φ
r), e.g. pA2(x1j ) =
pA2(x2j ) = · · · = p
Am(xmj ) = 2j.
For each such r, the game will also contain a copy of the game M(φr) depicted on
Figure 13. Each game M(φr) involves an extra set of players Brk, one for each variable x
r
k.
As we have seen in Section 5.4, in a Nash equilibrium, it cannot be the case that both xrk
and ¬xrk are visited infinitely often.
In order to test the parity of the number of satisfiable formulas, we then define two
families of modules, depicted on Figure 16 to 19. Finally, the whole game G is depicted on
Figure 20. In that game, the objective of A1 is to visit infinitely often the initial state init.
A1
M(φr) G(φr−1)
A2/A3
N(φr)
H(φr−1)
〈1,0〉
〈0,1〉
〈1,
1〉
〈0,
0〉
Figure 16. Module H(φr) for r ≥ 2
A1
M(φr) H(φr−1)
A2/A3
N(φr)
G(φr−1)
〈1,0〉
〈0,1〉
〈1,
1〉
〈0,
0〉
Figure 17. Module G(φr) for r ≥ 2
M(φ1)
Fig. 18. Module H(φ1)
A2/A3
N(φ1)
〈0,0〉
〈1,1〉
〈1,0〉 〈0,1〉
Fig. 19. Module G(φ1)
init G(φm)
Fig. 20. The game G
Lemma 5.20. There is a Nash equilibrium in the game G where A2 and A3 lose and A1
wins if, and only if, the number of satisfiable formulas is even.
Proof. Assume that there is a Nash equilibrium in G where A1 wins and both A2 and A3
lose. Let ρ be its outcome. As already noted, if ρ visits module M(φr) infinitely often,
then it cannot be the case that both xrk and ¬x
r
k are visited infinitely often in M(φ
r), as
otherwise Brk would be losing and have the opportunity to improve her payoff. This implies
that φr is satisfiable. Similarly, if ρ visits infinitely often the states of H(φr) or G(φr) that
is controlled by A2 and A3, then it must be the case that φ
r is not satisfiable, since from
Lemma 5.19 this would imply that A2 or A3 could deviate and improve her payoff by going
to N(φr).
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We now show by induction on r that if ρ goes infinitely often in module G(φr) then
#{j ≤ r | φr is satisfiable} is even, and that (if n > 1) this number is odd if ρ goes infinitely
in module H(φr).
When r = 1, since H(φ1) is M(φ1), φ1 is satisfiable, as noted above. Similarly, if ρ
visits G(φ1) infinitely often, it also visits its A2/A3-state infinitely often, so that φ
1 is not
satisfiable. This proves the base case.
Assume that the result holds up to some r−1, and assume that ρ visits G(φr) infinitely
often. Two cases may occur:
• it can be the case that M(φr) is visited infinitely often, as well as H(φr−1). Then φr is
satisfiable, and the number of satisfiable formulas with index less than or equal to r − 1
is odd. Hence the number of satisfiable formulas with index less than or equal to r is
even.
• it can also be the case that the state A2/A3 of G(φ
r) is visited infinitely often. Then φr is
not satisfiable. Moreover, since A1 wins, the play will also visit G(φ
r−1) infinitely often,
so that the number of satisfiable formulas with index less than or equal to r is even.
If ρ visits H(φr) infinitely often, using similar arguments we prove that the number of
satisfiable formulas with index less than or equal to r is odd.
To conclude, since A1 wins, the play visits G(φ
m) infinitely often, so that the total
number of satisfiable formulas is even.
Conversely, assume that the number of satisfiable formulas is even. We build a strat-
egy profile, which we prove is a Nash equilibrium in which A1 wins, and A2 and A3 lose.
The strategy for A1 in the initial states of H(φ
r) and G(φr) is to go to M(φr) when φr
is satisfiable, and to state A2/A3 otherwise. In M(φ
r), the strategy is to play according
to a valuation satisfying φr. In N(φr), it follows a strategy along which A2 and A3 lose
(this exists according to Lemma 5.19). This defines the strategy for A1. Then A2 and A3
are required to always play the same move, so that the play never goes to some N(φr).
In N(φr), they can play any strategy (they lose anyway, whatever they do). Finally, the
strategy of Brk never goes to ⊥.
We now explain why this is the Nash equilibrium we are after. First, as A1 plays
according to fixed valuations for the variables xrk, either B
r
k wins or she does not have
the opportunity to go to ⊥. It remains to prove that A1 wins, and that A2 and A3 lose
and cannot improve (individually). To see this, notice that between two consecutive visits
to init, exactly one of G(φr) and H(φr) is visited. More precisely, it can be observed that
the strategy of A1 enforces that G(φ
r) is visited if #{r < r′ ≤ m | φr
′
is satisfiable} is even,
and that H(φr) is visited otherwise. Then if H(φ1) is visited, the number of satisfiable
formulas with index between 2 and m is odd, so that φ1 is satisfiable and A1 can return
to init. If G(φ1) is visited, an even number of formulas with index between 2 and m is
satisfiable, and φ1 is not. Hence A1 has a strategy in N(φ
1) to make A2 and A3 lose, so
that A2 and A3 cannot improve their payoffs. 
This proves hardness for the constrained NE existence problem with parity objectives.
For the NE existence problem, we use the construction of Section 3.4, but since it can
only be used to get rid of constraint of the type “A1 is winning”, we add to the game
two players, A4 and A5, whose objectives are opposite to A2 and A3 respectively, and one
player A6 that will be playing matching-penny games. The objectives for A4 and A5 are
definable by parity objectives, by adding 1 to all the priorities. Then, we consider game
G′ = E(E(E(G, A1 , A6, ρ1), A4, A6, ρ4), A5, A6, ρ5) where ρ1, ρ4 and ρ5 are winning paths
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for A1, A4 and A5 respectively. Thanks to Proposition 3.5, there is a Nash equilibrium
in G′ if, and only if, there is a Nash equilibrium in G where A1 wins and A2 and A3 lose.
We deduce PNP‖ -hardness for the NE existence problem with parity objectives.
5.7. Objectives given as deterministic Rabin automata. In order to find Nash equi-
libria when objectives are given as deterministic Rabin automata, we first define the notion
of game simulation, which we show has the property that when G′ game-simulates G, then
a Nash equilibrium in the latter game gives rise to a Nash equilibrium in the former one.
We then define the product of a game with automata (defining the objectives of the
players), and show that it game-simulates the original game. This reduces the case of games
with objectives are defined as Rabin automata to games with Rabin objectives, which we
handled at the previous section; the resulting algorithm is in EXPTIME. We then show a
PSPACE lower bound for the problem in the case of objectives given as deterministic Bu¨chi
automata. This proves the following theorem:
Theorem 5.21. For finite games with single objectives given as deterministic Rabin au-
tomata or deterministic Bu¨chi automata, the NE existence problem and the constrained NE
existence problem are in EXPTIME and PSPACE-hard.
It must be noticed that game simulation can be used in other contexts: in particular,
in [4] (where we introduced this notion), it is shown that a region-based abstraction of timed
games game simulates its original timed game, which provides a way of computing Nash
equilibria in timed games.
5.7.1. Game simulation. We define game simulation and show how that can be used to
compute Nash equilibria. We then apply it to objectives given as deterministic Rabin
automata.
Definition 5.22. Consider two games G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 and
G′ = 〈States′,Agt,Act′,Mov′,Tab′, (-′A)A∈Agt〉 with the same set Agt of players. A relation
⊳ ⊆ States × States′ is a game simulation if s ⊳ s′ implies that for each move mAgt in G
there exists a move m′Agt in G
′ such that:
(1) Tab(s,mAgt) ⊳ Tab
′(s′,m′Agt), and
(2) for each t′ ∈ States′ there exists t ∈ States with t ⊳ t′ and
Susp((s′, t′),m′Agt) ⊆ Susp((s, t),mAgt).
If ⊳ is a game simulation and (s0, s
′
0) ∈ ⊳, we say that G
′ game-simulates (or simply sim-
ulates) G. When there are two paths ρ and ρ′ such that ρ=i ⊳ ρ
′
=i for all i ∈ N, we will
simply write ρ ⊳ ρ′.
A game simulation ⊳ is preference-preserving from (s0, s
′
0) ∈ States × States
′ if for all
ρ1, ρ2 ∈ PlayG(s0) and ρ
′
1, ρ
′
2 ∈ PlayG′(s
′
0) with ρ1 ⊳ ρ
′
1 and ρ2 ⊳ ρ
′
2, for all A ∈ Agt it holds
that ρ1 -A ρ2 iff ρ
′
1 -
′
A ρ
′
2.
As we show now, Nash equilibria are preserved by game simulation, in the following
sense:
Proposition 5.23. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 and G
′ = 〈States′,Agt,
Act′,Mov′,Tab′, (-′A)A∈Agt〉 be two games involving the same set of players. Fix two states
s0 and s
′
0 in G and G
′ respectively, and let ⊳ be a preference-preserving game simulation
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from (s0, s
′
0). If there exists a Nash equilibrium σAgt in G from s0, then there exists a Nash
equilibrium σ′Agt in G
′ from s′0 with OutG(s0, σAgt) ⊳ OutG′(s
′
0, σ
′
Agt).
Proof. We fix a strategy profile σAgt in G and ρ the outcome of σAgt from s0. We derive a
strategy profile σ′Agt in G
′ and its outcome ρ′ from s′0, such that:
(a) for every ρ′ ∈ PlayG′(s
′
0), there exists ρ ∈ PlayG(s0) s.t. ρ ⊳ ρ
′ and Susp(ρ′, σ′Agt) ⊆
Susp(ρ, σAgt);
(b) ρ ⊳ ρ′.
Assume we have done the construction, and that σAgt is a Nash equilibrium in G.
We prove that σ′Agt is a Nash equilibrium in G
′. Towards a contradiction, assume that some
player A has a strategy σ′A in G
′ such that ρ′ 6-A ρ
′, where ρ′ = OutG′(s
′, σ′Agt[A 7→ σ
′
A]).
Note that A ∈ Susp(ρ′, σ′Agt). Applying ((a)) above, there exists ρ ∈ PlayG(s0) such that
ρ ⊳ ρ′ and Susp(ρ′, σ′Agt) ⊆ Susp(ρ, σAgt). In particular, A ∈ Susp(ρ, σAgt), and there exists
a strategy σA for A such that ρ = OutG(s0, σAgt[A 7→ σ]). As ρ ⊳ ρ
′ (by ((b))) and ⊳ is
preference-preserving from (s0, s
′
0), ρ 6-A ρ, which contradicts the fact that σAgt is a Nash
equilibrium. Hence, σ′Agt is a Nash equilibrium in G
′ from s′0.
It remains to show how we construct σ′Agt (and ρ
′). We first build ρ′ inductively, and
define σ′Agt along that path.
• Initially, we let ρ′=0 = s
′
0. Since ⊳ is a game simulation containing (s0, s
′
0), we have
s0 ⊳ s
′
0, and there is a move m
′
Agt associated with σAgt(s0) satisfying the conditions of
Definition 5.22. Then ρ=0 ⊳ ρ
′
=0, and Susp(ρ
′
=0, σ
′
Agt(ρ
′
=0)) ⊆ Susp(ρ=0, σAgt(ρ=0)).
• Assume we have built ρ′≤i and σ
′
Agt on all the prefixes of ρ
′
≤i, and that they are such that
ρ≤i ⊳ ρ
′
≤i and Susp(ρ
′
≤i, σ
′
Agt) ⊆ Susp(ρ≤i, σAgt) (notice that Susp(ρ
′
≤i, σ
′
Agt) only depends
on the value of σ′Agt on all the prefixes of ρ≤i). In particular, we have ρ=i ⊳ ρ
′
=i, so that
with the move σAgt(ρ≤i), we can associate a move m
′
Agt (to which we set σ
′
Agt(ρ
′
≤i))
satisfying both conditions of Definition 5.22. This defines ρ′=i+1 in such a way that
ρ≤i+1 ⊳ ρ
′
≤i+1; moreover, Susp(ρ
′
≤i+1, σ
′
Agt) = Susp(ρ
′
≤i, σ
′
Agt) ∩ Susp((ρ
′
=i, ρ
′
=i+1),m
′
Agt)
is indeed a subset of Susp(ρ≤i+1, σAgt).
It remains to define σ′Agt outside its outcome ρ
′. Notice that, for our purposes, it suffices to
define σ′Agt on histories starting from s
′
0. We again proceed by induction on the length of the
histories, defining σ′Agt in order to satisfy ((a)) on prefixes of plays of G
′ from s′0. At each
step, we also make sure that for every h′ ∈ HistG′(s
′
0), there exists h ∈ HistG(s) such that
h ⊳ h′, Susp(h′, σ′Agt) ⊆ Susp(h, σAgt), and σAgt(h) and σ
′
Agt(h
′) satisfy the conditions of
Definition 5.22 in the last states of h and h′, resp.
As we only consider histories from s′0, the case of histories of length zero was already
handled. Assume we have defined σ′Agt for histories h
′ of length i, and fix a new history
h′ · t′ ∈ HistG′(s
′
0) of length i + 1 (that is not a prefix of ρ). By induction hypothesis,
there is h ∈ HistG(s0) such that h ⊳ h
′, and Susp(h′, σ′Agt) ⊆ Susp(h, σAgt), and σAgt(h)
and σAgt(h
′) satisfy the required properties. In particular, with t′, we can associate t s.t.
t ⊳ t′ and Susp((last(h′), t′), σ′Agt(h
′)) ⊆ Susp((last(h), t), σAgt(h)). Then (h · t) ⊳ (h
′ · t′).
Since t ⊳ t′, there is a move m′Agt associated with σAgt(h · t) and satisfying the conditions of
Definition 5.22. Letting σ′Agt(h
′ · t′) = m′Agt, we fulfill all the requirements of our induction
hypothesis.
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We now need to lift the property from histories to infinite paths. Consider a play
ρ′ ∈ PlayG′(s
′
0), we will construct a corresponding play ρ in G. Set ρ0 = s0. If ρ has
been defined up to index i and ρi ⊳ ρ
′
i (this is true for i = 0), thanks to the way σ
′
Agt is
constructed, σAgt(ρ≤i) and σ
′
Agt(ρ
′
≤i) satisfy the conditions of Definition 5.22 in ρ≤i and
ρ′i, respectively. We then pick ρi+1 such that ρi+1 ⊳ ρ
′
i+1 and Susp((ρi, ρi+1), σAgt(ρi)) ⊆
Susp((ρ′i, ρ
′
i+1), σ
′
Agt(ρ
′
i)). This being true at each step, the path ρ that is obtained, is such
that ρ ⊳ ρ′ and Susp(ρ′, σ′Agt) ⊆ Susp(ρ, σAgt). This is the desired property. 
5.7.2. Product of a game with deterministic Rabin automata. After this digression on game
simulation, we come back to the game G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉, where
we assume that some player A has her objective given by a deterministic Rabin automaton
A = 〈Q,States, δ, q0, (Qi, Ri)i∈[[1,n]]〉 (recall that this automaton reads sequences of states
of G, and accepts the paths that are winning for player A). We show how to compute Nash
equilibria in G by building a product G′ of G with the automaton A and by computing the
Nash equilibria in the resulting game, with a Rabin winning condition for A.
We define the product of the game G with the automaton A as the game G ⋉ A =
〈States′,Agt,Act,Mov′,Tab′, (-′A)A∈Agt〉, where:
• States′ = States ×Q;
• Mov′((s, q), Aj) = Mov(s,Aj) for every Aj ∈ Agt;
• Tab′((s, q),mAgt) = (s
′, q′) where Tab(s,mAgt) = s
′ and δ(q, s) = q′;
• If B = A then -′B is given by the internal Rabin condition Q
′
i = States × Qi and
R′i = States × R
′
i. Otherwise -
′
B is derived from -B, defined by ρ -
′
B ρ if, and only if,
proj(ρ) -B proj(ρ) (where proj is the projection of States
′ on States). Notice that if -B
is an internal Rabin condition, then so is -′B.
Lemma 5.24. G ⋉ A game-simulates G, with game simulation defined according to the
projection: s ⊳ (s′, q) iff s = s′. This game simulation is preference-preserving.
Conversely, G game-simulates G ⋉ A, with game simulation defined by (s, q) ⊳′ s′ iff
s = s′, which is also preference-preserving.
Proof. We begin with proving that both relations are preference-preserving. First notice
that if ((sn, qn))n≥0 is a play in G ⋉A, then its proj-projection (sn)n≥0 is a play in G.
Conversely, if ρ = (sn)n≥0 is a play in G, then there is a unique path (qn)n≥0 from initial
state q0 in A which reads it, and ((sn, qn))n≥0 is then a path in G ⋉ A that we write
proj−1(ρ) = ((sn, qn))n≥0. That way, proj defines a one-to-one correspondence between
plays in G and plays in G⋉A where the second component starts in q0. For a player B 6= A,
the objective is defined so that proj(ρ) has the same payoff as ρ. Consider now player
A, she is winning in G for ρ = (sn)n≥0 iff (sn)n≥0 ∈ L(A) iff the unique path (qn)n≥0
from initial state q0 that reads (sn)n≥0 satisfies the Rabin condition (Qi, Ri)i∈[[1,n]] in A iff
proj−1(ρ) satisfies the internal Rabin condition (Q′i, R
′
i)i∈[[1,n]] in G ⋉A. This proves that ⊳
is winning-preserving.
It remains to show that both relations are game simulations. Assume s ⊳ (s, q) and pick
a move mAgt in G. It is also a move in G⋉A, and Tab
′((s, q),mAgt) = (Tab(s,mAgt), δ(q, s)).
By definition of ⊳ it then holds that Tab(s,mAgt) ⊳ Tab
′((s, q),mAgt), which proves condi-
tion (1) of the definition of a game simulation. It remains to show condition (2). Pick a
state (s′, q′) ∈ States′. We distinguish two cases
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• If δ(q, s) 6= q′ then Susp(((s, q), (s′, q′)),mAgt) = ∅, and condition (2) trivially holds.
• Otherwise δ(q, s) = q′. In that case, for any move m′Agt, we have that Tab(s,m
′
Agt) = s
′
if, and only if, Tab′((s, q),m′Agt) = (s
′, q′). It follows that Susp(((s, q), (s′, q′)),mAgt) =
Susp((s, s′),mAgt), which implies condition (2).
This proves that G ⋉A game-simulates G.
We now assume (s, q) ⊳′ s and pick a move mAgt in G ⋉ A. It is also a move in G,
and as previously, condition (1) obviously holds. Pick now s′ ∈ States. We define q′ =
δ(q, s), and we have (s′, q′) ⊳ s′ by definition of ⊳′. As before, we get condition (2) because
Susp(((s, q), (s′, q′)),mAgt) = Susp((s, s
′),mAgt). 
We will solve the case where each player’s objective is given by a deterministic Rabin
automaton by applying the above result inductively. We will obtain a game where each
player has an internal Rabin winning condition. Applying Proposition 5.23 each time,
we get the following result:
Proposition 5.25. Let G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 be a finite concurrent
game, where for each player A, the preference relation -A is single-objective given by a
deterministic Rabin automaton A. Write Agt = {A1, . . . , An}. There is a Nash equilibrium
σAgt in G from some state s with outcome ρ iff there is a Nash equilibrium σ
′
Agt in G
′ =
(((G⋉A1)⋉A2) · · ·×An) from (s, q01, . . . , q0n) with outcome ρ
′, where q0i is the initial state
of Ai and ρ is the projection of ρ
′ on G.
5.7.3. Algorithm. Assume that the objective of player Ai is given by a deterministic Rabin
automaton Ai. The algorithm for solving the constrained NE existence problem starts by
computing the product of the game with the automata: G′ = (((G ⋉ A1) ⋉ A2) · · · × An).
The resulting game has size |G| ×
∏
j∈[[1,n]] |Aj|, which is exponential in the number of
players. For each player Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ n), the number of Rabin pairs in the product game
is that of the original specification Aj , say kj . We then apply the deterministic algorithm
that we have designed for Rabin objectives (see Subsection 5.6.3 page 39), which yields an
exponential-time algorithm in our framework.
5.7.4. Hardness. We prove PSPACE-hardness in the restricted case of deterministic Bu¨chi
automata, by a reduction from (the complement of) the problem of the emptiness of the
intersection of several language given by deterministic finite automata. This problem is
known to be PSPACE-complete [29, Lemma 3.2.3].
We fix finite automata A1, . . . ,An over alphabet Σ. Let Σ
′ = Σ ∪ {init,final}, where
init and final are two special symbols not in Σ. For every j ∈ [[1, n]], we construct a Bu¨chi
automaton A′j from Aj as follows. We add a state F with a self-loop labelled by final and
an initial state I with a transition labelled by init to the original initial state. We add
transitions labelled by final from every terminal state to F . We set the Bu¨chi condition
to {F}. If Lj is the language recognised by Aj, then the language recognised by the Bu¨chi
automaton A′j is L
′
j = init · Lj · final
ω. The intersection of the languages recognised by the
automata Aj is empty if, and only if, the intersection of the languages recognised by the
automata A′j is empty.
We construct the game G, with States = Σ′. For each j ∈ [[1, n]], there is a player Aj
whose objective is given by A′j and one special player A0 whose objective is States
ω (she is
always winning). Player A0 controls all the states and there are transitions from any state
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to the states of Σ ∪ {final}. Formally Act = Σ ∪ {final} ∪ ⊥, for all state s ∈ States,
Mov(s,A0) = Act, and if j 6= 0 then Mov(s,Aj) = {⊥} and for all α ∈ Σ ∪ {final},
Tab(s, (α,⊥, . . . ,⊥)) = α.
Lemma 5.26. There is a Nash equilibrium in game G from init where every player wins if,
and only if, the intersection of the languages recognised by the automata A′j is not empty.
Proof. If there is such a Nash equilibrium, let ρ be its outcome. The path ρ forms a word
of Σ′, it is accepted by every automata A′j since every player wins. Hence the intersection
of the languages Lj is not empty.
Conversely, if a word w = init · w1 · w2 · · · is accepted by all the automata, player A0
can play in a way such that everybody is winning: if at each step j she plays wj , then
the outcome is w which is accepted by all the automata. It is a Nash equilibrium since A0
controls everything and cannot improve her payoff. 
Since PSPACE is stable by complementation, this proves that the constrained NE exis-
tence problem is PSPACE-hard for objectives described by Bu¨chi automata.
In order to prove hardness for the NE existence problem we use results from Section 3.5.
Winning conditions in E(E(. . . (E(G, An, A0, ρn), . . . , A2, A0, ρ2), A1, A0, ρ1), where ρj is a
winning play for Ai, can be defined by slightly modifying automata A
′
1, . . . ,A
′
n to take into
account the new states. By Proposition 3.5, there exists a Nash equilibrium in this game if,
and only, if there is one in G where all the players win. Hence PSPACE-hardness also holds
for the NE existence problem.
6. Ordered Bu¨chi objectives
In this Section we assume that preference relations of the players are given by ordered Bu¨chi
objectives (as defined in Section 2.5), and we prove the results listed in Table 2 (page 3).
We first consider the general case of preorders given as Boolean circuits, and then exhibit
several simpler cases.
For the rest of this section, we fix a game G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉,
and assume that -A is given by an ordered Bu¨chi objective ωA = 〈(Ω
A
i )1≤i≤nA , (.A)A∈Agt〉.
6.1. General case: preorders are given as circuits.
Theorem 6.1. For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives where preorders are given
as Boolean circuits, the value problem, the NE existence problem and the constrained NE
existence problem are PSPACE-complete.
Proof. We explain the algorithm for the constrained NE existence problem. We assume
that for each player A, the preorder .A is given by a Boolean circuit CA. The algorithm
proceeds by trying all the possible payoffs for the players.
Fix such a payoff (vA)A∈Agt, with v
A ∈ {0, 1}nA for every player A. We build a circuit
DA which represents a single objective for player A. Inputs to circuit DA will be states of
the game. This circuit is constructed from CA as follows: We set all input gates w1 · · ·wn of
circuit CA to the value given by payoff v
A; The former input vi receives the disjunction of
all the states in Ωi; We negate the output. It is not hard to check that the new circuit DA
is such that for every play ρ, DA[Inf(ρ)] evaluates to true if, and only if, payoffA(ρ) 6.A v
A,
i.e. if ρ is an improvement for player A.
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Circuit DA is now viewed as a single objective for player A, we write G
′ for the new
game. We look for Nash equilibria in this new game, with payoff 0 for each player. Indeed,
a Nash equilibrium σAgt in G with payoff (v
A)A∈Agt is a Nash equilibrium in game G
′ with
payoff (0, . . . , 0). Conversely a Nash equilibrium σAgt in game G
′ with payoff (0, . . . , 0) is a
Nash equilibrium in G as soon as the payoff of its outcome (in G) is (vA)A∈Agt.
We use the algorithm described in Section 5.5. for computing Nash equilibria with
single objectives given as Boolean circuits, and we slightly modify it to take into account
the constraint that it has payoff vA for each player A. This can be done in polynomial
space, thanks to Proposition 3.1: it is sufficient to look for plays of the form π · τω with
|π| ≤ |States|2 and |τ | ≤ |States|2.
PSPACE-hardness was proven for single objectives given as a Boolean circuit (the circuit
evaluates by setting to true all states that are visited infinitely often, and to false all
other states) in Section 5.5. This kind of objective can therefore be seen as an ordered
Bu¨chi objective with a preorder given as a Boolean circuit. 
6.2. When the ordered objective can be (co-)reduced to a single Bu¨chi objective.
For some ordered objectives, the preference relation can (efficiently) be reduced to a single
objective. For instance, a disjunction of several Bu¨chi objectives can obviously be reduced
to a single Bu¨chi objective, by considering the union of the target sets. Formally, we say
that an ordered Bu¨chi objective ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉 is reducible to a single Bu¨chi objective if,
given any payoff vector v, we can construct in polynomial time a target set T̂ (v) such that for
all paths ρ, v . payoffω(ρ) if, and only if, Inf(ρ)∩ T̂ (v) 6= ∅. It means that securing payoff v
corresponds to ensuring infinitely many visits to the new target set. Similarly, we say that ω
is co-reducible to a single Bu¨chi objective if for any vector v we can construct in polynomial
time a target set T̂ (v) such that payoffω(ρ) 6. v if, and only if, Inf(ρ)∩ T̂ (v) 6= ∅. It means
that improving on payoff v corresponds to ensuring infinitely many visits to the new target
We prove the following proposition, which exploits (co-)reducibility for efficiently solving
the various problems.
Proposition 6.2.
• For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives which are reducible to single Bu¨chi objec-
tives, and in which the preorders are non-trivial6 and monotonic, the value problem is
P-complete.
• For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives which are co-reducible to single Bu¨chi
objectives, and in which the preorders are non-trivial and monotonic the NE existence
problem and the constrained NE existence problem are P-complete.
Note that the hardness results follow from the hardness of the same problems for single
Bu¨chi objectives (see Section 5.3). We now prove the two upper bounds.
6.2.1. Reducibility to single Bu¨chi objectives and the value problem. We transform the or-
dered Bu¨chi objectives of the considered player into a single Bu¨chi objective, and use a
polynomial-time algorithm [23, Chapter 2] to solve the resulting zero-sum (turn-based)
Bu¨chi game.
6That is, there is more than one class in the preorder.
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6.2.2. Co-reducibility to single Bu¨chi objectives and the (constrained) NE existence problem.
We assume that the ordered objectives (ωA)A∈Agt are all co-reducible to single Bu¨chi ob-
jectives. We show that we can use the algorithm presented in Section 5.3.2 to solve the
constrained NE existence problem in polynomial time.
We first notice that the preference relations -A satisfy the hypotheses (⋆) (see page 30):
(⋆)a and (⋆)b are obvious, and (⋆)c is by co-reducibility of the ordered objectives. It means
that we can apply the results of Lemmas 5.10 and 5.11 to the current framework. To be
able to conclude and apply Lemma 5.12, we need to show that for every payoff v, we can
compute in polynomial time the set W (G, v) in the suspect game H(G, v).
Lemma 6.3. Fix a threshold v. The set W (G, v) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. As the ordered objectives are co-reducible to single Bu¨chi objectives, we can construct
in polynomial time target sets T̂A(v) for each player A. The objective of Eve in the suspect
gameH(G,K) is then equivalent to a co-Bu¨chi objective with target set {(T̂A(v, P ) | A ∈ P}.
The winning region W (G, v) can then be determined using a polynomial time algorithm
of [23, Sect. 2.5.3]. 
6.2.3. Applications. We will give preorders to which the above applies, allowing to infer
several P-completeness results in Table 2 (those written with reference “Section 6.2”).
We first show that reducibility and co-reducibility coincide when the preorder is total.
Lemma 6.4. Let ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉 be an ordered Bu¨chi objective, and assume that . is
total. Then, ω is reducible to a single Bu¨chi objective if, and only if, ω is co-reducible to a
single Bu¨chi objective.
Proof. Let u ∈ {0, 1}n be a vector. If u is a maximal element, the new target set is empty,
and thus satisfies the property for co-reducibility. Otherwise we pick a vector v among the
smallest elements that is strictly larger than u. Since the preorder is reducible to a single
Bu¨chi objective, there is a target set T̂ that is reached infinitely often whenever the payoff
is greater than v. Since the preorder is total and by choice of v, we have w 6. u ⇔ v . w.
Thus the target set T̂ is visited infinitely often when u is not larger than the payoff. Hence
ω is co-reducible to a single Bu¨chi objective.
The proof of the other direction is similar. 
Lemma 6.5. Ordered Bu¨chi objectives with disjunction or maximise preorders are reducible
to single Bu¨chi objectives. Ordered Bu¨chi objectives with disjunction, maximise or subset
preorders are co-reducible to single Bu¨chi objectives.
Proof. Let ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉 be an ordered Bu¨chi objective. Assume Ti is the target set
for Ωi.
Assume . is the disjunction preorder. If the payoff v is different from 0 then we
define T̂ (v) as the union of all the target sets: T̂ (v) =
⋃n
i=1 Ti. Then, for every run ρ,
v . payoffω(ρ) ⇔ there is some i for which Inf(ρ) ∩ Ti 6= ∅
⇔ Inf(ρ) ∩ T̂ (v) 6= ∅
If the payoff v is 0 then we get the expected result with T̂ (v) = States. Disjunction being
a total preorder, it is also co-reducible (from Lemma 6.4).
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We assume now that . is the maximise preorder. Given a payoff v, consider the index
i0 = max{i | vi = 1}. We then define T̂ (v) as the union of the target sets that are above i0:
T̂ (v) =
⋃
i≥i0
Ti. The following four statements are then equivalent, if ρ is a run:
v . payoffω(ρ) ⇔ v . 1{i|Inf(ρ)∩Ti 6=∅}
⇔ i0 ≤ max{i | Inf(ρ) ∩ Ti 6= ∅}
⇔ ∃i ≥ i0. Inf(ρ) ∩ Ti 6= ∅
Hence ω is reducible, and also co-reducible as it is total, to a single Bu¨chi objective.
Finally, we assume that . is the subset preorder, and we show that ω is then co-
reducible to a single Bu¨chi objective. Given a payoff v, the new target is the union of the
target sets that are not reached infinitely often for that payoff: T̂ (v) =
⋃
{i|vi=0}
Ti. Then
the following statements are equivalent, if ρ is a run:
payoffω(ρ) 6. u ⇔ 1{i|Inf(ρ)∩Ti 6=∅} 6. u
⇔ ∃i. Inf(ρ) ∩ Ti 6= ∅ and ui = 0
⇔ Inf(ρ) ∩ T̂ (v) 6= ∅
As a corollary, we get the following result:
Corollary 6.6. For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives, with either the disjunction
or the maximise preorder, the value problem is P-complete. For finite games with ordered
Bu¨chi objectives, with either the disjunction, the maximise or the subset preorder, the NE
existence problem and the constrained NE existence problem are P-complete.
Remark 6.7. Note that we cannot infer P-completeness of the value problem for the subset
preorder since the subset preorder is not total, and ordered objectives with subset preorder
are not reducible to single Bu¨chi objectives. Such an ordered objective is actually reducible
to a generalised Bu¨chi objective (several Bu¨chi objectives should be satisfied).
6.3. When the ordered objective can be reduced to a deterministic Bu¨chi au-
tomaton objective. For some ordered objectives, the preference relation can (efficiently)
be reduced to the acceptance by a deterministic Bu¨chi automaton. Formally, we say that
an ordered objective ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉 is reducible to a deterministic Bu¨chi automaton
whenever, given any payoff vector u, we can construct in polynomial time a deterministic
Bu¨chi automaton over States which accepts exactly all plays ρ with u . payoffω(ρ). For
such preorders, we will see that the value problem can be solved efficiently by constructing
the product of the deterministic Bu¨chi automaton and the arena of the game. This con-
struction does however not help for solving the (constrained) NE existence problems since
the number of players is a parameter of the problem, and the size of the resulting game will
then be exponential.
Proposition 6.8. For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives which are reducible to
deterministic Bu¨chi automata, the value problem is P-complete.
Proof. Given the payoff vA for player A, the algorithm proceeds by constructing the automa-
ton that recognises the plays with payoff higher than vA. By performing the product with
the game as described in Section 5.7.2, we obtain a new game, in which there is a winning
strategy if, and only if, there is a strategy in the original game to ensure payoff vA. In this
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new game, player A has a single Bu¨chi objective, so that the NE existence of a winning
strategy can be decided in polynomial time.
Hardness follows from that of games with single Bu¨chi objectives. 
Applications. We now give preorders to which the above result applies, that is, which are
reducible to deterministic Bu¨chi automata objectives.
Lemma 6.9. An ordered objective where the preorder is either the conjunction, the subset
or the lexicographic preorder is reducible to a deterministic Bu¨chi automaton objective.
Proof. We first focus on the conjunction preorder. Let ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉 be an ordered
Bu¨chi objective, where . is the conjunction. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Ti be the target set
defining the Bu¨chi condition Ωi. There are only two possible payoffs: either all objectives
are satisfied, or one objective is not satisfied. For the second payoff case, any play has a
larger payoff: hence the trivial automaton (which accepts all plays) witnesses the property.
For the first payoff case, we construct a deterministic Bu¨chi automaton B as follows. There
is one state for each target set, plus one accepting state: Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qn}; the initial
state is q0, and the unique repeated state is qn. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the transitions are
qi−1
s
−→ qi when s ∈ Ti and qi−1
s
−→ qi−1 otherwise. There are also transitions qn
s
−→ q0 for
every s ∈ States. Automaton B describes the plays that goes through each set Ti infinitely
often, hence witnesses the property. It can furthermore be computed in polynomial time.
The construction is illustrated in Figure 21.
We now turn to the subset preorder. Let ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉 be an ordered Bu¨chi
objective, where . is the subset preorder. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Ti be the target set
defining the Bu¨chi condition Ωi. Fix a payoff u. A play ρ is such that u . payoffω(ρ) if,
and only if, ρ visits infinitely often all sets Ti with ui = 1. This is then equivalent to the
conjunction of all Ωi’s with ui = 1. We therefore apply the previous construction for the
conjunction and get the expected result.
We finish this proof with the lexicographic preorder. Let ω = 〈(Ωi)1≤i≤n,.〉 be an
ordered Bu¨chi objective, where . is the lexicographic preorder. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let
Ti be the target set defining the Bu¨chi condition Ωi. Let u ∈ {0, 1}
n be a payoff vector.
We construct the following deterministic Bu¨chi automaton which recognises the runs whose
payoff is greater than or equal to u.
In this automaton there is a state qi for each i such that ui = 1, and a state q0 that is
both initial and repeated: Q = {q0} ∪ {qi | ui = 1}. We write I = {0} ∪ {i | ui = 1}. For
every i ∈ I, we write succ(i) = min(I \ {j | j ≤ i}), with the convention that min∅ = 0.
The transition relation is defined as follows:
• for every s ∈ States, there is a transition q0
s
−→ qsucc(0);
• for every i ∈ I \ {0}, we have the following transitions:
– qi
Ti−→ qsucc(i);
– qi
Tk\Ti
−−−→ q0 with k < i and uk = 0;
– qi
s
−→ qi for every s ∈ States \ (Ti ∪
⋃
k<i,uk=0
Tk).
An example of the construction is given in Figure 22.
We now prove correctness of this construction. Consider a path that goes from q0 to q0:
if the automaton is currently in state qi, then since the last occurrence of q0, at least one
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state for each target set Tj with j < i and uj = 1 has been visited. When q0 is reached
again, either it is because we have seen all the Tj with uj = 1, or it is because the run
visited some target Ti with ui = 0 and all the Tj such that uj = 1 and j < i; in both cases,
the set of targets that have been visited between two visits to q0 describes a payoff greater
than u. Assume the play π is accepted by the automaton; then there is a sequence of qi as
above that is taken infinitely often, therefore payoffω(π) is greater than or equal to u for the
lexicographic order.
Conversely assume v = payoffω(π) is greater than or equal to u, that we already read a
prefix π≤k for some k, and that the current state is q0. Reading the first symbol in π after
position k, the run goes to the state qi where i is the least integer such that ui = 1. Either
the path visits Ti at some point, or it visits a state in a target Tj, with j smaller than i and
vj = 0, in which case the automaton goes back to q0. Therefore from q0 we can again come
back to q0 while reading the following of π, and the automaton accepts. 
q0 q1 q2
q3
T1 T2
T3
States
Figure 21. The automaton
for the conjunction preorder,
n = 3
q2 q5 q6
q0
T2 T5
T1, T3, T4, T6
T1, T3, T4
T1
States
Figure 22. The automaton for the
lexicographic order, n = 7 and u =
(0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0)
We conclude with the following corollary:
Corollary 6.10. For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives with either of the conjunc-
tion, the lexicographic or the subset preorders, the value problem is P-complete.
6.4. Preference relations with monotonic preorders. We will see in this part that
monotonic preorders lead to more efficient algorithms. More precisely we prove the following
result:
Proposition 6.11. • For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives where the preorders
are given by monotonic Boolean circuits, the value problem is in coNP, and the NE exis-
tence problem and the constrained NE existence problem are in NP.
• Completeness holds in both cases for finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives where the
preorders are given by monotonic Boolean circuits or with the counting preorder.
• NP-completeness also holds for the constrained NE existence problem for finite games with
ordered Bu¨chi objectives where the preorders admit an element v such that for every v′,
it holds v′ 6= 1⇔ v′ . v.7
We first show that monotonicity of the preorders imply some memorylessness property in
the suspect game. We then give algorithms witnessing the claimed upper bounds, and show
the various lower bounds.
7To be fully formal, a preorder . is in fact a family (.n)n∈N (where .n compares two vectors of size n),
and this condition should be stated as “for all n, there is an element vn ∈ {0, 1}
n such that for all v′ ∈ {0, 1}n,
it holds v′ 6= 1⇔ v′ . vn”.
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6.4.1. When monotonicity implies memorylessness. We say that a strategy σ is memoryless
(resp. memoryless from state s0) if there exists a function f : States → Act such that
σ(h · s) = f(s) for every h ∈ Hist (resp. for every h ∈ Hist(s0)). A strategy profile is said
memoryless whenever all strategies of single players are memoryless. We show that when
the preorders used in the ordered Bu¨chi objectives are monotonic, the three problems are
also easier than in the general case. This is because we can find memoryless trigger profiles
(recall Definition 4.1).
We first show this lemma, that will then be applied to the suspect game.
Lemma 6.12. Let H be a turn-based two-player game. Call Eve one player, and let σ∃ be
a strategy for Eve, and s0 be a state of H. There is a memoryless strategy σ
′
∃ such that for
every ρ′ ∈ OutH(s0, σ
′
∃), there exists ρ ∈ OutH(s0, σ∃) such that Inf(ρ
′) ⊆ Inf(ρ).
Proof. This proof is by induction on the size of the set
S(σ1) = {(s,m) | ∃h ∈ Hist(σ1). σ1(h) = m and last(h) = s}.
If its size is the same as that of {s | ∃h ∈ Hist(σ1). last(h) = s} then the strategy is
memoryless. Otherwise, let s be a state at which σ1 takes several different actions (i.e.,
|({s} ×Act) ∩ S(σ1)| > 1).
We will define a new strategy σ′1 that takes fewer different actions in s and such that
for every outcome of σ′1, there is an outcome of σ1 that visits (at least) the same states
infinitely often.
If σ is a strategy and h is a history, we let σ◦h : h′ 7→ σ(h·h′) for any history h′. Then for
every m such that (s,m) ∈ S(σ1) we let Hm = {h ∈ Hist(σ1) | last(h) = s and σ1(h) = m},
and for every h, h−1 ·Hm = {h
′ | h · h′ ∈ Hm}. We pick m such that Hm is not empty.
• Assume that there is h0 ∈ Hist(σ1) with last(h0) = s, such that h
−1
0 · Hm is empty.
We define a new strategy σ′1 as follows. If h is an history which does not visit s, then
σ′1(h) = σ1(h). If h is an history which visits s, then decompose h as h
′ · h′′ where
last(h′) = s is the first visit to s and define σ′1(h) = σ1(h0 · h
′′). Then, strategy σ′1 does
not use m at state s, and therefore at least one action has been “removed” from the
strategy. More precisely, |({s} ×Act) ∩ S(σ′1)| ≤ |({s} ×Act) ∩ S(σ1)| − 1. Furthermore
the conditions on infinite states which are visited infinitely often by outcomes of σ′1 is
also satisfied.
• Otherwise for any h ∈ Hist(σ1) with last(h) = s, h
−1 ·Hm is not empty. We will construct
a strategy σ′1 which plays m at s. Let h be an history, we first define the extension e(h)
inductively in that way:
– e(ε) = ε, where ε is the empty history;
– e(h · s) = e(h) · h′ where h′ ∈ (e(h))−1 ·Hm;
– e(h · s′) = e(h) · s′ if s′ 6= s.
We extend the definition of e to infinite outcomes in the natural way: e(ρ)i = e(ρ≤i)i.
We then define the strategy σ′1 : h 7→ σ1(e(h)). We show that if ρ is an outcome of σ
′
1,
then e(ρ) is an outcome of σ1. Indeed assume h is a finite outcome of σ
′
1, that e(h) is
an outcome of σ1 and last(h) = last(e(h)). If h · s is an outcome of σ
′
1, by construction
of e, e(h · s) = e(h) · h′, such that last(h′) = s, and h′ is an outcome of σ1 ◦ e(h) and as
e(h) is an outcome of σ1 by hypothesis, that means that e(h · s) is an outcome of σ1. If
h · s′ with s′ 6= s is an outcome of σ′1, e(h · s
′) = e(h) · s′, s′ ∈ Tab(last(h), σ′1(h)), and
σ′1(h) = σ1(e(h)). Using the hypothesis last(h) = last(e(h)), and e(h) is an outcome of σ1,
therefore e(h · s′) is an outcome of σ1. This shows that if ρ is an outcome of σ
′
1 then
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e(ρ) is an outcome of σ1. The property on states visited infinitely often follows. Several
moves have been removed from the strategy at s (since the strategy is now memoryless
at s, playing m).
In all cases we have S(σ′1) strictly included in S(σ1), and an inductive reasoning entails the
result. 
Lemma 6.13. If for every player A, .A is monotonic, and if there is a trigger profile for
some play π from s, then there is a memoryless winning strategy for Eve in H(G, π) from
state (s,Agt).
Proof. Assume there is a trigger profile for π. We have seen in Lemma 4.4 that there is
then a winning strategy σ∃ in game H(G, π) for Eve. Consider the memoryless strategy σ
′
∃
constructed as in Lemma 6.12. Let ρ′ be an outcome of σ′∃, there is an outcome ρ of σ∃
such that Inf(ρ′) ⊆ Inf(ρ). As σ∃ is winning in H(G, π), for every A ∈ λ(ρ), proj1(ρ) -A π.
We assume the Bu¨chi conditions are given by the target sets (TAi )A,i. For each player A,
{i | Inf(proj1(ρ
′))∩TAi } ⊆ {i | Inf(proj1(ρ))∩T
A
i }. As the preorder is monotonic the payoff
of proj1(ρ
′) is smaller than that of proj1(ρ): proj1(ρ
′) -A proj1(ρ). So the play is winning
for any player A and σ′∃ is a memoryless winning strategy in game H(G, π) for Eve. 
Lemma 6.14. If for every player A, .A is given by monotonic Boolean circuits, then given
a path π, we can decide in polynomial time if a memoryless strategy for Eve in H(G, π) is
winning.
Proof. Let σ∃ be a memoryless strategy in H(G, π) for Eve. By keeping only the edges that
are taken by σ∃, we define a subgraph of the game. We can compute in polynomial time
the strongly connected components of this graph. If one component is reachable and does
not satisfy the objective of Eve, then the strategy is not winning. Conversely if all the
reachable strongly connected components satisfy the winning condition of Eve, since the
preorder is monotonic, σ∃ is a winning strategy. Notice that since the preorder is given as a
Boolean circuit, we can check in polynomial time whether a strongly connected component
is winning or not. Globally the algorithm is therefore polynomial-time. 
We now turn to the proof of the claimed upper bounds.
6.4.2. Proofs for the upper bounds. We show that the value problem is in coNP for finite
games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives, when preorders are given by monotonic Boolean
circuits.
As already mentioned at the beginning of Section 5, for the value problem, we can
make the concurrent game turn-based: since player A must win against any strategy of the
coalition P = Agt \ {A}, she must also win in the case where the opponents’ strategies can
adapt to what A plays. In other terms, we can make A play first, and then the coalition.
This turn-based game is determined, so that there is a strategy σ whose outcomes are always
better (for A) than vA if, and only if, for any strategy σ′ of coalition P , there is an outcome
with payoff (for A) better than vA. If there is a counterexample to this fact, then thanks to
Lemma 6.12 there is one with a memoryless strategy σ′. The coNP algorithm proceeds by
checking that all the memoryless strategies of coalition P have an outcome better than vA,
which is achievable in polynomial time, with a method similar to Lemma 6.14.
We show now that the constrained NE existence problem is in NP for finite games with
ordered Bu¨chi objectives, when preorders are given by monotonic Boolean circuits.
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The algorithm for the constrained NE existence problem proceeds by guessing:
• the payoff for each player,
• a play of the form π · τω, where |π| ≤ |States|2 and |τ | ≤ |States|2,
• an under-approximation W of the set of winning states in H(G, π · τω)
• a memoryless strategy profile σAgt in H(G, π · τ
ω).
We check that σAgt is a witness for the fact that the states in W are winning; thanks to
Lemma 6.14, this can be done in polynomial time. We also verify that the play π ·τω has the
expected payoff, that the payoff satisfies the constraints, and that it never gets out of W . If
these conditions are fulfilled, then the play π · τω meets the conditions of Theorem 4.5, and
there is a Nash equilibrium with outcome π · τω. Lemma 6.13 and Proposition 3.1 ensure
that if there is a Nash equilibrium, we can find it this way.
6.4.3. Proofs for the hardness results. We first prove the hardness results for the counting
preorder.
Lemma 6.15. For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives that use the counting preorder,
the value problem is coNP-hard.
Proof.We reduce (the complement of) 3SAT into the value problem for two-player turn-based
games with Bu¨chi objectives with the counting preorder. Consider an instance
φ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm
with Cj = ℓj,1 ∨ ℓj,2 ∨ ℓj,3, over a set of variables {x1, . . . , xn}. With φ, we associate a
two-player turn-based game G. Its set of states is made of
• a set containing the unique initial state V0 = {s0},
• a set of two states Vk = {xk,¬xk} for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
• and a set of three states Vn+j = {tj,1, tj,2, tj,3} for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Then, for each 0 ≤ l ≤ n +m, there is a transition between any state of Vl and any state
of Vl+1 (assuming Vn+m+1 = V0).
The game involves two players: player B owns all the states, but has no objectives
(she always loses). Player A has a set of Bu¨chi objectives defined by TA2·k = {xk} ∪ {tj,p |
ℓj,p = xk}, T
A
2·k+1 = {¬xk} ∪ {tj,p | ℓj,p = ¬xk}, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Notice that at least n of
these objectives will be visited infinitely often along any infinite play. We prove that if the
formula is not satisfiable, then at least n+ 1 objectives will be fulfilled, and conversely.
Assume the formula is satisfiable, and pick a witnessing valuation v. We define a
strategy σB for B that “follows” valuation v: from states in Vk−1, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the
strategy plays towards xk if v(xk) = true (and to ¬xk otherwise). Then, from a state
in Vn+l−1 with 1 ≤ l ≤ m, it plays towards one of the tj,p that evaluates to true under v
(the one with least index p, say). This way, the number of targets of player A that are
visited infinitely often is n.
Conversely, pick a play in G s.t. at most (hence exactly) n objectives of A are fulfilled.
In particular, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, this play never visits one of xk and ¬xk, so that it defines
a valuation v over {x1, . . . , xn}. Moreover, any state of Vn+l, with 1 ≤ l ≤ p, that is visited
infinitely often must correspond to a literal that is made true by v, as otherwise this would
make one more objective that is fulfilled for A. As a consequence, each clause of φ evaluates
to true under v, and the result follows. 
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s0
x1
¬x1
x2
¬x2
x3
¬x3
t1,1
t1,2
t1,3
t2,1
t2,2
t2,3
Figure 23. The game G associated with formula φ of 6.1
Example 6.16. We illustrate the construction of the previous proof in Figure 23 for the
formula
ϕ = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) . (6.1)
The targets for player A are T1 = {x1, t1,1}, T2 = {¬x1, t2,1}, T3 = {x2, t1,2, t2,2}, T4 =
{¬x2}, T5 = {x3}, T6 = {¬x3, t1,3, t2,3}. Player A cannot ensure visiting infinitely often
four target sets, therefore the formula is satisfiable.
Lemma 6.17. For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives that use the counting preorder,
the NE existence problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Let G be the game we constructed for Lemma 6.15. We construct the game G′′ from
G as described in Section 3.3. The preference in G′ can still be described with ordered
Bu¨chi objectives and the counting preorder: the only target set of B is {s1} and we add
s1 to n different targets of A, where n is the number of variables as in Lemma 6.15. From
Proposition 3.4 there is a Nash equilibrium in G′′ from s0 if, and only if, A cannot ensure
visiting at least n + 1 targets infinitely often. Hence the NE existence problem is NP-hard.

This proves also NP-hardness for the constrained NE existence problem for ordered
Bu¨chi objectives with the counting preorder. Hardness results for preorders given by mono-
tonic Boolean circuits follow from the above since the counting preorder is a special case of
preorder given as a monotonic Boolean circuit (and the counting preorder can be expressed
as a polynomial-size monotonic Boolean circuit).
We now show hardness in the special case of preorders with (roughly) at most one
maximal element below 1.
Lemma 6.18. For finite turn-based games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives with a monotonic
preorder for which there is an element v such that for every v′, v′ 6= 1 ⇔ v′ . v, the
constrained NE existence problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Let us consider a formula φ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm For each variable xi, our game has one
player Bi and three states si, xi and ¬xi. The objectives of Bi are the sets {xi} and {¬xi}.
Transitions go from each si to xi and ¬xi, and from xi and ¬xi to si+1 (with sn+1 = s0).
Finally, an extra player A has full control of the game (i.e., she owns all the states) and has
n objectives, defined by TAi = {ℓi,1, ℓi,2, ℓi,3} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The construction is illustrated
in Figure 24.
We show that formula φ is satisfiable if, and only if, there is a Nash equilibrium where
each player Bi gets payoff βi satisfying βi . v (hence βi 6= (1, 1)), and player A gets payoff 1.
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s1
x1
¬x1
s2
x2
¬x2
s3
x3
¬x3
s4
x4
¬x4
Figure 24. The Bu¨chi game for a formula with 4 variables
First assume that the formula is satisfiable, and pick a witnessing valuation u. By play-
ing according to u, player A can satisfy all of her objectives (hence she cannot improve her
payoff, since the preorder is monotonic). Since she alone controls all the game, the other
players cannot improve their payoff, so that this is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, since A
plays memoryless, only one of xi and ¬xi is visited for each i, so that the payoff βi for Bi
satisfies βi . v. Conversely, if there is a Nash equilibrium with the desired payoff, then by
hypothesis, exactly one of each xi and ¬xi is visited infinitely often (so that the payoff for Bi
is not (1, 1)), which defines a valuation u. Since in this Nash equilibrium, player A satisfies
all its objectives, one state of each target is visited, which means that under valuation u,
formula φ evaluates to true. 
6.4.4. Applications. We now describe examples of preorders which satisfy the conditions on
the existence of an element v such that v′ 6= 1⇔ v′ . v.
Lemma 6.19. Conjunction, counting and lexicographic preorders have an element v such
that v′ 6= 1⇔ v′ . v.
Proof. Consider v = (1, . . . , 1, 0), and v′ 6= 1. For conjunction, there is i such that v′i = 0,
so v′ . v. For counting, |{i | v′i = 1}| < n, so v
′ . v. For the lexicographic preorder, let i
be the smallest index such that v′i = 0, and either vi = 1 and vj = v
′
j for all j < i, or for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, vj = v
′
j . In both cases v
′ . v. 
As a consequence, the result of Lemma 6.18 applies in particular to the conjunction
and lexicographic preorders, for which the constrained NE existence problem is thus NP-
complete. Hence we get:
Corollary 6.20. For finite games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives with either of the conjunc-
tion or the lexicographic preorders, the constrained NE existence problem is NP-complete.
7. Ordered reachability objectives
In this Section we assume that preference relations of the players are given by ordered
reachability objectives (as defined in Section 2.5), and we prove the results listed in Table 3
(page 3). We will first consider the general case when preorders are given by Boolean circuits
and we will show that the various decision problems are PSPACE-complete. We will even
notice that the hardness result holds for several simpler preorders. We will finally improve
this result in a number of cases.
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For the rest of this section, we fix a game G = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉,
and we assume that -A is given by an ordered reachability objective ωA = 〈(Ω
A
i )1≤i≤nA ,
(.A)A∈Agt〉.
7.1. General case: preorders are given as circuits. We prove the following result:
Proposition 7.1.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives where preorders are given by Boolean
circuits, the value problem, the NE existence problem and the constrained NE existence
problem are in PSPACE.
• For finite two-player turn-based games with ordered reachability objectives where preorders
have 1 as a unique maximal element, the value problem is PSPACE-hard.
• For finite two-player games with ordered reachability objectives where preorders have 1 as
a unique maximal element, and have an element v such that for every v′, v′ 6= 1⇔ v′ . v,
then the NE existence problem and the constrained NE existence problem are PSPACE-hard.
The upper bound will be proven by reduction to games with ordered Bu¨chi objectives using
game-simulation.
7.1.1. Reduction to a game with ordered Bu¨chi objectives. We show how to transform a game
G with preferences given by Boolean circuits over reachability objectives into a new game G′,
with preferences given by Boolean circuits over Bu¨chi objectives. Although the size of G′
will be exponential, circuit order with Bu¨chi objectives define prefix-independent preference
relations and thus checking condition 3 of Theorem 4.5 can be made more efficient.
States of G′ store the set of states of G that have already been visited. The set of
states of G′ is States′ = States × 2States. The transitions are as follows: (s, S) → (s′, S′)
when there is a transition s → s′ in G and S′ = S ∪ {s′}. We keep the same circuits to
define the preference relations, but the reachability objectives are transformed into Bu¨chi
objectives: a target set T is transformed into T ′ = {(s, S) | S ∩ T 6= ∅}. Although the
game has exponential size, the preference relations only depend on the strongly connected
components the path ends in, so that we will be able to use a special algorithm, which we
describe after this lemma.
We define the relation s ⊳ s′ over states of G and G′ if, and only if, s′ = (s, S) with
S ⊆ States, and prove that it is a game simulation (see Definition 5.22).
Lemma 7.2. The relation ⊳ (resp. ⊳−1) is a game simulation between G and G′, and it is
preference-preserving from (s0, (s0, {s0})) (resp. ((s0, {s0}), s0)).
Proof. Let mAgt be a move; writing t = Tab(s,mAgt), we have Tab
′((s, S),mAgt) = (t, S ∪
{t}). Therefore Tab(s,mAgt) ⊳ Tab
′(s′,mAgt). Let (t, S
′) be a state of G′; then we also have
t ⊳ (t, S′). If S′ = S ∪ {t} then Susp((s, t),mAgt) = Susp(((s, S), (t, S
′)),mAgt); otherwise
Susp(((s, S), (t, S′)),mAgt) = ∅. In both cases, condition (2) in the definition of a game
simulation is obviously satisfied.
In the other direction, let (s′, S ∪ {s′}) = Tab((s, S),mAgt); we have that s
′ ⊳ (s′, S ∪
{s′}). Let t ∈ States. Then t ⊳ (t, S ∪ {t}), and Susp((s, t),mAgt) = Susp(((s, S), (t, S ∪
{t})),mAgt). Hence ⊳
−1 is a game simulation.
Let ρ and ρ′ be two paths, from s0 and (s0, {s0}) respectively, and such that ρ ⊳ ρ
′.
We show preference preservation, by showing that ρ reaches target set T if, and only if,
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ρ′ visits T ′ infinitely often. If ρ visits some state s ∈ T , then from that point, states visited
by ρ′ are of the form (s′, S′) with s ∈ S′; all these states are in T ′, therefore ρ′ visits T ′
infinitely often. Conversely, if ρ′ visits T ′ infinitely often, then some state of T ′ have been
visited by ρ. From this, we easily obtain preference preservation. 
As a corollary (Proposition 5.23) we get that there is a correspondence between Nash
equilibria in G and Nash equilibria in G′.
Lemma 7.3. If there is a Nash equilibrium σAgt in G from s0, then there is a Nash equi-
librium σ′Agt in G
′ from (s0, {s0}) such that OutG(s0, σAgt) ⊳ OutG′((s0, {s0}), σ
′
Agt). And
vice-versa: if there is a Nash equilibrium σ′Agt in G
′ from (s0, {s0}), then there is a Nash
equilibrium σAgt in G from s0 such that OutG′((s0, {s0}), σ
′
Agt) ⊳
−1 OutG(s0, σAgt).
Note that, if OutG(s0, σAgt) ⊳ OutG′((s0, {s0}), σ
′
Agt), then OutG(s0, σAgt) satisfies the
reachability objective with target set T if, and only if, OutG′((s0, {s0}), σ
′
Agt) satisfies the
Bu¨chi objective with target set T ′ = {(s, S) | S ∩T 6= ∅}. From this strong correspondence
between G and G′, we get that it is sufficient to look for Nash equilibria in game G′.
7.1.2. How to efficiently solve the suspect game of G′. In game G′, preference relations are
prefix-independent. Applying Remark 4.6 the preference relation in the suspect game is
then also prefix-independent, and the payoff of a play only depends on which strongly-
connected component the path ends in. We now give an alternating algorithm which runs
in polynomial time and solves the game H(G′, π′), where π′ is an infinite path in G′.
Lemma 7.4. The winner of H(G′, π′) can be decided by an alternating algorithm which
runs in time polynomial in the size of G.
Proof. Let CA be the circuit defining the preference relation of player A. Let ρ = (si, Si)i≥0
be a path in G′, the sequence (Si)i≥0 is non-decreasing and converges to a limit S(ρ). We
have payoffA(ρ) = 1{i|T iA∩S(ρ)=∅}
. Therefore the winning condition of Eve in H(G′, π′) for a
play ρ only depends on the limits λ(ρ) and S(proj1(ρ)). It can be described as a single Bu¨chi
condition with target set T = {((s, S), P ) | ∀A ∈ P. CA[vA(S), wA] evaluates to true}
where vA(S) = 1{i|T iA∩S=∅}
and wA = payoffA(π
′). We now describe the algorithm.
Initially the current state is set to ((s0, {s0}),Agt). We also keep a list of the states
which have been visited, and we initialise it with Occ← {(s0, {s0}),Agt}. Then,
• if the current state is ((s, S), P ), the algorithm existentially guesses a move mAgt of Eve
and we set t = ((s, S), P,mAgt);
• otherwise if the current state is of the form ((s, S), P,mAgt), it universally guesses a state s
′
which corresponds to a move of Adam and we set t = ((s′, S∪{s′}), P ∩Susp((s, s′),mAgt)).
If t was already seen (that is, if t ∈ Occ), the algorithm returns true when t ∈ T and false
when t /∈ T , otherwise the current state is set to t, and we add t to the list of visited states:
Occ ← Occ∪{t}, and we repeat this step. Because we stop when the same state is seen,
the algorithm stops after at most ℓ + 1 steps, where ℓ is the length of the longest acyclic
path. Since the size of S can only increase and the size of P only decrease, we bound ℓ with
|States|2 · |Agt|.
We now prove the correctness of the algorithm. First, H(G′, π′) is a turn-based Bu¨chi
game, which is a special case of parity game. Parity games are known to be determined with
memoryless strategies [34, 19], hence H(G′, π′) is determined with memoryless strategies.
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If the algorithm returns true, then there exist a strategy σ∃ of Eve such that for all the
strategies σ∀ of Adam, any outcome ρ of Out(σ∃, σ∀) is such that there exist i < j ≤ ℓ + 1
with ρi = ρj ∈ T and all ρk with k < j are different. We extend this strategy σ∃ to a
winning strategy σ′∃ for Eve. We do so by ignoring the loops we see in the history, formally
we inductively define a reduction r of histories by:
• r(ε) = ε;
• if ((s, S), P ) does not appear in r(h) then r(h · ((s, S), P )) = r(h) · ((s, S), P );
• otherwise r(h · ((s, S), P )) = r(h)≤i where i is the smallest index such that r(h)i =
((s, S), P ).
We then define σ′∃ for any history h by σ
′
∃(h) = σ∃(r(h)).
We show by induction that if h is a history compatible with σ′∃ from ((s0, {s0}),Agt)
then r(h) is compatible with σ∃ from ((s0, {s0}),Agt) . It is true when h = ((s0, {s0}),Agt),
now assuming it holds for all history of length ≤ k, we show it for history of length k + 1.
Let h · s be a history of length k+ 1 compatible with σ′∃. By hypothesis r(h) is compatible
with h and since σ′∃(h) = σ∃(r(h)), r(h) · s is compatible with σ∃. If r(h · s) = r(h) · s then
r(h · s) is compatible with σ∃. Otherwise r(h · s) is a prefix of r(h) and therefore of length
≤ k, we can apply the induction hypothesis to conclude that r(h · s) is compatible with σ∃.
We now show that the strategy σ′∃ that we defined, is winning. Let ρ be a possible
outcome of σ′∃, let i < j be the first indexes such that ρi, ρj ∈ (States × S(ρ)) × λ(ρ) and
ρi = ρj . Because there is no repetition between i and j − 1: r(ρ≤j−1) = r(ρ≤i−1)ρi · · · ρj−1.
We have that σ∃(r(ρ≤i−1)ρi · · · ρj−1) = σ
′
∃(ρj−1). From this move, ρj is a possible next
state, so r(ρ≤i−1)ρi · · · ρj is a possible outcome of σ∃. As ρi = ρj and all other states are
different, by the hypothesis on σ∃ we have that ρj ∈ T . This shows that ρ ultimately loops
in states of T and therefore ρ is a winning run for Eve.
Reciprocally, if Eve has a winning strategy, she has a memoryless one σ∃ since this is a
Bu¨chi game. We can see this strategy as an oracle for the various existential choices in the
algorithm. Consider some universal choices in the algorithm, it corresponds to a strategy
σ∀ for Adam. The branch corresponding to (σ∃, σ∀) ends the first time we encounter a loop,
we write this history h · h′ with last(h′) = last(h). Since the strategy σ∃ is memoryless,
h · h′ω is a possible outcome. Since it is winning, last(h′) is in T and therefore the branch
is accepting. This being true for all the branches given by the choices of σ∃, the algorithm
answers true. 
7.1.3. Proof of the PSPACE upper bounds in Proposition 7.1. We describe a PSPACE algo-
rithm for solving the constrained NE existence problem. The algorithm proceeds by trying
all plays π in G of the form described in Proposition 3.1. This corresponds to a (unique)
play π′ in G′. We check that π′ has a payoff satisfying the constraints, and that there is a
path ρ in H(G′, π′), whose projection is π′, along which Adam obeys Eve, and which stays
in the winning region of Eve. This last step is done by using the algorithm of Lemma 7.4
on each state ρ goes through. All these conditions are satisfied exactly when the conditions
of Theorem 4.5 are satisfied, in which case there is a Nash equilibrium within the given
bounds.
The PSPACE upper bound for the value problem can be inferred from Proposition 3.2.
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7.1.4. Proof of PSPACE-hardness for the value problem. We show PSPACE-hardness of the
value problem when the preorder has 1 as a unique maximal element.
We reduce QSAT to the value problem, where QSAT is the satisfiability problem for
quantified Boolean formulas. For an instance of QSAT, we assume without loss of generality
that the Boolean formula is a conjunction of disjunctive clauses8.
Let φ = Q1x1 . . . Qpxp. φ
′, where Qi ∈ {∀,∃} and φ
′ = c1∧· · ·∧cn with ci =
∨
1≤j≤3 ℓi,j
and ℓi,j ∈ {xk,¬xk | 1 ≤ k ≤ p} ∪ {⊤,⊥}. We define a turn-based game G(φ) in the
following way (illustrated in Example 7.6 below). There is one state for each quantifier, one
for each literal, and two additional states ⊤ and ⊥:
States = {Qk | 1 ≤ k ≤ p} ∪ {xk,¬xk | 1 ≤ k ≤ p} ∪ {⊤,⊥}.
The game involves two players, A and B. The states ⊤, and ⊥, the existential-quantifier
states and the literal states are all controlled by A, while the universal-quantifier states
belong to player B. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ p, the state corresponding to quantifier Qk has two
outgoing transitions, going to xk and ¬xk respectively. Those two literal states only have
one transition to the next quantifier state Qk+1, or to the final state ⊤ if k = p. Finally,
states ⊤ and ⊥ carries a self-loop (notice that ⊥ is not reachable, while ⊤ will always be
visited).
Player A has one target set for each clause: if ci =
∧
1≤j≤3 ℓi,j then T
A
i = {ℓi,j | 1 ≤
j ≤ 3}. The i-th objective ΩAi is to reach target set T
A
i . The following result is then
straightforward:
Lemma 7.5. Formula φ is valid if, and only if, player A has a strategy whose outcomes
from state Q1 all visit each target set T
A
i .
Proof. We begin with the direct implication, by induction on p. For the base case, φ =
Q1x1.
∧
i ci where ci only involves x1 and ¬x1. We consider two cases:
• Q1 = ∃: since we assume φ be true, there must exist a value for x1 which makes all clauses
true. If this value is ⊤, consider the strategy σ⊤ of Player A such that σ⊤(Q1) = x1. Then
each clause ci must have x1 as one of its literals, so that the objective Ω
A
i is satisfied with
this strategy. The same argument applies if the value for x1 were ⊥.
• Q1 = ∀: in that case, Player A has only one strategy. For both x1 and ¬x1 all the clauses
are satisfied. It follows that each clause ci must contain x1 and ¬x1, so that objective Ω
A
i
is satisfied for any strategy of player B.
Now, assume that the result holds for all QSAT instances with at most p− 1 quantifiers.
• if Q1 = ∃, then one of Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊤] and Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊥] is valid.
We handle the first case, the second one being symmetric. For a literal λk ∈ {xk,¬xk},
we write Tλk for the set of target sets T
A
i such that the clause ci contains the literal λk.
Assume Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊤] is valid; by induction we know that there exists a
strategy σx1 such that all the targets in Tλk are visited along any outcome from state Q2
(because G(Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊤]) is the same game as G(φ), but with Q2 as the initial
state, and with the targets in Tx1 containing {⊤} in place of x1). We define the strategy σ
by σ(Q1) = x1 and σ(Q1 · x1 · ρ) = σ
x1(ρ). An outcome of σ will necessarily visit x1,
hence visiting all the targets in Tx1 ; because σ follows σ
x1 , all the objectives not in Tx1
are met as well.
8With the convention that an empty disjunction is equivalent to ⊥.
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• if Q1 = ∀, then Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊤] is valid. Using the induction hypothesis we
know that from Q2 there is a strategy σ
x1 that enforces a visit to all the targets in Tx1 .
Similarly, Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊥] is valid, and there is a strategy σ
¬x1 that visits all the
objectives not in T¬x1 . We define a new strategy σ as follows: σ(Q1 · x1 · ρ) = σ
x1(ρ) and
σ(Q1 ·¬x1 ·ρ) = σ
¬x1(ρ). Consider an outcome of σ: if it visits x1, then all the objectives
in Tx1 are visited, and because the path follows σ
x1 , the objectives not in Tx1 are also
visited. The other case is similar.
We now turn to the converse implication. Assume the formula is not valid. We prove
that for any strategy σ of player A, there is an outcome ρ of this strategy such that some
objective ΩAi is not satisfied. We again proceed by induction, beginning with the case
where n = 1.
• if Q1 = ∃, then both φ
′[x1 ← ⊤] and φ
′[x1 ← ⊥] are false. This entails that one of the
clauses only involves ⊥ (no other disjunction involving x1 and/or ¬x1 is always false),
and the corresponding reachability condition is ⊥, which is not reachable.
• if Q1 = ∀, then one of φ
′[x1 ← ⊤] and φ
′[x1 ← ⊥] is false. In the former case, one of
the clauses ci contains ¬x1, or only contains ⊥. Then along the run Q1 · x1 · ⊤
ω, the
objective TAi is not visited. The other case is similar.
Now, assuming that the result holds for formulas with n − 1 quantifiers, we prove the
result with n quantifiers.
• if Q1 = ∃, then both Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊤] and Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊥] are false.
Ising the induction hypothesis, any run from Q2 fails to visit some objective not in
Tx1 ∪ T¬x1 . Hence no strategy from Q1 can enforce a visit to all the objectives.
• if Q1 = ∀, then one of Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊤] and Q2x2 . . . Qpxpφ
′[x1 ← ⊥] is false. We
handle the first case, the second one being symmetric. By induction hypothesis, for any
strategy σ of player A in the game G(φ′[x1 ← ⊤]), one of the outcome fails to visit all the
objective not in Tx1 . Then along the path ρ = Q1 · x1 · ρ
′, some objectives not in Tx1 are
not visited. 
We can directly conclude from this lemma that the value of the game for A is 1 (the unique
maximal payoff for our preorder) if, and only if, the formula φ is valid, which proves that
the former problem is PSPACE-hard.
Example 7.6. As an example of the construction, let us consider the formula
φ = ∀x1. ∃x2. ∀x3. ∃x4. (x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x4) ∧ (¬x4 ∨ ⊥ ∨ ⊥) (7.1)
The target sets for player A are given by TA1 = {x1;¬x2;¬x3}, T
A
2 = {x1;x2;x4}, and
TA3 = {¬x4;⊥}. The structure of the game is represented in Figure 25. B has a strategy
that falsifies one of the clauses whatever A does, which means that the formula is not valid.
7.1.5. Proof of PSPACE-hardness for the (constrained) NE existence problem. We will now
prove PSPACE-hardness for the NE existence problem, under the conditions specified in the
statement of Proposition 7.1, using Proposition 3.4. We specify the new preference relation
for the construction of Section 3.3. We give B one objective, which is to reach s1 (s1 is the
sink state introduced by the construction). In terms of preferences for A, going s1 should be
just below visiting all targets. For this we use the statement in Proposition 7.1, that there
is v such that for every v′, v′ 6= 1 ⇔ v′ . v, and add s1 as a target to each T
A
i such that
vi = 1. This defines a preference relation equivalent to the one in the game constructed
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player A
player B
∀1
x1
¬x1
∃2
x2
¬x2
∀3
x3
¬x3
∃4
x4
¬x4
⊤
Figure 25. Reachability game associated with the formula (7.1)
in Section 3.3, therefore we deduce with Proposition 3.4 that the NE existence problem is
PSPACE-hard.
7.1.6. Applications. We should now notice that conjunction, counting and lexicographic
preorders (thanks to the fact that 1 is the unique maximal element for theses orders and
to Lemma 6.19). As conjunction (for instance) can easily be encoded using a (monotonic)
Boolean circuit in polynomial time, the hardness results are also valid if the preorder is
given by a (monotonic) Boolean circuit. Finally the subset preorder can be expressed as a
polynomial-size Boolean circuit and has a maximal element. We therefore get the following
summary of results:
Corollary 7.7.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives, with either the conjunction, the
counting or the lexicographic preorder, the value problem, the NE existence problem and
the constrained NE existence problem are PSPACE-complete.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives, where the preorders are given by
(monotonic) Boolean circuits, the value problem, the NE existence problem and the con-
strained NE existence problem are PSPACE-complete.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives, with the subset preorder, the value
problem is PSPACE-complete.
On the other hand, the disjunction and maximise preorders do not have a unique maximal
element, so the hardness result does not carry over to these preorders. In the same way, for
the subset preorder, there is no v such that v′ 6= 1⇔ v′ . v, so the hardness result does not
apply. We prove later (in Section 7.2) that in these special cases, the complexity is actually
lower.
7.2. Simple cases. As for ordered Bu¨chi objectives, for some ordered reachability objec-
tives, the preference relation can be (efficiently) (co-)reduced to a single reachability objec-
tive. We do not give the formal definitions, they can easily be inferred from that for Bu¨chi
objectives on page 48.
Proposition 7.8.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives which are reducible to single reachabil-
ity objectives and in which the preorders are non-trivial, the value problem is P-complete.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives which are co-reducible to single reach-
ability objectives, and and in which the preorders are non-trivial, the NE existence problem
and the constrained NE existence problem are NP-complete.
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Proof. Since P-hardness (resp. NP-hardness) already holds for the value (resp. NE existence)
problem with a single reachability objective (see [23, Sect. 2.5.1]), we only focus on the upper
bounds.
We begin with the value problem: given a payoff vector u for player A, we build the new
target set T̂ in polynomial time, and then use a classical algorithm for deciding whether
A has a winning strategy (see [23, Sect. 2.5.1]). If she does, then she can secure payoff u.
Consider now the constrained NE existence problem, and assume that the preference
relation for each player A is given by target sets (TAi )1≤i≤nA . The NP-algorithm consists
in guessing the payoff vector (vA)A∈Agt and an ultimately periodic play ρ = π · τ
ω with
|π|, |τ | ≤ |States|2, which, for each A, visits TAi if, and only if, v
A
i = 1. We then co-reduce
the payoff to a new target set T̂A(vA) for each player A.
The run ρ is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium with payoff (vA)A∈Agt for the original
preference relation if, and only if, ρ is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium with payoff 0 with
the single reachability objective T̂A(vA) for each A ∈ Agt. Indeed, in both cases, this is
equivalent to the property that no player A can enforce a payoff greater than vA. Applying
the algorithm presented in Section 5.1. this condition can be checked in polynomial time.

We now see to which ordered objectives this result applies. It is not difficult to realise
that the same transformations as those made in the proof of Lemma 6.5 can be made as
well for reachability objectives. We therefore get the following lemma, from which we get
the remaining results in Table 3.
Lemma 7.9. Ordered reachability objectives with disjunction or maximise preorders are
reducible to single reachability objectives. Ordered reachability objectives with disjunction,
maximise or subset preorders are co-reducible to single reachability objectives.
We conclude with stating the following corollary:
Corollary 7.10.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives, with either the disjunction or the
maximise preorder, the value problem is P-complete.
• For finite games with ordered reachability objectives, with either the disjunction, the max-
imise or the subset preorder, the NE existence problem and the constrained NE existence
problem are NP-complete.
8. Conclusion
Summary and impact of the results. Concurrent games are a natural class of games, ex-
tending classical turn-based games with more complex interactions. We have developed
a complete methodology, involving new techniques, for computing pure Nash equilibria in
this class of games. We were able to characterise the complexity of finding Nash equilibria
(possibly with constraints on the payoff) for simple qualitative objectives first (Section 5),
and then for semi-quantitative objectives (Section 6 and 7). We would like to point out
that the algorithm for Bu¨chi objectives with maximise preorder (see Section 6.2) has been
implemented in tool Praline9 [8]
9Available on http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Software/praline/
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We believe the methodology we have developed in this paper can be used in many
other contexts, and the suspect game is a very powerful tool that will allow to analyze
various properties of multi-agent systems. Indeed, the correspondence between pure Nash
equilibria in the original game and winning strategies in the suspect game holds with no
assumption on the structure of the game. In particular it can be applied to games given as
pushdown systems, counter systems, etc. Also it does not assume anything on the preference
relations, only the resulting winning condition in the suspect game can become very complex
if the preference relations are complex. Now the matter is just algorithmics, in that we
have to solve a two-player turn-based game in a potentially complex arena (if the original
game structure is complex) with a potentially complex winning condition (if the preference
relations are complex).
The suspect game construction can also be adapted to compute many other kinds of
equilibria; this is for instance applied to robust equilibria in [9]. We believe this can be used
in many other contexts.
We have also developed in this paper another tool that might have its own interest and
be useful in some other contexts: the game-simulation (see Section 5.7.1). We used this
tool several times (for handling objectives given by deterministic Rabin automata, but also
for handling ordered reachability objectives). This tool can also be used to handle more
complex game structures, like we did in [5] for timed games, when we originally introduced
this notion. In particular, the construction done in [5] shows that we can compute Nash
equilibria for timed games with all kinds of objectives studied in the current paper.
Our future researches will include extending the use of the suspect game abstraction for
other families of games, and to push it further to also handle truly quantitative objectives.
Discussion on the various hypotheses made in this paper. We have assumed strategies are
pure, and game structures are deterministic. This is indeed a restriction, and allowing for
randomised strategies would be of great interest. Note however that pure Nash equilibria are
resistant to malicious randomised players (that is, to deviations by randomised strategies).
There is no obvious way to modify the suspect game construction to handle either stochastic
game structures or randomised strategies. Indeed, given a history, it is hard to detect
strategy deviations if they can be randomised, and therefore the set of suspects is hard to
compute (and actually even define). This difficulty is non-surprising, since the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in pure or randomised strategies is undecidable for stochastic games with
reachability or Bu¨chi objectives [42], and the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised
strategies is undecidable for deterministic games [41]. However we would like to exhibit
subclasses of stochastic games for which we can synthesize randomised Nash equilibria, this
is part of our research programme.
We have assumed that strategies are based on histories that only record states which
have been visited, and not actions which have been played. We believe this is more relevant
in the context of distributed systems, where only the effect of an action might be visible
to other players. Furthermore, this framework is more general than the one where every
player could see the actions of the other players, since the latter can easily be encoded in
the former. In the context of complete information (precise view of the actions), computing
Nash equilibria is rather easy since, once a player has deviated from the equilibrium, all
the other players know it and can make a coalition against that player. To illustrate that
simplification, we only mention that the constrained NE existence problem falls in NP for
finite games with single parity objectives (we can obtain this bound based on the suspect
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game construction), if we assume that strategies can observe actions, whereas the problem
is PNP‖ -hard if strategies do not observe the actions.
Finally we have chosen the framework of concurrent games, and not that of turn-based
games as is often the case in the literature. Concurrent games naturally appear when
studying timed games [5] (the semantics of a timed game is that of a concurrent game,
and the abstraction based on regions that is correct for timed games is concurrent), and in
the context of distributed systems, concurrent moves are also very natural. In fact turn-
based games are even a simpler case of concurrent games when we assume strategies can
see the actions. Of course, the suspect game construction applies to turn-based games,
but becomes quite simple (as is the case if strategies do see actions), since the set of
suspect players is either the set Agt of all players (this is the case as long as no player
has deviated from the equilibrium), or reduces to a singleton, as soon as a player has
deviated. To illustrate this simplification, we notice that in the turn-based finite games,
the constrained NE existence problem is NP-complete for single parity objectives [40] (it is
PNP‖ -complete in finite concurrent games).
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5.2
We show PSPACE-hardness of the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium for various
kinds of qualitative objectives, using an encoding of the satisfiability of a QSAT formula
ψ = ∀x1. ∃x2. . . . ∀xp−1. ∃xp.
∧
1≤i≤n ci, where each ci is of the form ℓi,1 ∨ ℓi,2 ∨ ℓi,3 and
ℓi,j ∈ {xk,¬xk | 1 ≤ k ≤ p}.
We construct a game Gψ = 〈States,Agt,Act,Mov,Tab, (-A)A∈Agt〉 as follows: States =
{u,w} ∪
⋃
k∈[[1,p]]{sk, tk, fk, dk, ek}∪
⋃
i∈[[1,n]]{bi, ci}; Agt = {Eve}∪
⋃
k∈[[1,p]]{Ak, Bk}; Act =
{0, 1, 2}. We now define the transition table (the structure of the game is represented in
Figure 26).
s1
t1
f1
s2
t2
f2
. . . sp
tp
fp
b1
b2
. . .
bn
c1
c2
. . .
cn
d(ℓ1,1)
d(ℓ1,2)
d(ℓ1,3)
. . .
w
u
Figure 26. Encoding of a QSAT formula into a game with succinct repre-
sentation of the transition formula. Dotted edges correspond to the strategy
profile that in each states selects action 0 for every player.
• If k ≤ p is odd, then in state sk, the transition function is given by:
10
(( ⊗
1≤k′≤p
(Ak′ = 1)⊗
⊗
1≤k′≤p,k′ 6=k
(Bk′ = 1), tk
)
,
( ⊗
1≤k′≤p,k′ 6=k
(Ak′ = 0)⊗
⊗
1≤k′≤p
(Bk′ = 0), fk
)
,
(
⊤, u
))
In the first part, the coalition of all the players except Eve and Bk takes the decision to
go to tk, and any of those players can switch her action and enforce state tk (meaning
that xk is set to true); if the move to state tk is not chosen, then the coalition of all
players except Eve and Ak takes the decision to go to fk, and any of those players can
switch her action and enforce state fk (meaning that xk is set to false); otherwise the
game goes to state u.
In states tk and fk, the transition function is (⊤, sk+1).
• If k ≤ p is even, then in state sk the transition function is given by ((Eve = 1, tk), (⊤, fk)):
Eve decides the value of variable xk (state tk corresponds to setting xk to true, and
state fk corresponds to setting variable xk to false).
10The operator
⊗
evaluates the parity of the number of subformulas that are true:
⊗g
h=1 αh is true iff
|{αh | αh evaluates to true}| is odd.
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In state tk, the transition function is given by(( ∨
1≤k′≤p
(Ak′ = 1) ∨
∨
1≤k′≤p,k′ 6=k
(Bk′ = 1), sk+1
)
,
(
⊤, u
))
with sp+1 = b1: any player except Eve and Bk can decide to go to state sk+1 by playing
action 1; otherwise the game proceeds to state u. Intuitively, any of the above players
can “validate” the previous choice of Eve having set xk to true.
In state fk, the transition function is given by(( ∨
1≤k′≤p,k′ 6=k
(Ak′ = 0) ∨
∨
1≤k′≤p
(Bk′ = 0), sk+1
)
,
(
⊤, u
))
with sp+1 = b1: any player except Eve and Ak can decide to go to state sk+1 by playing
action 1; otherwise the game proceeds to state u. Intuitively, any of the above players
can “validate” the previous choice of Eve having set xk to false.
• If i ≤ n, in bi, the transition function is given by(( ⊗
1≤k≤p
((Ak = 1)⊗ (Bk = 1)), ci
)
,
(
⊤, bi+1
))
with bn+1 = u. Intuitively the coalition of all players except Eve can decide to go to
state ci, which will mean that they want to check the truth of clause ci. Moreover, any
of those players can switch her action and decide by her own to check this clause.
• If i ≤ n, in ci, the transition function is given by((
Eve = 1, d(ℓi,1)
)
,
(
Eve = 2, d(ℓi,2)
)
,
(
⊤, d(ℓi,3)
))
where for all 1 ≤ k ≤ p, d(xk) = dk and d(¬xk) = ek. Intuitively Eve proves the current
clause is satisfied by pointing to the literal which is set to true.
In state dk (1 ≤ k ≤ p), the transition function is given by
(
(Bk = 1, w), (⊤, u)
)
.
Player Bk decides to go to u or w.
In state ek (1 ≤ k ≤ p), the transition function is given by
(
(Ak = 1, w), (⊤, u)
)
.
Intuitively, in the game we have just defined, Eve will be in charge of properly choosing
the value of the existentially quantified variables in ψ. The value of the variables will be
given by the history (visiting tk means variable xk is set to true, whereas visiting fk means
variable xk is set to false). Then, player Ak will be in charge of witnessing that variable xk
is set to true, whereas player Bk will be in charge of witnessing that variable xk is set to
false. Their role will be clearer in the proof.
The objective for each player Ak, Bk is to reach state w, and for Eve to reach state u.
This is naturally a reachability objectives but can also be encoded as a Bu¨chi objective or
a safety objective where the goal is to avoid state u for Ak and Bk, and avoid v for Eve.
We will show that there is a Nash equilibrium in Gψ where Eve wins if, and only if, ψ
is valid.
Before switching to the proof of this equivalence, we define a correspondence between
(partial) valuations and histories in the game. with a partial valuation v : {x1, . . . , xk} →
{true, false}, we associate the history h(v) = s1w1s2w2 . . . wksk+1 where for all 1 ≤ k
′ ≤ k,
wk′ = tk′ (resp. wk′ = fk′) if v(xk′) = true (resp. v(xk′) = false). Conversely with
every history h in Gψ, we associate the partial valuation vh : {x1, . . . , xk} → {true, false}
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such that state sk+1 (with sp+1 = b1) is the latest such state appearing along h, and
vh(xk′) = true (resp. false) if h visits tk′ (resp. fk′), for all 1 ≤ k
′ ≤ k.
Assume formula ψ is valid. For all players Ak and Bk we set strategies σAk and σBk
to always play action 2. We now turn to the strategy for Eve. Consider a history h =
s1 · · ·wk−1 ·sk where k < p is odd. Let v
′ be the valuation where v′(xk′) = vh(xk′) for all k
′ <
k, and v′(xk) = 1. We set σEve(h) to be 1 if v
′ makes the formula ∀xk+1. . . . ∃xp.
∧
1≤i≤n ci
valid, and 0 otherwise. Since ψ is valid, one of the two choices makes the rest of the formula
true. This ensures that a history that reaches b1 and that is compatible with σEve will define
a valuation that makes
∧
1≤i≤n ci true. Fix a history h that is compatible with σEve and
ends up in some state ci: the strategy of Eve is to go to d(ℓi,j) where the literal ℓi,j makes
the clause ci true under valuation vh. For all other histories, we set the strategy of Eve to
be 2.
We show that the strategy profile σAgt = (σEve, (σAk , σBk)1≤k≤p) is a Nash equilibrium.
First notice that the outcome of σAgt is s1 · u (since all players Ak and Bk play action 2):
Eve wins, and all the other players lose. We now describe interesting deviating strategies
for the players Ak or Bk:
• Consider a deviating strategy σ′Ak for player Ak: let h ∈ Out
f(σAgt[Ak 7→ σ
′
Ak
]); if
σ′Ak(h) = 2, then Out(σAgt[Ak 7→ σ
′
Ak
]) ends up in state u; therefore an interesting
deviating strategy should choose some value 0 or 1 after any history. Now if k′ is odd
with k′ 6= k, then from sk′, player Ak can choose to go to tk′ (action 1) or fk′ (action 0).
If k is odd, then the only way not to end up in u from sk is to choose action 1 which leads
to state tk. Now at state tk′ with k
′ even, σ′Ak should validate the choice of Eve (that is,
play action 1 in tk′ – meaning that variable xk′ has value true). At state fk′ with k
′ even,
if k′ 6= k, σ′Ak should validate the choice of Eve (that is, play action 0 in fk′ – meaning
that variable xk′ has value false). At state fk if k is even, nothing can be done which
could be profitable to player Ak: state u will be reached.
• A similar reasoning can be done for player Bk: the only difference is at state sk when k
is odd, where player Bk can only choose action 0 and go through fk.
• In the part of the game after b1, each player can deviate and choose to go to some state ci;
this choice will be made for checking the truth of clause ci under the valuation that has
been fixed by the history so far.
Consider a deviation of some player that moves to ci, and write h for the corresponding
history up to state ci. The strategy of Eve after h is to go to d(ℓi,j) where ℓi,j sets ci
to true under valuation vh. If d(ℓi,j) = xk, then (a) this means that vh(xk) = true, and
(b) the next state is controlled by player Bk. Using the characterization of interesting
deviating strategies above, it cannot be the case that player Bk is the deviating player
since from tk (which is visited by h), if only Bk deviates, the game unavoidably goes to
state u. Hence, for every strategy σ′Bk for player Bk, history h cannot be an outcome of
σAgt[Bk 7→ σ
′
Bk
]. In particular, no deviation of player Bk can lead to state w. Similarly, if
d(ℓi,j) = ¬xm, the outcome ends up in u. In other words, each time a player other than Eve
changes her strategy, the outcome ends up in u, yielding no improvement for the player.
Hence no player can improve her outcome by changing unilaterally her strategy, which
shows that the strategy profile σAgt is a Nash equilibrium where Eve wins.
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Now assume there is a Nash equilibrium σAgt in which Eve wins. Let v be a valuation
such that for every 2 ≤ k′ ≤ p even,
(σEve(h(v|{x1,...,xk′−1})) = 1)⇔ (v(xk′) = true) (#)
where v|{x1,...,xk′−1} is the valuationv restricted to {x1, . . . , xk′−1}. We show the following
two properties:
• if v(xk) = true then there is a strategy σ
′
Ak
for Ak s.t. h(v) ∈ Out
f(σAgt[Ak 7→ σ
′
Ak
]);
• if v(xk) = false then there is a strategy σ
′
Bk
for Bk s.t. h(v) ∈ Out
f(σAgt[Bk 7→ σ
′
Bk
]).
We show the result by induction on the number of atomic propositions. For zero atomic
propositions, the result obviously holds. Assume the result holds for atomic propositions
{x1, . . . , xh−1} (h ≤ p). Let v be a valuation over {x1, . . . , xh}, and k such that v(xk) is
true. Define v′ as the restriction of v to atomic propositions {x1, . . . , xh−1}. By induction
hypothesis, h(v′) = s1 · w1 · · ·wh−1 · sh is an outcome of some strategy σ
′
Ak
for player Ak.
• If h is odd. Let mAgt = σAgt(h(v
′)). We set σ′Ak(h(v
′)) to be 1 if
⊗
1≤k′≤p,k′≤k(mAk′ =
1)⊗
⊗
1≤k′≤p,k′ 6=k(mBk′ = 1) is different from v(xh), and to be 0 otherwise. Then we have
that the next state is th if, and only if, v(xh) is true.
• If h is even, then the state after sh (actually after h(v
′)) is th if v(xh) is true, and fh
otherwise, and this cannot be changed by player Ak. Then in th and fh we set σ
′
Ak
(h(v′)th)
(resp. σ′Ak(h(v
′)fh)) to be 1. Note that since v(xk) is true we cannot reach fk, hence
setting the action of Ak in those states to 1 always ensures that the next state is sh+1.
This shows that h(v) ∈ Outf(σAgt[Ak 7→ σ
′
Ak
]) for some strategy σ′Ak .
The second property can be proven similarly for player Bk.
Let v be a valuation satisfying condition (#). We show that ψ evaluates to true under
that valuation. Let ci be a clause of ψ, and let j = σEve(h(v) · b1 · · · bl · cl). We show
that v(ℓi,j) = true, which means that ci evaluates to true under v. This will show that
formula ψ is valid since condition (#) defines sufficiently many witness valuations. Assume
w.l.o.g. that ℓi,j = xk. Assume towards a contradiction that v(xk) = false. We have proven
that there is a strategy σ′Bk for player Bk such that h(v) ·b1 · · · bi ·ci ∈ Out
f(σAgt[Bk 7→ σ
′
Bk
]).
Now, the state xk is controlled by player Bk, so Bk can enforce a visit to w from xk, so
there is a strategy σ′′Bk for player Bk such that h(v) · b1 · · · bl · cl ·xk ∈ Out
f(σAgt[Bk 7→ σ
′′
Bk
]).
This contradicts the fact that σAgt is a Nash equilibrium. We conclude that v(xk) = true,
and we conclude that ψ is valid (as explained above). 
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